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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Summary
Trust is an ambiguous concept. Most of this ambiguity is produced by the fact
that trust (such as, e.g., love) is a naïve concept: every human being possesses
a rough and pre-theoretical notion of trust and, to apply it, they often rely on
their guts feelings, rather than objective evaluations. For instance, even though
not advisable, there seems to be no particular problem with the sentence: “I
don’t know why, but I feel I can trust him.”, uttered by someone placing
his trust in a complete stranger. This fact produces the unpleasant effect of
not having a general meaning of trust on which everyone agrees, since each
individual attaches a specific meaning to the concept based on their personal
experiences and, more importantly, on their moral and ethical status and
upbringing. A further source of ambiguity is generated by the fact that trust
is a wide concept, applicable in different contexts with meanings that can vary
greatly. When someone utters: “I trust you are enjoying your summer.”, she
has a quite different meaning in mind compared to when she utters: “I trust
you will complete the task in time.”; the former sentence expressing hope,
while the latter expressing a form of belief on the abilities of the other agent.
Coupling those two facts together (trust naïve and multi-purpose nature),
it comes with no surprise that in everyday life there is a plethora of different
interpretations surrounding the concept of trust. Per se, this doesn’t produce
any specific problems: in natural languages there are many concepts which
do not have a precise meaning and, after all, the word “trust” is employed
on a daily basis by many agents without particular difficulties. This is due
to the fact that in ordinary interactions, context identification and physical
cues can help disambiguating the various meanings of the concepts employed
and, when they don’t, further enquiries and repeated interactions make it
possible for groups of agents to agree on common meanings. However, the
multifaceted nature of trust becomes problematic when the plethora of inter-
pretations is carried over to formal settings. If two political economists discuss
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some national policy which involves trust, but they do not realize that they
are not sharing a common meaning for the notion, then it is very unlikely that
they will settle on the correct way of implementing the policy. This is indeed
what happens with the concept of trust. Different disciplines conceptualize
trust differently and, often, inside the same discipline, it is possible to find
highly different conceptualizations. The most straightforward example is that
of economy, where:
“ [T]rust is defined by some as a characteristic of a particular class
of action, while others identify it as a precondition for any such
action to take place. At the same time, some discuss trust with
reference to governments and organisations, while others examine
trust between individuals or people in particular roles. ” [39]
Another example is that of (the security fragment of) computer science:
with the gradual transition of social interactions from face-to-face to digital
environments, the importance of having a digital counterpart of trust con-
tributed to the emergence of numerous theoretical analyses of the notion,
which, instead of fostering a unified account, produced a potpourri of defini-
tions with different domains of application and different levels of abstraction.
This is a pressing issue for computer scientists who desire to build general
frameworks for digital systems which include a trust component: different
definitions of trust might have drastically different effects on the frameworks
and thus, might produce incompatible digital systems. This calls for a unified
formal account of the notion of trust and a formal framework which embody
this formal notion. With such structures in hand, a computer scientist would
be able to construct general frameworks which can reproduce and imitate so-
cial environments better and, thus, promote interactions of a higher quality
on the web.
The focus of this thesis is, therefore, that of forming a set of core features
of socio-economical notions of trust. From there, the aim is to build a com-
putational counterpart of the notion, which does justice to previous attempts
of formalising trust in computer science. This computational counterpart is
then employed to build gradually more powerful formal languages which al-
low reasoning about trust. The main properties of those formal languages
are analysed and, finally, comparisons are made with other models which are
employed to model trust in computer science.
1.2 Scope
This thesis doesn’t belong to a single discipline. In line with the definition of
complexity science (which characterizes the curriculum under which this thesis
was produced), i.e., “an emerging approach to research, complexity science is
a study of a system. It is not a single theory, but a collection of theories
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and conceptual tools from an array of disciplines.” [129], the thesis employs
different techniques and explores different disciplines in order to achieve the
result of providing a good formal definition of trust.
In the first part, the concept of trust is inspected through a philosophically-
oriented conceptual analysis based on literature data from the disciplines of
biological evolution, economy and the social sciences. This part is therefore a
work in the field of philosophy of science.
In the second part, the emphasis shifts to computer science models of trust,
which are classified following both a qualitative analysis of the core features
attributed to trust in each model, and a quantitative analysis of the relevance
of the models in the literature, based on number of citations. Theoretical
attention is also paid to paradigms in the computational trust literature, which
define the main characteristics of computational environments in which trust is
implemented. This part is therefore a work in the field of theoretical computer
science.
In the third part, after a brief introduction to modal logic, a proper logical
language is built based on the results of the previous chapters and theorems
about the decidability of the computational problems of the language are given.
This part if therefore a work in the fields of formal methods and computational
logic.
In the fourth and final part, the logical language presented in the third
part is compared to other models employed to represent trust and uncertainty
(placing emphasis on models suited for applications in security systems). Sim-
ilarities and differences are pinpointed and fusions between them are proposed.
This part is therefore a work in the field of computer science and formal mod-
elling.
It is important to note, that the intended scope of the thesis is here explic-
itly presented just to give the reader a general idea of what were the approaches
followed during the various analyses made. This is fully compatible (if not even
desirable) with the fact that most results are open to interpretation and are
applicable to other fields, other than the ones imagined by the author. In this
spirit, the wider scope of the thesis should be taken to be that of all fields
which can benefit from implementations of formal structures for trust.
1.3 Objectives and Methodology
As was mentioned at the end of the previous section (see section 1.2), the
wider aim of the thesis is that of providing a unified formal definition of trust
employable in all fields which can benefit from formal implementations of the
notion. In this sense, there are three main objectives in the thesis: 1) To
provide a thorough conceptual analysis of the concept of trust, comprising
reflections from all major fields which focused (at least part of) their attention
on it; 2) to employ such analysis to build a logical language that can help
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to describe and reason about trust and its relationship with other cognitive
notions (e.g., beliefs and knowledge); 3) to produce an account of trust in the
computer science literature and compare existing models for trust with the
semantical structure for the logical language presented in the thesis.
Objective one is a philosophical one and it is carried out both through a
meta-analysis of existing literature on trust and armchair reflection on such
meta-analysis. First, a possible explanation for the origin of trust is proposed,
starting from studies on reciprocal altruism [126] in biological systems and
extending those with socio-biological studies. Second, seminal papers on trust
in economy and sociology are examined, in order to extract some common
features of trust recognized by both communities. Those features, it is ar-
gued, form a solid core for a general definition of trust. Third, the conceptual
analysis is extended to the field of computer science: classical models of com-
putational trust are surveyed and a second set of features is obtained. Those
two set of features are then compared, in order to determine whether com-
puter scientists are building reliable models for trust. Once the affinities and
differences between the economical/sociological and the computational con-
ceptions of trust are highlighted, conclusions are drawn and improvements are
proposed.
Objective two is a logical one and it is carried out through a logical con-
struction of an interpretative semantical structure for a novel logical language
for trust. First, previous attempts to formalize trust are introduced, with em-
phasis on their advantages and disadvantages. Second, gradually more pow-
erful logical languages are introduced, with their respective truth-theoretical
semantical structures. The final language (i.e. a context-sensitive, single-agent
logical trust language), which is the most expressive between those presented,
is thoroughly analysed. The analysis will consist in proofs of the computa-
tional decidability problems for the language.
Objective three is a computer science one and it is carried out through
comparison between existing models for the representation of trust and uncer-
tainty, and the semantical resources introduced for the logical language at the
centre of this thesis: in particular, bridges are built with Subjective Logic [59]
and Dempster-Shafer Theory of Evidence [29, 116]. It is then shown how the
logical language proposed can complement those formal models for trust and
which benefits each bring to the other. This might help to obtain fruitful trust
models employable in computational environments.
1.4 Contributions
The contributions of this thesis are classified according to the list of objectives
presented in the previous section (see section 1.3).
For objective one, the results obtained are:
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1. A proposal for the origins of trust, based on biological and anthropolog-
ical reflections.
2. A conceptual analysis of the concept of trust in economy and sociology,
based on a general survey of seminal economical and sociological papers
on trust.
3. The construction of a solid core of features for trust, based on socio-
economic considerations.
4. A meta-analysis of existing computational trust models.
5. The construction of a taxonomy for computational trust models, useful
for the classification of different formal models of trust.
6. A thorough comparison between the core features of a socio-economical
conception and a computational conception of trust.
For objective two, the results obtained are:
1. The introduction of two different logical languages, of increasing expres-
sivity, for describing and reasoning about trust. Syntax and semantical
structures are proposed for each of the languages.
2. The proofs for the decidability problems for the second language.
For objective three, the results obtained are:
1. The presentation of bridge theorems between the semantical structures
introduce in the thesis and existing formal structures for the represen-
tation of trust and uncertainty.
2. Some reflections on the possibility of merging different formal structures
together to obtain more powerful structures.
1.5 Organization
The thesis is organized in chapters and sections as follows.
For chapter two (2):
• In section one (2.1), an initial classification of the dimensions character-
izing trust is introduced.
• In section two (2.2), a possible explanation for the origins of trust is
presented.
• In section three (2.3), an economical/sociological analysis of the concept
of trust is presented.
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• In section four (2.4), conclusions are drawn for the previous sections and
a unified set of core features of trust is proposed.
For chapter three (3):
• In section one (3.1), a justification for the need of computational notions
of trust in the computer science community is provided.
• In section two (3.2), a meta-analysis of existing surveys about differ-
ent models for computational trust is made. A taxonomy is built for
classifying computational trust models.
• In section three (3.3), representative classical computational trust mod-
els are selected. Those models are analysed and core features of a com-
putational conception of trust are determined.
• In section four (3.4), conclusions are drawn and the features of the socio-
economic conception and the computational conception of trust are com-
pared.
• In section five (3.5), some theoretical paradigms used to set assumptions
on the environments in which computational trust models are imple-
mented are analysed.
For chapter four (4):
• In section one (4.1), prerequisite notions needed for the construction of
the logical languages are introduced: in particular modal logic based on
neighborhood structures is introduced.
• In section two (4.2), the syntax and semantics of a context-free, single-
agent logical language for trust are given.
• In section three (4.3), the syntax and semantics of a context-sensitive,
single-agent logical language for trust are given.
• In section four (4.4), decidability results for the language presented in
section 4.4 are proved.
For chapter five (5):
• In section one (5.1), Subjective Logic is analysed and bridge theorems are
given between the logical languages of chapter 4 and Subjective Logic.
• In section two (5.2), Dempster-Shafer Theory of Evidence is analysed
and bridge theorems between it and the logical languages of chapter 4
are given and proved.
General conclusions follow.
Chapter 2
Conceptual analysis of trust
In this chapter, seminal papers on the concept of trust belonging to different
disciplines are selected and then analysed. The aim is that of obtaining a set
of features common to all those definitions provided in the different disciplines.
This common ground is thought to be a useful starting point for further re-
flections on trust and can provide valuable insights on necessary conditions
for the presence of trust in any kind of system. The chapter starts by pre-
senting different dimensions which can characterize trust. Those dimensions
are inspired by multi-disciplinary reports about trust [110, 111, 117] and the
relevant bibliographical elements of those reports [106, 130, 131]. After the
conceptual map of trust is built, a possible explanation for the evolution of
trust in biological and anthropological systems is proposed: this should be
thought of as a purely rational (as opposed to empirical) hypothesis on the
way trust originated. Understanding where trust might have come from can
provide important insights on how trust can be formed in contemporary com-
plex systems and what to expect from behaviours generating from trustful
relationships. The chapter then proceeds with economical and sociological
analyses of trust. The main reason for choosing those two disciplines is the
importance of trust for them. In economy, trust is mainly thought to be an
enabling factor in exchanges [6, 105], improving the quantity and quality of in-
teractions between agents. In sociology, trust is seen as an element permitting
the actual existence of society and of social relationships [82, 119]. Given the
centrality of the notion of exchange/interaction in economy and that of society
in sociology, it is evident why having a clear definition of trust can improve
the quality of research in those fields. Those reasons justify the existence of
this chapter, which attempts at giving a unified conceptual treatment of trust.
Indeed, given the facts expressed above (the fundamental importance of trust
in sociology and economy) it should be expected that general treatments of
the concept of trust already exist. However, as Gambetta notes:
“ [T]he importance of trust is often acknowledged but seldom ex-
amined, and scholars tend to mention it in passing, to allude to it as
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a fundamental ingredient or lubricant, an unavoidable dimension
of social interaction, only to move on to deal with less intractable
matters. ” [40]
This fact, true at the end of the ’80, when Gambetta edited his volume,
swiftly changed in the ’90, when various disciplines started to focus their at-
tention on trust, which moved from being an elusive notion to becoming a
key issue to address. Yet, despite the common understanding of the impor-
tance of the notion, the close attention paid to the concept of trust produced
more confusion than clarity. Suddenly, a proliferation of definitions flooded
the different disciplines, making it progressively implausible to find common
grounds on trust in those disciplines (if not even intra-disciplines). Therefore,
in order to achieve the aim of the chapter (i.e., that of obtaining an unified set
of features for trust), attention will be paid on pioneering works on trust and
contemporary literature, extracting the features which defined the concept of
trust employed in those researches.
In section one, a conceptual map of trust is given, with the aim of providing
a guide for the conceptualizations of different analyses of trust. In section two,
a tentative proposal on the origins of trust is developed; data is taken from
biology and ethology, and the method followed is the one typical of conceptual
analysis. In section three, trust is analysed from the point-of-view of economy
and sociology. Finally, in section four, a tentative set of common features
of trust is given; such set is formed based on the reflections of all previous
sections.
2.1 Conceptual map of trust
Navigating through the various definitions of trust given in the different disci-
plines can be a burdensome task. First of all, disciplines as diverse as sociol-
ogy [9, 23, 40, 82], economy [28, 36, 114, 133], political science [53, 54, 78] and
evolutionary biology [10, 126, 127] dedicated some of their attention to trust,
obviously prioritizing their specific needs and using their typical examination
techniques. This produced many theoretical definitions of trust which diverge
on the technical language employed to express the definitions and the princi-
pal features that are highlighted by those. This section is aimed at producing
a conceptual map which can help the novice reader in his navigation. The
map (which can be seen in figure 2.1) is constructed around three dimensions
which characterize trust and it is claimed that all definitions of trust (already
existing or future ones) eventually fall under a specific quadrant of the map.
The map is taken from [110] and its dimensions are discussed with reference to
the original authors who introduced them. Specifically, the three dimensions
regard the nature of : i) the actual trust relation; ii) the agents’ trusted; iii)
the context in which to trust.
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Figure 2.1: Conceptual map of trust dimensions.
The first dimension, indicated in [110] as the how dimension, distinguishes
between trust definitions that are strategic and those that are moralistic. A
strategic definition [23, 53, 54] of trust identifies the phenomenon of trusting
as one depending on explicit knowledge and explicit computations about the
interacting party’s trustworthiness, intentions and capacities. On the other
hand, a moralistic definition [85, 130, 131] of trust identifies the phenomenon
of trusting as a by-product of an agent’s moral and ethical upbringing and
consequently it depends on his psychological predispositions as defined by
social norms and the values of the agent’s culture. Where strategic trust can
be described by the motto: Agent A trusts agent B to do X ; moralistic trust
is simply described by saying that: agent A trusts. This dimension of trust is
absolutely important to discussions concerning the notion, inasfar as strategic
definitions of trust presuppose that, for agent A to trust agent B, repeated
encounters between the agents are necessary and, moreover, agent A must
possesses the computational powers to compute trustworthiness values. Even
though plausible, those assumptions are suited only for small communities
and apply to a small number of interactions and thus, strategic trust can’t
account for all the transactions and collaborations that occur in ordinary life.
Moralistic versions of trust are designed to overcome this downside of strategic
trust. If trust is produced as a moral commandment (similar in spirit to Kant’s
categorical imperative [68]), then even complete strangers might initiate a trust
relationship. In the case of moralistic trust, it is the culture of the trustor that
determines whether or not he will trust someone else and past experiences with
the trustee are neither required nor important.
The second dimension, indicated in [110] as the whom dimension, distin-
guishes between trust definitions that are particular and those that are general.
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A particular definition of trust identifies the phenomenon of trusting as a one-
to-one relation, where trust can only be placed on specific individuals. In
particular, the individuals that are considered to be trust bearers are those on
whom the trustor has a fair amount of information, such as, e.g., family mem-
bers, friends or colleagues. On the other hand, a general definition of trust
identifies the phenomenon of trusting as a one-to-many relation, where trust
can be placed also on anonymous individuals or strangers and such that there
is no specific task or context of evaluation. In such a case, it might be said
that trust is considered as an omnicomprehensive attitude towards a specific
group of individuals (often those attitudes are determined by stereotypical
categories). This dimension has an obvious relation with the first one: moral-
istic trust seem to lend well to general trust, while strategic trust is strictly
tied to particular trust. However, those links are not absolute, leaving open
the possibility for strategic general trust and moralistic particular trust. The
former case is typical of views in which trust is seen as a stereotype, while the
latter identifies views for which agents are morally inclined to cooperate (and
therefore trust) close relatives and known others.
The third, and final, dimension, indicated in [110] as the what dimension,
distinguishes between trust definitions that are simplex and those that are
multiplex. A simplex definition of trust identifies the phenomenon of trusting
as being context-specific, where trust is granted according to a specific task.
On the other hand, a multiplex definition of trust identifies the phenomenon
of trusting as being context-free, where agents trust other agents without con-
sidering any specific issue or scenario of evaluation. In the former case, trust
is evaluated on a case-by-case basis and the same two agents might trust each
other in specific contexts and refuse to do so in different situations. Given the
variety of different scenarios that might happen in the real world, the assump-
tion that trust is context-specific seem to be a suitable one for a good definition
of trust. However, it is important to note that there are times in which an
agent trusts others blindly, independently from all context considerations. For
instance, a child trusts his parents blindly1. Moreover, even admitting that
pure multiplex phenomenon of trust are impossible (independently from how
much you trust someone, that someone might not be able to perform given
actions, e.g., piloting a plane and thus he shall not be trusted in such con-
texts), it is still plausible that mild-versions of multiplex trust exist, where
trust is granted with respect to a set of contexts sharing some core features,
rather than a single ones. It is, however, open to debate whether those kinds
of multiplex trust are genuinely multiplex or just a combination of multiple
simplex trust evaluations.
Given the three dimensions introduced, it is possible to allocate trust def-
initions into eight different categories (in figure 2.1 each quadrant represents
1Note that some authors might claim that the child isn’t actually trusting the parents,
since he has no choice other than relying on them.
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a category). Each category correspond to a given idea of what is trust. In
particular, the categories are the following:
1. Strategic particular simplex trust: trust is seen as a specific belief
about another person’s reliability on a specific issue.
2. Strategic general simplex trust: trust is seen as a specific expecta-
tion about strangers’ reliability on a specific issue.
3. Strategic particular multiplex trust: trust is seen as a specific belief
about another person’s reliability in general.
4. Strategic general multiplex trust: trust is seen as a specific expec-
tation about strangers’ reliability in general.
5. Moralistic particular simplext trust: trust is seen as a general trust-
ing attitude towards specific individuals in specific circumstances.
6. Moralistic general simplex trust: trust is seen as a general trusting
attitude towards strangers in specific circumstances.
7. Moralistic particular multiplex trust: trust is seen as a general
trusting attitude towards specific individuals.
8. Moralistic general multiplex trust: trust is seen as a general trusting
attitude towards strangers.
This conceptual map will help all further discussion on trust, by allowing
the indication of a specific class to which definitions that will be introduced
from now on belong to.
2.2 The origins of trust: a tentative proposal
In this section, a tentative proposal on the origins of trust is developed. The
section is structured as follows: i) first, a proposal on the biological evolution
of trust is formulated based on biological researches [10, 126, 127]; ii) second,
some experimental data on what actions and situations foster or reduce trust
are reviewed [25, 42, 89, 90]; iii) finally, the proposal is confronted with the
experimental data, in order to establish its plausibility.
The proposal presented can be summarized as follows: Reciprocal altruism
led to the development of trust relationships. Note that this proposal is not a
completely original one2; as noted by Bateson:
2A similar idea to the one presented here can be found in [74] and [99].
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“ . . . questions about the evolution of cooperation do not bear di-
rectly on the issue of trust, though they may give pause to any-
one who supposes that trust is required for effective cooperation
. . . Even though the study of cooperation in animals seems irrel-
evant to an understanding of trust in humans, careful analysis of
the conditions in which cooperative behaviour is expressed sug-
gests that many animals are exquisitely sensitive to the behaviour
of others. This observation suggests an explanation for the evo-
lution of the mental state that we recognize as trust in ourselves.
” [10]
Bateman suggests that the existence and evolution of cooperative be-
haviours can provide valuable insights into the development of the mental
state of trust in human beings. The idea presented in this thesis is similar
in spirit, even though the focus is placed on reciprocal altruism specifically
instead of cooperative behaviour in general: the former defining sets of ac-
tions where who performs the action incurs in a loss, while the recipient of the
action benefits, while the latter defining sets of actions where both the actor
and the recipient benefit from the actions performed [47].
It is held that, once it is established that reciprocal altruism is compatible
with and favoured by natural selection, trust can be seen as a psychological
trait developed to sustain human reciprocal altruism behaviour, i.e., trust
helps in perpetuating the advantageous behaviour over less optimal options
(e.g., cheating behaviours). Thus, trust is a specific mechanism developed
in order to categorize others according to their propensity towards reciprocal
altruism behaviours.
2.2.1 Reciprocal altruism
In Trivers [126], a model which explains the evolution of reciprocal altruism
is presented. Notably, the model shows how altruistic behaviours in different
species can be evolutionarily selected for even in cases where kin selection [47]
can be ruled out (i.e., when close relationships are not present between the
agents involved in the actions). To achieve his goal, Trivers presents some rel-
evant conditions that explain the possibility of selecting altruistic behaviours
on the basis of reciprocation. The conditions identified are three: 1) pres-
ence of many altruistic situations in the lifetime of the altruists; 2) repeated
interactions between a given altruist and the same small set of individuals;
3) symmetrical expositions to altruistic situations for each couple of altruists.
The claim is that if those conditions are fulfilled, an agent will dispense altru-
ism based on the tendencies of the recipient agent, rather than on kinship or
randomly. Formally, this is equivalent to the claim that, when the conditions
hold, the following inequality is true:
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bm) (2.1)
Where 1
p2
and 1
q2
can be interpreted respectively as the frequency in the
population of altruistically behaving and of non-altruistically behaving indi-
viduals; bk is the benefit for the altruist of the kth altruistic act performed
towards him; cj is the cost for the altruist of the jth altruistic act he performs
and bm is the benefit for the non-altruist (an agent who won’t reciprocate) of
the mth altruistic act performed towards him. Two further assumptions are
required in order for the conditions to influence the truth of the inequality:
i) the altruist stops behaving altruistically with the non-altruist once he finds
out that the latter doesn’t reciprocate3; ii) the cost of performing an altruistic
action for the actor is lower than the benefit gained by the recipient of the ac-
tion, thus producing a net gain for the whole system. After individuating the
three conditions necessary for the validity of the inequation, Trivers proceeds
to elaborate such conditions into a set of relevant biological traits which affect
the selection of altruism over non-altruism. He identifies, in particular, six
traits: a) length of lifetime; b) dispersal rate; c) degree of mutual dependence;
d) parental care; e) dominance hierarchy; f) aid in combat. Since trait (d)
can be seen as a special case of trait (c), and trait (f) is specific only of sit-
uations in which combative scenarios are plausible, only four of the six traits
are analysed.
a) Length of lifetime: The longer individuals of a species live, the higher
the chance that any two individuals of such species will encounter occasions
in which altruistic acts should be performed.
b) Dispersal rate: The lower the dispersal rate of the individuals of a given
species, the higher the chance that any individual will interact, repeatedly,
with the same set of agents.
c) Degree of mutual dependence: The more dependent from each other are
individuals of a given group, the higher the chance that individuals in the
group will encounter occasions in which altruistic acts are required to achieve
collective goals. This trait is closely connected to dispersal rate, inasfar as
high degree of dependence impose low dispersal rates.
e) Dominance hierarchy: The existence of a dominance relation between
two individuals, decreases the chances of altruistic behaviour. The reason is
that the more dominant individual can often force the less dominant one to
perform the altruistic act against his will and without the necessary require-
ment of reciprocating the act in the future.
It is easy to check that individuals in human societies possess such traits.
3Put in game-theoretical terms, this is equivalent to the claim that the agent follows a
tit for tat strategy.
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First, the life span of human beings is long enough to guarantee the occur-
rence of numerous situations where altruistic behaviours are required; second,
humans tend to be sedentary, thus spending most of their life inside the same
community, increasing the chances of interacting with the same agents; third,
the variability in talents and abilities of human beings favours high levels of
mutual dependencies between them; finally, few exceptions made (e.g., work-
places), human societies are void of dominance relations between individuals,
whereas law and social norms determine the boundaries of what an agent can
forcefully demand from another agent. Those facts lead to the conclusion that
reciprocal altruism should be selected over non-altruism in human societies.
However, such a scenario is still compatible with the adaptiveness of subtle
forms of cheating. A subtle cheater shall be distinguished from a gross cheater
according to the following definitions: a gross cheater is an individual who
fails to reciprocate at all, producing a scenario where the altruist individual’s
costs to perform altruist actions outweighs the benefits he receives from the
actions performed by the cheater. Formally, this is expressed by the following
inequality:
1∑
i
ci >
1∑
j
bj (2.2)
Where ci is the cost for the altruist of the ith altruistic action performed by
him, while bj is the benefit he gains from the jth altruistic action performed by
the cheater. On the other hand, a subtle cheater is an individual who recipro-
cates subpar, i.e., producing actions that generate less benefits for the others
with respect to the benefits that would follow if those agent were perform-
ing actions in his place. Formally, this is expressed by the two inequalities,
assuming that ∑i ba,i >∑j ca,j :∑
i,j
(bsc,j − csc,i) > x (2.3)
x >
∑
i,j
(ba,i − ca,j) (2.4)
Where the assumption says that the sum of the benefits for the altruist
deriving from all the actions performed by the cheater is superior to the sum
of the costs for the altruist of all the actions he performs towards the cheater,
i.e., even if the altruist is interacting with a cheater, he has a net gain from
the relationship. Inequality 2.3 states that the subtle cheater has a net gain
superior to the net gain (x) he would get from of an equitable relationship,
while inequality 2.4 states that the altruist has a net gain inferior to the net
gain (x) he would get from an equitable relationship.
The main difference between a gross cheater and a subtle cheater is that
when dealing with the former, an altruist will incur in losses, while, when
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dealing with the latter, he will benefit from the relationship, even though not
optimally. It is therefore easy for the altruist to recognize gross cheaters,
but quite difficult to recognize subtle cheaters, since it is never clear if the
behaviour of the other interacting party is due to unavoidable limitations or
cheating intentions; this ignorance can be expressed by the fact that the al-
truist doesn’t have access to the value x of equitable relationships, but he
can only compute his benefits and his costs. Furthermore, the difficulty of
recognizing subtle cheaters increases when those cheaters develop the ability
to mimic some traits designed to foster altruistic behaviours in others. Exam-
ples of those traits are: friendship, guilt, sympathy, gratitude and moralistic
aggression4. In such cases, subtle cheaters might induce altruists to perform
altruistic behaviours towards them even in situations where such behaviours
aren’t strictly necessary.
Trust, it is proposed, evolved as an effective mechanism to improve the
ability of agents of detecting subtle cheaters in their social neighbours. Specif-
ically, trust is employed as a intention-selecting mechanism and thus as a tool
to categorize individuals into altruists and cheaters:
“ Selection may favour distrusting those who perform altruistic
acts without the emotional basis of generosity or guilt because the
altruistic tendencies of such individuals may be less reliable in the
future. ” [126]
Given the computational difficulties of recognizing the behaviours of subtle
cheaters over the ones of genuine altruistic agents, trust might have evolved in
order to classify individuals according to their intentions based on the scarce
information available in the environment. In general, genuine altruism en-
courages further altruism, while altruism induced by sheer utilitaristic com-
putations is less likely to be reciprocated [56, 71, 75]: trust, therefore, aids an
agent in distinguishing between those two typologies of altruistic behaviours,
decreasing the chances of incurring in subtle cheating and increasing the overall
net gain of the social system of which the agent is part of. There is evidence [25]
that, in interacting settings, when an agent believes that the other party is
genuinely willing to participate in a positive collaboration, his choices will be
driven by trust. There are also strong indications [18] that trust is tied to reci-
procity in altruistic behaviours, such that communities in which reciprocity
norms are most active display strong tendencies towards trusting behaviours.
Moreover, this proposal on the origins of trust is compatible with classical so-
ciological theories of trust, which define the concept as a complexity-reducing
tool5. All those facts contribute to the plausibility of the proposal advanced
in this section. In the next subsection the proposal is going to be put to the
test, judging its status with respect to experimental data on trust.
4See [126] for a thorough analysis of all those traits.
5See section 2.3.
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Note that no references have been made to which kind of information an
agent seeks in order to determine whether to trust or not another agent. In
fact, there is no fixed set of information typologies on which trust evaluations
are based. The main reason is that trust is a highly subjective concept and the
kind of information on which trust evaluations are based might vary greatly
from agent to agent. A possible explanation is that an agent is able to assess
whether the other party is or isn’t a subtle cheater only according to his past
interactions with other subtle cheaters; thus, the agent will tend to focus on
information typologies which helped him to recognize the cheating behaviour
in the past. Nonetheless, general elements of evaluation are recognized in the
literature as the basic starting points for each new relation which must be
established; among those, the most prominent is reputation, i.e., the public
trustworthiness evaluation of an agent made by the community he lives in.
Yet, finding a general set of pieces of information necessary for the arising of
trust (over and above those few often mentioned) is an implausible task. This
should not, though, refrain discussion on the way trust is established and how
it evolves through time; after all, determining such set of pieces of information,
and explaining the origins and evolution of trust are two separate (orthogonal)
tasks. In this thesis (and in this chapter in particular) the focus is placed on
the second task rather than the first, i.e., attention is focused on experimental
data pointing at the establishment and dynamics of trust, without claiming
that the features that will be highlighted are the uniquely necessary feature
required to have trust. In this sense, the data presented are thought of only
as supporting elements that increase the plausibility of the proposal made in
this section and not as conclusive elements which prove the correctness of it.
One final caveat to highlight is that the proposal makes no assumptions
on the actual status of trust (see section 2.1 for a general discussion on what
trust might be). It doesn’t say anything about what trust actually is, but only
on how it might have come to exist. The view is compatible with different
interpretations on what trust actually is (e.g., a belief, an expectancy or an
unconscious psycological attitude). To test such a claim, the different dimen-
sions of trust introduced in the previous section will be assumed one at a time
and it will be shown that those can all be seen as categorizing mechanisms.
Assume that trust is a strategic phenomenon. In such a case, it was argued,
trust depends on the trustor’s previous encounters with and knowledge about
the other interacting party. This dimension is compatible with trust being a
cheater selecting mechanism. In fact, previous encounters with and knowledge
about the other party can be seen as means to an end, where the end is that of
determining if the other party is willing to cheat or act altruistically. Assume
now that trust is a moralistic phenomenon. Also in this case, moral and ethical
values of an agent can be seen as automatic mechanisms that foster altruism.
In particular, moral dictatums are employed as rules of thumbs and help in
producing altruistic behaviour in situations where lack of information would
cause stagnation. This exhausts the how dimension.
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Assume that trust is a particular phenomenon. This is obviously in line
with the hypothesis that trust is a selecting mechanism. The fact that only
specific close-connected agents might be trusted is completely compatible with
the fact that those specific agents, by being closer to the trustor, are less likely
to indulge in cheating behaviours. On the other hand, if trust is assumed
to be a general phenomenon, this could be explained by the fact that, once
stereotypes are taken into account, under uncertainty conditions, it is always
preferable for an agent to trust rather than not trusting, since the net gain of
reciprocating with a subtle cheater is still positive, while gross cheaters can
be quickly identified after a small number of interactions and thus the loss
incurred would be limited. This exhausts the whom dimension.
Assume that trust is a simplex phenomenon. This would mean that agents
trust others only according to specific contexts of evaluation. This is compat-
ible with view of trust as an intention-selecting mechanism since other agent
might have different intentions based on contexts. Thus, an agent categoriz-
ing the other interacting parties might produce different categorizations based
on the context of evaluation. On top of that, generic categorizations might
be produced, in order to facilitate the case-by-case selection and reduce the
computational effort required to make the decision on whether to collaborate
or not. Such a possibility, grants that the proposal is compatible also with
multiplex trust. This exhausts the what dimension.
All dimensions have been covered and it has been shown that the current
proposal is compatible with different definitions of trust.
Even though no actual assumption has been made, up to now, on the
nature of trust, some assumptions are going to be made in the subsections
that follow and in later chapters. Those assumptions will deeply depend on
the subject under analysis, as trust is seen as a different object in different
disciplines; this won’t, however, cause any harm to this proposal on the origins
of trust, since, as it has just been argued, the proposal is compatible with
different ontological views on trust.
2.2.2 Experimental data on trust
The experimental data that is going to be discussed in this subsection are
taken both from the field of economy and that of sociology. In particular,
attention is placed on laboratory experiments and the conclusions derived
from those. No field studies analyses are considered, mainly because it is
thought that the data gathered through those studies are influenced by many
uncontrolled (and uncontrollable) factors (especially cultural ones) and thus
might only be useful in building culturally specific conception of trust and
not general ones. It is recognized that also experimental settings have their
issues and the choice of relying only on them for validation of a thesis might
be highly problematic. It is believed, though, that the results obtained from
the works reported are reliable enough to draw some important conclusions
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with respect to the proposal made on the origins of trust. The sources of the
results presented in the following subsection are taken from [25, 42, 89, 90]
and all relevant works reported in those papers. The selection of this material
was determined by the desire of having diversity of disciplines and approaches
to the question of analysing trust and its dynamics, thus allowing results from
sociology, behavioural psychology, and economy 6.
In [42], the author examines four facts about trust. Each fact presented
is examined with respect to the increase of cooperation it elicits. The facts
analysed are: i) relations and exchanges that last over longer periods of time;
ii) the lack of threat potential; iii) small initial investments (with small gradual
increases); iv) high amount of communication between agents.
The first and fourth facts are derived from analyses of various instances of
the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) [73]. PD is an experimental matrix game where
two or more agents are given a payoff matrix and they must decide which row
or column of the matrix to choose based on their intention to cooperate or
non-cooperate with the other agent. In figure 2.2, it is possible to observe a
two-players example of a game matrix: the best result in terms of both players
is achievable when they both collaborate, while the worst result for a player
is obtained when he collaborates, but the other player defects (and viceversa
for the best result for a player).
The hypothesis, developed in [104] and reported in [42], is that if subjects
view the interchange from a long-term perspective (i.e., they employ long-term
thinking in their decision making), they will display cooperation-inclined be-
haviours, often showing trust in the other subjects in the experiment. The
hypothesis is built from experimental results involving (and comparing) short
and long instances of Prisoner’s Dilemma scenarios. Short and long instances
of PD are never directly quantified, but results suggest a switch between short
and long term thinking in the range of 30 to 60 trials of a game [108]. The
proposed explanation is that, on the one hand, when there are only few in-
stances of the game to be played, players will tend to try to maximize their
welfare, by either exploiting collaborative players or by defending their-selves
from defecting players; this can explain the seemingly paradoxical result stud-
ied in the PD literature for which often both players decide to defect and they
therefore end up in a much worse situation compared to the one they could
have achieved by cooperating. On the other hand, when the game is played re-
peatedly, players tend to favour collaborative behaviours, in order to improve
the overall quality of the outcomes and the general net gain. For the fourth
fact, results are drawn from experiments involving four different instances of
PD, each one consisting of increasing levels of communication between the
6Even if this thesis is driven by a spirit of completeness and broadness, it is an unlikely
task that of reporting all existing experimental data on trust. The reader is directed to the
following papers for further results about trust: [3, 24, 33, 52, 87, 134]. The results explicitly
reported in this thesis are thought to be exemplary reports on laboratory experiments and
this is the reason they were selected with respect to the other works cited in this footnote.
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Figure 2.2: Example of a prisoners’ dilemma matrix.
players [132]. In the first instance, players were completely isolated; in the
second, they could see but not hear each other; in the third, they could hear,
but not see each other; in the fourth and final one, they could both see and
hear each other. The results show that increasing levels of communication
(especially visually-oriented) produce increasing levels of cooperation. This
is explained by the formation of strong beliefs of the other agent’s intentions
based on verbal and non-verbal communication. This increased knowledge
about the other agent decreases the uncertainty about possible defections and
therefore foster collaboration.
The second and third facts are derived from analyses of instances of the
Trucking Game (TG) [30]. TD is a game in which two players represent
manufacturers who must deliver their goods. In the game there are three roads
which can be used by the players, two which are respectively exclusive to each
player and one in common; the common road (employable by only one player
at a time) is the shortest between each player’s producing facility and delivery
point. In the game, time is a resource, therefore employing the shortest road
benefits both players. In figure 2.3, an example of the game is displayed.
In [30], among others, two important variations of the game are explored: in
the first variation each manufacturer has control over a specific gate placed
on the short road, allowing them to eventually block the other manufacturer
from using the road; in the second variation, no gates are present and the only
way for a manufacturer to block the other is by leaving a truck on the road
(therefore blocking also its-own deliveries).
The experimental results show that, when there are no gates (i.e., there is
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Figure 2.3: Example of a trucking game map.
no perceived threat of blocking), collaboration has a higher chance of devel-
oping. An hypothesis which explains such evidence is given in [42]: from the
study of [112], it is possible to conclude that individuals assign much higher
subjective probabilities to situation arising when they are given a cause to
think in detail about the situation, therefore exhibiting a form of cognitive in-
ertia (they rather assign a higher probability to the event highlighted instead
of computing actual probabilities); given this fact, players in the gate-version
of TD might concentrate their attention on the gates and therefore come to
expect, with a subjective probability higher than the objective one, that the
other player will, in fact, implement the threat. Experimental results [31]
also show that when rewards and costs are low (and only gradually increased
during each interaction), players tend to collaborate more. This is again ex-
plained in [42], making use of the so called set effect: individuals tend to be
bias towards the preservation of a theory, neglecting negative data and inter-
preting ambiguous information in line with their thesis7. The set effect might
explain the behaviour of agents in TD in the following way: agents are willing
to risk small sums in the initial phases of the game in order to evaluate the
intentions of the other agent; once initial collaboration is achieved, through
the set effect, further instances of interactions are interpreted according to
the theory each agent developed during previous interactions and therefore
confirm collaborative behaviours.
7The existence of such phenomenon is examined and proved in [81].
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In [25], the authors examine the following fact about trust: intention at-
tribution increments the chances of trusting behaviour.
The fact is explored analysing results of three separate games: one being
an instance of the Moonlighting Game (MG) [1] and the other two distinct
versions of the Dictator Game (DG) [66]. In MG, two players interact by
taking resources from/giving resources to each other. The game is played
in turn by the players, therefore, the first player, when giving money to the
second player, often exhibits trust-driven behaviours. In DG, the setting is
similar to MG, but one of the players is not able to make his choice, therefore
limiting the outcomes of the game to the choices made the other, without
any chance of retaliation. The experimental results show that in MG players
going first make more trust-involving decisions compared to the same players
playing DG. The authors suggest that a possible explanation of such findings
is that agents which attribute intentional behaviour to other agents, tend to
be more inclined towards trust compared to players that face other players
who are coerced to make a choice.
In [89], the authors examine the following fact about trust: the amount of
trust placed in other agents, strictly depend on past experiences.
The fact is explored analysing results of two consecutive instances of the
Trust Game (TG) [14]. TG replicates the general setting of MG; however,
players are only allowed to give resources, but not to take them from the
other player. The experimental results show that agents take into great con-
sideration past experiences and, moreover, this consideration is emphasized
when an agent interacts with members of the same group. The authors sug-
gest that the concept of trust in a collective entity is different, even though
related, to the one of trust in an individual. The general result, nonetheless, is
that past experiences influence trust in future occasions and group reputation
has a stronger impact than individual considerations.
Finally, in [90], the authors examine the following fact about trust: trust
is a target-specific phenomenon and not a general disposition of agents.
The fact is explored analysing results from two games: the first being the
Distrust Game (DisG) and the second being an instance of DG. In DisG,
two players are assumed to produce a given amount of resources, which can
then be divided between the two players; player two is the one deciding how
the resources have to be split, while player one has the option of investing
a certain amount of resources to prevent player two from being able to make
that decision, therefore splitting the resources evenly. The amount of resources
player one is willing to invest in this warranty is taken to represent how much
he distrusts player two. In the study, one instance of DG was employed to
disclose the general attitudes of the agents and then various instances of DisG
were employed to measure the distrust levels agents exhibit towards different
demographics. The experimental results show that agents tend to employ their
general information about a certain demographic to determine their distrust in
other agents. The authors claim that those finding also highlight the fact that
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distrust is not part of the general attitudes of agents, but are target-specific,
in the sense that the level of distrust strictly depends on who is the other
interacting agent in a relationship.
To sum up, in this subsection, seven experimental results on trust have
been presented. Those results all seem to have an impact on trust:
• Length of relations.
• Lack of potential threats.
• Small initial investments and small increments in such investments.
• High amount of communication.
• Intention attribution.
• Past experiences with the same agents.
• Group information.
2.2.3 Assessing the origins of trust
In this subsection, the proposal on the origins of trust given in subsection 2.2.1
is assessed with respect to the experimental results given in subsection 2.2.2.
Recall that the proposal advanced is that trust evolved as an intention-selecting
mechanism which has the purpose of detecting subtle cheaters in the agent’s
social neighborhood. It is claimed that all the experimental results improve
the plausibility of such a proposal.
The proposal is consistent with result one: length of relations and long-
term thinking increment agents’ trust. The longer the relations, the higher the
amount of information an agent has about the other interacting agent. This
reduces the chances that the agents mimic altruism eliciting behaviors, since
mimicking such behaviors for longer periods of time would be counter-intuitive
for a cheater. Therefore, as expected, relations that last for longer periods of
time should increase the propensity of agents to engage in reciprocal altruistic
relationships.
The proposal is consistent with result two: lack of potential threats in-
crement agents’ trust. The non-existence of threats (or, at least, the lack
of perception of potential threats) should improve the positive perception an
agent has of the other interacting agents. The reason is that when attributing
intentions to other agents, the existence of a potential threat that can be made
effective could elicit the attribution of the emotion of temptation. Therefore,
as expected, the existence of threats that can punish an agent fosters in that
agent a sense of uncertainty and a related decrease in trust; conversely, the
lack of those threats, increase the amount of trust.
The proposal is consistent with result three: small investments and small
increments in such investments increment agents’ trust. Since trust should
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favour reciprocal altruism strategies (given their positive impact on the general
net gain of the interacting party), losing small investments can be considered
an acceptable risk which might produce, in case of success, positive altruistic
relations in the future; on the other hand, small increments with respect to
previous investments can be considered acceptable in light of the possibility
of strengthening past successful relations.
The proposal is consistent with result four: high amount of communication
increment agents’ trust. The more two subjects communicate, the harder it
gets for a subtle cheater to hide his true intentions. This is due to the fact
that the subtle cheater must create false information to justify, in the eyes of
the altruistic agent, his altruistic intentions (which aren’t, in fact, altruistic).
The altruist has, therefore, better chances of individuating inconsistencies in
what the cheater tells. This higher level of assurance produces a higher level
of trust.
The proposal is consistent with result five: intention attribution is relevant
for trust. This follows directly from the proposal, since trust is actually seen
as a mechanism to select intentions. It is no surprise that if the choices of
other agents are driven by genuine intentions, rather than mere calculation or
coercion, then trust increases.
The proposal is consistent with result six: past experiences with other
agents influence the levels of trust. Again, as in the previous case, this comes
directly from the proposal. It should be expected that the ability to categorize
agents between cheaters and altruists, affect the way trust is placed.
The proposal is consistent with result seven: group information influences
individual trust. This is consistent with the proposal if it is assumed that
group of agents share common features with respect to their intentions. This
assumption seems a reasonable one, inasmuch as a given social group shall, at
least, share a generally accepted minimum level of altruism. If this were not
the case, i.e., the group contains members that do not share this minimum
level of altruistic intentions, then there would be a contradiction, since it is
expected from the theory of reciprocal altruism that the members of the group
lacking this level of minimal altruistic intentions, should be ostracized. Once
this assumption is accepted, it follows directly that having information about
a social group automatically brings information about single individuals inside
such group.
To conclude, the proposal seem to hold in the face of experimental results
and therefore should be, at least, treated as a plausible explanation on the
origins of trust.
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2.3 Trust in Economy and Sociology
In this section, a conceptual analysis of the concept of trust is presented. The
section is structured as follows: i) first, trust is analysed from the point-of-
view of sociology [9, 23, 32, 82, 83, 119, 120]; ii) second, trust is analysed from
the point-of-view of economy [28, 36, 40, 44, 114, 133]. The material from
which the analysis starts are seminal papers in the economical and sociologi-
cal literature. Attention is directed at peculiar features of trust and how they
characterize the concept. Some level of contradiction is expected, since the
works analysed come from different disciplines and, even when analysing trust
inside the same discipline, the papers might differ for the theoretical frame-
work in which they perform their reflections. Those contradictions shall not
be considered a problem, since in the last section of this chapter a further re-
finements will be made and the consistent features of trust will be selected. It
can be anticipated that all features are compatible with the various dimensions
of trust introduced in section 2.1. Where possible, the definitions analysed in
this section will be described in terms of those dimensions.
2.3.1 Trust in sociology
Both in his book Trust and Power and his paper Familiarity, Confidence,
Trust: Problems and Alternatives, Luhmann tries to clarify what is the func-
tion of trust in society, comparing the concept with other closely related no-
tions: the aim is to build a precise enough concept of trust to be employed in
theoretical models of society. To achieve his goal, he tries to provide a con-
ceptual distinction between trust, familiarity and confidence, focusing on their
interrelationship and on the different impact that each one of these concepts
has on society broadly conceived. For what concerns this thesis, the concept
of familiarity will not be taken into consideration. The concept of confidence,
however, can help to better understand Luhmann’s ideas about trust.
“[T]rust is a solution for specific problems of risk” [83]. The preceding
quote best summarizes Luhmann’s proposal about trust. Luhmann interprets
trust as an attitude towards positive expectations in situations of risk, where
personal decisions determine the possibility of the situation of risk to occur.
Thus, trust is present when an agent can take voluntarily a specific course of
action and this course of action might have uncertain outcomes, where the
losses of the bad outcomes outweigh the gains of the good outcomes. The
latter condition is important, otherwise trusting “. . . would simply be a ques-
tion of rational calculation and you would choose your action anyway, because
the risks remain within acceptable limits” [83]. The decisions an agent can
make are fundamental to the distinction between trust and confidence. Con-
fidence arises in all occasions in which no alternatives are considered and it
is felt that that outcomes are imposed on the agent. Trust becomes a mat-
ter of subjective evaluation and is dependent, for its status, on the agent’s
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perceptions and attributions: “If you choose one action in preference to oth-
ers in spite of the possibility of being disappointed by the action of others,
you define the situation as one of trust” [83]. Confidence copes with danger,
trust with risk, where the latter notion presupposes agency over passive con-
siderations. Thus, the two concepts are often present at the same time, with
confidence being a prerequisite for participating in society and trust being a
condition for active action. If an agent lacks confidence, he will be alienated
from society at large and will retreat to smaller social groups, where dangers
are reduced. However, a lack of trust limits the possibility of rational action,
thus “Through lack of trust a system may lose size; it may even shrink below
a critical threshold necessary for its own reproduction at a certain level of de-
velopment” [83]. Those considerations should be enough to understand that
both confidence and trust are necessary components for society and that they
must complement each other to produce action and participation; they help
in reducing the complexities of evaluation about the world and its evolution.
You form mechanisms of confidence, when obtaining full information about a
system and therefore avoid all dangers is impossible; you form mechanisms of
trust, when computing the outcomes of your actions and the actions of others
is implausible.
From Luhmann’s ideas it is possible to extract some features of trust.
Trust requires: a) a decision to be made; b) the possibility of incurring in
a loss whose absolute value is higher than the possible gains of the trusting
decision; c) there must be alternatives to the decision, allowing the agent to
avoid the choice, if he is willing to do so; d) the decisions available are a
matter of subjective interpretation and not objective possibilities (the agent
must believe he can make the decisions, whether or not they are actually
possible). Moreover, answering Luhmann’s original question on the function
of trust: trust helps in reducing the complexities of computations on the effects
of different courses of action.
With a similar aim, but a different approach, Barber, in his work The Logic
and Limits of Trust, tried to produce a functional account of trust, determining
the role of the concept in modern societies. Specifically, for Barber, trust
provides “cognitive ad moral expectational maps for actors and systems as they
continuously interact.” [9]. To fulfil its role, trust is split into three distinct
attitudes towards others. A general feeling of trust involves expectations of the
future, where what is expected is the persistence and fulfilment of a natural
and moral social order. Two more specific trust phenomena are related to the
expectation of expertise and competent behaviour on the part of the trustees
and of commitment to carry out fiduciary obligations and responsibilities.
In such a sense, for Barber, trust is a phenomenon whose how dimension is
halfway through moralistic and strategic. It is neither purely moralistic, since
expectations involve some conscious computations about the willingness of
others to fulfil their moral obligations and maintain the moral social order and
those computations often involve previous acquaintance with the interacting
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party; nor is it purely strategic, since the value of comparison is a moral
social order which is culturally influenced and is based on values that depend
on society at large. From Barber’s account, it is possible to identify some
important features of trust. Trust is basically a set of expectations, therefore
it requires high amount of knowledge about the interacting agents. Those
expectations help the trustors to navigate society, thus, they fulfil a role similar
to the one presented by Luhmann, where trust is employed to reduce the
complexities of modern societies. Finally, those maps are determined by the
general moral values of the trustor, who assumes that in society there is a
fixed, morally inclined, natural and social order. Moreover, the maps are
determined by the perceived expertise and the moral status of the trustee,
where the ability and willingness to fulfil obligations determine whether he is
trusted or not.
A different route is followed, in sociology, by the analyses of Durkheim
and Simmel. Both of those authors defend an idea for which trust is a by-
product of the increasing division of labour and the functional specialization
of societies. Their idea is to conflate small family-based microsocieties typical
of medieval times with the complex multi-faceted macrosocieties of modern
times. In the former type of societies, frequency and intimacy of relations
produced scenarios where each agent knew almost everything about the other
agents and where kinship bonds produced automatic collaborative behaviours.
In such cases, trust was not required and thus non-existent. Perfect knowl-
edge substituted trust. On the other hand, in the latter type of societies,
interactions become more scarce and impersonal. The requirements of hyper
specializations produce a secret society, where all agents are strangers to one
another. This shift towards imperfect knowledge about the others, generates
the necessity of building trust relationships. In Simmel words:
“ Without the general trust that people have in each other, soci-
ety itself would disintegrate, for very few relationships are based
entirely upon what is known with certainty about another person,
and very few relationships would endure if trust were as strong as,
or stronger than, rational proof or personal observation ” [119]
This point, i.e., the importance of trust for the existence of modern so-
cieties, is highlighted even more in Durkheim treatment of the division of
labour and of hyper specializations. According to Durkheim, the transition
from premodern societies to modern ones, produced an equivalent transition
from social solidarity based on likeness and similarity (mechanical solidarity)
to social solidarity based on interdependence and trust (organic solidarity).
Being dependent on one another for even simple tasks, require agents to form
bonds. Those bonds can either be based on law and contracts or on trust and
faith: the former typology often present in structured interactions and the
latter typical of small-scale unstructured interactions. This division strictly
2.3 Trust in Economy and Sociology 27
depends on the high costs of establishing sovra-personal structures; incurring
in this cost is justified only when transactions are repeated over time and they
can produce some value for the entity establishing the structure. When in-
teractions are scarce and they produce low added value for the participants,
trust must take the place of the sovra-personal structures. In such a sense,
trust is again an expectation of fulfilment and thus Durkheim’s thesis could
be partially conflated with the one of Barber. However, this conflation is not
a complete one, since the expectation is only on the upholds of previously
established agreements or of performing the actions prescribed by someone’s
role in society.
From Simmel and Durkheim’s analyses it is possible to extract the following
features of trust: i) trust is present when no perfect information is available;
ii) where no familiar bonds are present, the existence of dependencies require
trust to be present.
Summarizing the results, from the sociological point-of-view trust ought
to be an expectation about future events:
1. Involving a collaborative decision to be made, where the trustor must
consider possible alternative decisions.
2. Where the possible net costs for the trustor are higher than the possible
net gains.
3. Where high amount of knowledge is required on the part of the trustor,
who, however, is not omniscient about the trustee.
4. Where the moral status of the trustor, the trustee and the moral social
order of society is taken into account.
5. Where a requirement of dependence is present.
Moreover, the function of trust is that of enabling action, by both per-
mitting non-familiar bonds to be created and by reducing the complexity of
making decisions.
2.3.2 Trust in economy
When discussing matters of trust in economics, it is very important to identify
the economical paradigm in which the discussion takes place. The main reason
is that in some economical paradigms, there is no space for social consider-
ations and/or concepts. For example, in the neoclassical paradigm, agents
are seen as perfectly rational and utility maximising actors, therefore, they
never consider intentions and moral facts when taking decisions, relying solely
on concrete computations and strategic thinking. Moreover, in a neoclassical
environments, information is fully available and misbehaviour is forbidden.
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However, the idealization of the market in such a way has received much criti-
cism [34], especially concerning the fact that most assumptions of neoclassical
theory are ill suited to represent the real world market. Agents are not omni-
scient oracles that can perform perfect computations about their utilities and
welfares, and living in a benevolent environment; they are rather irrational
beings, which make inconsistent choices and they live in a deceitful world.
Those criticisms and the desire to produce analyses of the market closer to
reality, produced new paradigms. The choice of analysing trust in such novel
paradigms rather than the classical ones is made because computational agents
are limited in a similar fashion to the agent of economical markets. Thus, con-
centrating on assumptions which consider boundedly rational agents will help
extending this economic analysis to computational environments.
Some of those new paradigms (e.g., transaction cost theory [133]) include
social considerations in their reflections about exchanges and interactions in
economical systems. The most predominant factors that are taken into account
in those alternative paradigms are opportunistic behaviours and uncertainty
about the state of the general system. Opportunistic behaviour could be
interpreted, in this thesis, as the behaviour a subtle cheater might hold in an
interaction8. Uncertainty about the state of a system should be interpreted as
limited information in the hand of the interacting agents, which makes them
prone to incur in deceitful behaviour on the part of the other agent with whom
they are interacting. The possibility of uncertainty and possible opportunistic
behaviour are used in such theoretical frameworks to explain the existence of
hierarchical organisations (e.g., law and legally binding contracts) as control
mechanism. However, establishing such organisation is not always possible,
because it is both complicated and costly to establish them and often the
effort required is not worth the gain of the transaction. Trust, as a social
mechanism, has the effect of diminishing or removing the cost of establishing
those transaction-facilitating organisations.
In this subsection, three different positions of how trust is interpreted in
economic environment are analysed. The first is typical of the paradigm of
transaction-cost theory and is advanced in [39]. The second is taken from [44],
where the social structures in which economic action take place are thoroughly
analysed. Finally, the third position is taken from [36], where trust is discussed
with respect to its impact on economical transactions.
Concerning the first position, it has been argued that trust serves as a
vehicle to diminish the cost of transaction in economical systems; therefore
trust is seen as an enabling factor in exchanges. However, the way this goal
of trust is achieved can differ when different conceptions of trust are taken
into consideration. In its simplest form, trust is seen as a calculative process,
favouring aseptic numerical evaluations rather than careful examination. Un-
der this interpretation, someone trusts another agent when his evaluation of
8See subsection 2.2.1.
2.3 Trust in Economy and Sociology 29
the possible costs of malevolent behaviour is outweighed by the potential gains
of the transaction. While justifiable in an economical framework, note how this
interpretation is in direct contrast with Luhmann’s view, for whom sheer com-
putations are representing confidence behaviours, rather than trusting ones.
This aseptic view of trust is partially mitigated when subjective evaluations
are taken into account. For instance, in Gambetta’s interpretation, trust is a
subjective probability:
“ [T]rust. . . is a particular level of subjective probability with which
one agent assesses that another agent or group of agents will per-
form a particular action, both before he can monitor such action
(or independently of his capacity to monitor it) and in a context in
which it affects his own action. . .When we say we trust someone
or that someone is trustworthy, we implicitly mean that the prob-
ability that he will perform an action that is beneficial or at least
not detrimental to us is high enough for us to consider engaging in
some form of cooperation with him. ” [40]
When trust is seen as a subjective probability, rather than an objective cal-
culation based on possessed information, the attitudes and intentions of the
agents re-enter the picture. While still numerical in value, the numbers are
taken according to personal, and often biased, evaluations. Those evaluations,
in turn, are based on general dispositions of the agents and their social upbring-
ing, which determine conventional thresholds for cooperation and trustworthy
behaviour: some agents will be more prone to trusting behaviours and this will
show up in how the agents compute their subjective probabilities. Moreover,
social norms will guide the perceptions of agents, thus determining how they
assess each other’s intentions and dispositions.
“ [T]he need for transaction-specific safeguards (governance) varies
systematically with the institutional environment within which
transactions are located. Changes in the condition of the en-
vironment are therefore factored in - by adjusting transaction-
specific governance in cost effective ways. In effect, institutional
environments that provide general purpose safeguards relieve the
need for added transaction-specific supports. Accordingly, trans-
actions that are viable in an institutional environment that pro-
vides strong safeguards may be nonviable in institutional envi-
ronments that are weak - because it is not cost-effective for the
parties to craft transaction-specific governance in the latter cir-
cumstances. . . [S]ocietal culture, politics, regulation, professional-
ization, networks, and corporate culture. Each can be thought
of as institutional trust of a hyphenated king: ’societal-trust’, ’
political trust’, and so forth. ” [133]
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As expected, in transaction-cost theory trust is seen as a formal and nu-
merical measure, requiring computations in order to be applied. This doesn’t
come as a surprise, given the fact that economical models are often built with
the aspiration of being completely formal. However, it has been argued, strict
paradigms, which make strong assumptions about real-world systems, are ill
suited to both describe and understand those complex systems and alternative
loose paradigms must be assumed. In those paradigms trust is still seen as
a numerical value, but whose computation take into account social and per-
sonal evaluations (thus moving from a purely strategic view of trust towards
a milder position between strategic and moralistic trust).
From those reflections it is possible to extract some features of trust. Trust
requires: a) a certain level of uncertainty with respect to the outcomes of a
given interaction; b) a limit in the computational capacities of agents; c) the
possibility of quantifying the cost and gains of actions. Moreover, trust has the
purpose of diminishing the structural costs of building infrastructures needed
for exchanges to take place risk-free.
Concerning the second position, in [44] Granovetter presents a thorough
analysis of how economical actions are embedded in sociological structures
(which, then, foster trust between agents in exchanges). In particular, he notes
that previous attempts at describing economical actions have suffered from an
undersocialized or an oversocialized treatment. In particular, he argues that:
“ [T]he level of embeddedness of economic behaviour is lower in
nonmarket societies than is claimed by substantivists and develop-
ment theorists, and it has changed less with “modernization” than
they believe; but . . . this level has always been and continues to be
more substantial than is allowed for by formalists and economists.
” [44]
In this quote, the substantivist view of economic behaviour argues that
premodern societies where heavily reliant on social constructs, while modern
societies gradually moved towards independent approaches to exchanges. On
the other hand, formalist views argue that neoclassical treatment of agents is
not only useful in describing modern societies, but also premodern ones, for
which reliance on social constructs has always been overestimated. Thus, Gra-
novetter defends an idea that the level of social embeddedness of economical
action is in between a undersocialized view (typical of neoclassicism) and a
oversocialized view (typical of sociological studies, in which economy is just a
by-product of social interaction). His analysis starts by realizing that while
under/oversocialized view of the embeddedness might provide justified expla-
nations for the behaviours observed at a macrolevel of economy, those are
no longer appropriate when the level of analysis if that of micro-level imper-
fectly competitive markets. In such markets, the impacts of large numbers of
competitors in the form of sellers and buyers is not present and thus, novel
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explanations on why the market doesn’t collapse under the pressure of mis-
trust and malfeasance must be provided. Appeals to “generalized morality”
are often quoted as plausible explanations (noteworthy is the connection be-
tween those explanations and moralistic views of trust). Those explanations
rely on the existence of a set of values commonly shared by all members of
a given society, where imperatives produce collaboration rather than deceit.
While those shared values might explain some behaviours, they hardly explain
all behaviours, especially when it is realized that communities are not stable
entities, but evolve through time, allowing entrance and exit of members which
might have different moral values. Thus, Granovetter, proposes to substitute
reference to general morality with reliance on concrete personal relations and
social networks. Thus trust emerges as a result of repeated interactions and
knowledge about the others intentions and values. What trust depends on
is not general reputations, but in personal expectations that the other will
behave honestly: two thieves might trust each other during a robbery, even
though their reputation is obviously bad. The expectations about the possible
behaviours of others stand, thus, at the base of economical actions. Someone
trusts when his expectations are positive, while he doesn’t, when those ex-
pectations are negative. For instance, when a group of strangers flee from a
fire, it is highly likely that stampeding phenomena will take place, diminishing
the possibility of everyone escaping unharmed. On the other hand, when a
family escapes from their burning house, it is highly unlikely that the mem-
bers of the family will rush at the door in an unorganized way. This can be
explained by the fact that, when dealing with strangers, there is no guaran-
tee that everyone will behave appropriately. In economy, the same argument
applies. In large-scale economical systems, infrastructures are required and
trust is less present, since the chances of having misbehaviours is higher. On
the other hand, on the smaller scales, personal knowledge and relations can
foster well-informed expectations on the behaviours of others, thus allowing
trusting decisions to be made. In this sense, economic analyses of trust are
close to the ones pursued in sociology. This should not come as a surprise,
since Granovetter’s aim is explicitly that of taking into account sociological
structures in which economical actions are embedded.
Finally, concerning the third position, in [36], Fehr advances a proposal on
the nature of trust taking into account various aspects typical of risk analysis.
In particular, he shows how trust involves an important aspect of betrayal
aversion, where betrayal aversion is distinguished from the close concept of
risk aversion. From [15], it is possible to derive the conclusion that agents are
more willing to take a risk involving a specific probability of bad luck than
to enter a relation with an equivalent probability of being cheated. This fact
shows that social factors are considered more than sheer probability computa-
tions. The definition Fehr provides is a behavioural one, where trusting is an
act for which a trustor voluntarily places some of his resources at the disposal
of the trustee, without any legal (or otherwise binding) commitment from the
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latter. This definition, similar in spirit to the one given in [23] by Coleman,
is then conflated with experimental and survey-based results on trust, con-
firming that possible action is a component of trust. While in this thesis the
main idea behind Fehr proposal is accepted, it is argued that the trusting be-
haviour and trust per se are distinct phenomena, even though tightly related.
Undoubtedly, there are some actions which are performed only under trusting
assumption, however, those trusting assumptions are action enabling phenom-
ena and not the action in itself. Conflating the two is equivalent to committing
a category mistake, where the condition that allow a given course of action is
confused with the actual action. Thus, what should actually follow from Fehr
reflections is that trust is a willingness (based on a subjective expectation) to
enter in a risk-involving interaction with another party, based on possessed
knowledge, the beliefs and the mental states of the trustor; specifically, be-
trayal aversion is predominant among the mental states and thus influenced
trust more than other components. One might argue that the betrayal aver-
sion aspect is external to trust evaluations, determining only a comparison
threshold with which to compare someone’s trust beliefs. However, it is highly
unlikely that purely belief-based definitions of trust are sufficient to capture
trusting phenomena. This is because agents sharing the same beliefs might
still behave differently and explaining this difference is explained better by
diversity in the trust values placed on the trustees, rather than assuming that
the threshold for collaboration is different, but the trust values are the same.
From Fehr analysis, it follows that trust involves action and that this action
is dependent, among other things, on betrayal aversion (thus, more generally,
on uncertainty).
Summarizing the results, from the economical point-of-view trust ought to
be an explicit computation about future events:
1. Embedded in an environment lacking other control mechanisms such as
sovra-personal infrastructures or general moralistic values.
2. Whose outcomes are uncertain and exposed to risk.
3. Where the agents are unable to explicitly compute exact values for all
outcomes.
4. Whose outcome is numerable, inasmuch as it is possible to attribute
clear values to losses and gains.
5. Where the internal mental states of agent play an important role.
The socio-economical features of trust will now be merged in the next
section.
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2.4 Trust in a nutshell
In this section, the results obtained through the analyses made in this chapter
are summarized and the core features of trust are presented. First of all, trust
is an action-enabling concept: this can be derived from both the proposal on
the origins of trust and the socio-economic studies presented. The environ-
ments in which such decisions must be taken must always involve a form of
risk; moreover, in traditional analyses, the risk must be consciously perceived
as being present, and it must be possible to compute the actual effects of the
negative outcomes happening. The second point is that trust is an inherently
subjective phenomenon and, therefore, all qualitative and quantitative evalu-
ations made by an agent about his trust must take into account his personal
mental states. Third, trust must involve uncertainty; assuming a world of
perfect information and unlimited rationality, where the intentions of others,
the state of the world and the outcomes of all possible actions are known,
and there is no limit to the derivations agents can make, there is no room for
trusting decisions. Finally, trust involves interactions, inasfar as decisions and
actions acquire their full meaning in interactive scenarios.
We can thus derive the following conclusion: Trust is a action-enabling
concept produced by subjective evaluations in risk-involving interactions placed
in an uncertainty-heavy environment. This pseudodefinition of trust is the
starting point of all further discussions in the thesis.
Chapter 3
Trust in Digital Environments
In this chapter, trust is analysed with respect to digital environments. The
aim is to examine the current state of the art in computer science on trust
and then extract from the literature the core features of a computational no-
tion of trust; a notion which can then be employed in digital environments
(e.g., a digital market) to improve the quality of interactions in it. Particu-
lar attention is paid to existing computational trust models and on how they
implement computational versions of the socio-economical concept of trust in-
troduced in the previous chapter (see chapter 2). In section one, the need
for trust in digital environments is justified and it is explained how such a
notion can improve those environments; in section two, surveys on computa-
tional trust models are analysed and a novel taxonomy useful in classifying
computational trust models is built; in section three, classical computational
trust models are briefly analysed and core features of their respective concepts
of trust are extracted; in section four, the features extracted in section three
are conflated and a unified conception of computational trust is formed. This
unified conception is then merged with the socio-economical definition of trust
provided in the previous chapter (see section 2.4). Finally, a further discussion
on paradigms employed to construct assumption on how to formalize trust is
presented.
3.1 Justifying Trust in Digital Environments
In this section, a justification for the importance of trust in digital environ-
ments is provided, placing emphasis on the role trust might play in compu-
tational systems and the future development of digital societies. The main
proposal is that trust can play two distinct roles: the first role is that of a
soft-security mechanism that fosters benevolent behaviours and limits malev-
olent ones; the second is that of aiding tool, employed to guide agents in their
choices in environments where their usual physical cues are lacking and they
do not know how to properly make use of their instinct, which is tailored
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specifically for the recognition of relevant biological traits.
Society and economy are rapidly changing and moving towards digital envi-
ronments, putting an increasing distance between them and the old-fashioned
physical world. This is to be expected. The internet era makes it easier and
faster to achieve results. Communications and exchanges of information have
become instant, while a growing amount of services allow users to get access
to resources they never even thought existed (nor they thought they needed).
Companies as AirBnb, StackOverflow, BlaBlaCar and Amazon revolutionized
the market and the way human beings interpret their environment [16, 17].
This shift from the physical world to the digital world brought with it ad-
vantages and disadvantages. On the one side, many new possibilities arose
that enhanced relationships and economy. Once impossible, today is straight-
forward to entertain friendship relations with people all around the world.
Academic research once relied on intensive manual search in libraries, while in
contemporary times, a researcher could plausibly spend the whole time in his
office and, nonetheless, have access to the most recent results in his field. Econ-
omy has also been reshaped. Most services and goods are purchasable online,
with no spatial and/or temporal limits: food delivery services, airplane and
hotel companies offering self-booking opportunities and content sharing plat-
forms (among others) made it possible for people to vary their consumption
habits and access information faster and better, which, in turn, allow better-
informed decisions to be made. On the other side, technological advances also
brought some disadvantages. One over all is that living in a digital world,
all the biological mechanisms that allowed human beings to cope with their
environment and which have evolved along the centuries are no longer able to
provide reliable guidance. Importantly, there are no indications that things
will get better in the future. The growing economic interest in all activities
that are performed over the web attract benevolent and malevolent behaving
agents alike. Having lost the natural defences developed through evolution
with uncountable amounts of trials and errors put users in danger of becoming
victims during transactions. Moreover, also the initial wave of enthusiasm and
willingness to collaborate which characterized web interactions at its origin is
no longer present. As soon as the digital world moved from an information ex-
change environment to a proper economical platform, malevolent users started
to infiltrate it. Those concerns require computer scientists to design and de-
velop systems which can mimic and substitute the natural defence mechanisms
of human beings. Furthermore, the issue becomes even more pressing, when it
is realized that digital environments are evolving also in the direction of allow-
ing human-machine and machine-machine interactions [37]. Digital worlds are
not exclusively a vehicle for human-to-human interactions, but have gradually
transitioned to human-to-machine interactions and, with the development of
IoT [84], it has now become also a platform allowing machine-to-machine in-
teractions. In this sense, not only it is important to defend human beings
from other human beings when interacting in the digital world, but it is also
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important to protect humans from malicious use of programs (which are of-
ten assumed to be honest by human agents, since they lack direct interests
or intentions) and, often, also shelter digital agents from other digital agents,
which might totally lack a sense of risk.
In this setting, trust plays a valuable role, both by being able to foster pos-
itive behaviour and as a defensive mechanism that shelters from malevolent
behaviours [105]. Moreover, producing trust-aware digital agents might also
contribute to the increase of confidence of those agents (as defined by Luh-
mann; see subsection 2.2.2), in a virtuous circle of self-enhancing attitudes.
This role of trust, and more in general of social norms implemented in digi-
tal environments, should be seen as that of a soft-security mechanism [109]. To
understand what exactly a soft-security mechanism is, an analogy might prove
to be useful. A digital system could be seen as a fortress. The goal of such
fortress is to protect the information which is contained inside, allowing access
to it only to certain persons with the right authorizations. The defenders of
such fortress must obviously constantly aware of all possible weaknesses of the
fortress and, moreover, they must check that their hard security mechanisms
are always in place and working fine. Hard security mechanisms could com-
prehend, for example, identity authentication mechanisms for control access
or barriers such as firewalls. This burden on the defenders is enormous and
expensive in terms of resources and energy. On the other side of the fence,
there are the attackers. The goal of the attackers is to access the information,
even though they are not authorized in doing so. In order to do so, they must
find an access to the fortress and thus they must exploit some vulnerability
of it. What is important to note is that one vulnerability might be sufficient
for the attackers to achieve their goal. Moreover, they can communicate with
other attackers and form coalitions, which can spread the intel one attacker
has obtained, making their attacking chances higher. In this spirit, the cost
for the attackers in terms of resources and energy is way lower compared to
those of the defenders. Constant and possibly complete knowledge for the de-
fenders versus highly specific and partial knowledge for the attackers creates
an important imbalance. Soft-security mechanisms enter the picture when,
instead of focusing only on hard-security, the defenders note that part of their
resources could be invested in forming a society that punish, by, e.g., ostra-
cization, every agent who is found dwelling on the possibility of attacking the
fortress. Moreover, they might also note that part of the investment could
be diverted towards other agents that are told to try and construct attacks
towards the fortress, letting know the defenders of all the possible exploita-
tions they might find during their fake attack. In this sense, the soft-security
actions fostered benevolent behaviours (agents tell the defenders of possible
issues) and punished malevolent behaviours (real attackers are ostracized.
It is argued in this thesis, that trust can play exactly this role of soft-
security mechanism in digital societies. It does so by punishing malevolent
agents with untrust and distrust, either reducing the amount of interactions
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they can have or eliminating this possibility in total. On the other hand, trust
can increase the quality and number of interactions a benevolent and honest
agent has, by directing other benevolent agents towards him. Moreover, once
trust starts to spread, it can create nets in which positive behaviours produce
further positive behaviours. This, as shown in chapter 2, can contribute to
the increase in reciprocal altruism, which in turn, generates an increased net
gain for the whole system at no extra cost in investments.
One question remains: why isn’t trust simply generated as it is in normal
face-to-face interactions? This question is interesting, because the main con-
cern in investing time researching social phenomena and trying to implement
them into system which are inherently social (even though digital), is that this
investment is futile. The expectancy is that, as they developed in ordinary
social systems, they will also develop in digital social systems. However, this
is not actually the case. While some milder forms of social notions might
transfer to digital communities, many of the cues humans are evolutionarily
programmed to discern are lacking. In addition, there is an abundance of
other cues (up to the point of having too many) which might confuse an agent
trying to establish the social status of other agents. Another concern is that,
as noted above, not all interactions in the digital world are between humans;
often those interactions are between humans and machines, or between ma-
chines. Excluding the obvious fact that machines completely lack evolutionary
tools to recognize malevolent interactors and therefore must be given formal
tools to implement social concepts, a human being, when facing a machine
(either through a computer screen or when interacting with a robot/android),
is completely lost in determining which factors to take into consideration [5].
Those reason are the ones justifying research on trust, especially on trust
in digital communities. In the rest of the chapter, general considerations on a
computational notion of trust are made, leaving to the next chapter the goal
of producing a suitable formalism for trust.
3.2 A Taxonomy of Computational Trust Models
In this section, a taxonomy for general computational trust models is pre-
sented. This taxonomy is built starting from a meta-analysis of existing sur-
veys on computational trust and computational trust models.
Computational trust is the digital counterpart of trust as applied in or-
dinary social communities and computational trust models are mechanisms
that implement the notion of trust in digital environments to increase the
quantity and quality of interactions. Computational trust models are typi-
cally composed of two parts: a trust computing part and a trust manipulation
part.
Note that this is not a distinction which is made explicitly in the liter-
ature on computational trust models. Generally speaking, authors tend to
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label their models as “computational trust models”, omitting whether they
are specifically computing models or simply manipulation models. The main
explanation for this phenomenon is that, from a practical perspective, the main
focus for a computer scientist is to specify how a model works in the context
in which it has to be applied. Moreover, often smaller models are merged
together to obtain larger ones that can perform highly complex tasks: when
those merged models are analysed is then hard to distinguish between the
trust computing and the trust manipulation component. Nonetheless, given
the theoretical focus of this thesis, it is important to draw a clear distinction
between the two aspects of computational trust models; the reason is that
doing so can help in understanding better the important aspects of trust that
are relevant in computer science and in formal model building in general.
In the trust computing component, basic trust values are computed using
other typologies of information gathered by the system (usually reputation
scores based on previous interactions); basically, a trust computing model de-
fines trust directly, by explicitly stating what are the components of trust and
how all of those components come together to form trusting behaviours. In
the trust manipulation component, new trust values are computed by ma-
nipulating already existing trust values using various operators1; in a trust
manipulating model, less attention is paid at how trust comes about and the
focus shifts on how trust can be spread in a community or how different trust
evaluations are combined to form new ones. The better a model implements
both components, the higher the quality of the model. However, existing
models tend to specialize in one of the two tasks: those models either imple-
ment sophisticated notions of trust, focusing on repeated computations of new
trust values, without ever combining those values together (e.g. [86]), or they
implement sophisticated sets of operators employed to combine really simple
representations of trust (e.g. [59, 135]). Moreover, the literature is abundant of
different models which are highly specialized in the respective tasks for which
they have been developed, but there are very few general models that can
help in theoretical discussions about trust. Thus, there is a urge for and an
omnicomprehensive formal language that allows an abstract discussion about
trust tout court; this will indeed be the focus of the fourth chapter of this
thesis 4. For now, the focus is going to be on traditional computational trust
models.
The section is structured as follows: i) first, some terminological remarks
are made about the conception of trust employed during all subsequent analy-
ses; ii) second, the taxonomy is given and the methodology employed to build
it is explained.
1See [59] for a wide range of examples.
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3.2.1 Terminological remarks
Before moving to the meta-analysis of computational trust surveys, some ter-
minological remarks are required. Those terminological remarks serve the pur-
pose of identifying computational trust models that implement a conception of
trust which is in line with the one provided in chapter 2. However, given the
different nature of the discipline, some aspects of the socio-economical con-
ception of trust provided must be adapted or partially ignored. The remarks
which follow are thought to provide such adaptations and further clarify how
trust is conceived in digital environments.
The first terminological remark is needed to distinguish the concept of
trust and that of reputation. In particular, the remark is required to highlight
that those are two distinct concepts. In computer science, they are often
conflated and it’s common to find reputation models presented as trust models.
Moreover, initial trust values computed in various trust models depend solely
on reputation, showing a strong dependence of the former concept on the
latter2. However, since it is perfectly reasonable and natural to trust someone
with a bad reputation or distrust highly reputable individuals, it is important
to have two distinct conceptions. The following distinction between trust
systems and reputation systems will be made:
“ Trust systems produce a score that reflects the relying party’s
subjective view of an entity’s trustworthiness, whereas reputation
systems produce and entity’s (public) reputation score as seen by
the whole community. ” [64]
Reputation, as is given in the above definition, indicates how a given in-
dividual is perceived in a given community. Often such values are dependent
on implicit biases or general past interactions between the individual and the
community. For example, a doctor might have a good reputation inasfar as the
academic titles he obtained and the way he interacts with his patients made
him highly esteemed. Moreover, what distinguishes trust from reputation is
that the reputation score of an individual is seldom personally formed by an
agent, but is rather given directly by the community. On the other hand, trust
must be formed by each agent, requiring, thus, a minimum level of interaction
between the trusting parties. This said, in this thesis it is assumed that the
reputation score of an agent can be obtained by joining all the interactions
the agent had, thus representing a sort of “common trust value”. On the other
hand, trust values will be considered personal evaluations, where a given agent
must have access to at least some information about the other agent he shall
trust: this way of defining trust, leaves open the possibility of having personal
trust values entirely dependent on the reputation of a given agent, when such
reputation is the only available source of information.
2Indeed, in some contexts, the dependency can be made even stronger by thinking about
reputation as the publicly perceived trustworthiness of a person.
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The second terminological remark is required by the fact that the term
“trust” is applied differently in different context and therefore the same name
might stand for different concepts (see the reflections made in section 1.1).
The following working definition for trust will be employed:
“ . . . [T]rust implies a decision. Trust can be seen as a process
of practical reasoning that leads to the decision to interact with
somebody. ” [102]
This definition highlights the fact that trust is involved in decision-making
processes. In particular, trust is the process of evaluating whether it is valuable
to collaborate with another agent or not. This definition is similar in spirit to
what Audun Jøsang dubs decision trust:
“ [Decision] trust is the extent to which a given party is willing
to depend on something or somebody in a given situation with a
feeling of relative security, even though negative consequences are
possible. ” [60]
Decision trust must be distinguished from other conceptions of trust such
as reliability trust, for which trust indicates only the subjective assessment a
trustor makes about the probability that a trustee will perform a given action
on which the welfare of the trustor depends; reliability trust has a meaning
similar to the pure calculative trust conception of economic theory (see sub-
section 2.2.2). The main difference between decision trust and reliability trust
is that the former is more specific and considers more information for its eval-
uation: imagine there is a worn rope which has a high probability of breaking
if used; that rope would never be trusted during a fire drill, but it might be
during a real fire, if no other escape options are available to the trustor. In
this simple example, the rope has the same reliability trust, however, since
the negative consequences of not trusting the rope in the two scenarios are
different, so is the decision trust value. From now on, all appearances of the
term “trust” indicate “decision trust”3. Note that even though it is assumed
that trust is always decision trust, no further assumption are made on its
nature. However, this simple assumption can greatly influence the nature of
trust. For example, even though trust can also be seen as a second-order rela-
tion (e.g., as a property of communications), such accounts count as examples
of reliability trust, rather than decision trust. This is due to the fact that in
order for a decision to be made, the trusting entities must have some sort of
agency. Trust must therefore be always a first-order relation between two (or
more) agents who can have the possibility of making a decision in a specific
3Note that this implies that the approach assumed in this chapter is different from the one
present in some classical models for the assessment of trust [4, 59, 62, 67]. This is because
the interest in this thesis is for a notion of trust that can be directly employed in digital
environments and therefore it must be suited for dealing with decision making.
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situation. This is an important point, since in chapter four of this thesis, trust
will be presented as an operator on formulas, rather than a relation between
agents. Anticipating what will be said later, even in the case in which trust is
presented as an operator on formulas, when practical considerations are taken
into account, such operators will always be applied to formulas expressing
interacting situations which must be evaluated.
The final working definition of trust that will be employed in subsequent
sections and chapters is thus the following:
“ [Trust is] a belief about another person’s trustworthiness with re-
spect to a particular matter at hand that emerges under conditions
of unknown outcomes [emphasis in original]. ” [110]
On top of such definition, it is assumed that trust, as reported, is decision
trust. Therefore, the belief formed about the other person’s trustworthiness
shall be employed to decide whether to collaborate with such agent or not.
3.2.2 The taxonomy
To build the taxonomy, a meta-analysis of existing surveys on computational
trust models has been made. To select the surveys to analyse, a search on
Research Gate was made. The combination of key words employed were: i)
Survey, Trust, Computation, Model; ii) Review, Trust, Computation, Model;
iii) Survey, Trust, Computation; iv) Review, Trust, Computation; v) Survey,
Trust, Computer Science; vi) Review, Trust, Computer Science. Of all the
survey obtained through such research pattern, ten were selected according
to number of citations4. The ten surveys which were selected are [7, 22,
43, 60, 64, 80, 102, 107, 113, 121]. In order to avoid redundancies in the
analysis, two further selection criteria were applied to the list: first, an author-
based selection criterion was applied, thus excluding works which came from
the exact same author; second, a temporal criterion was applied, excluding
surveys published in the same year. The second criterion was applied because
it is thought, by the author of this thesis, that works published in the same
period might display cross influences and therefore biasing the results. Given
those two added selection criteria, the survey analysed were brought down to
seven. It is believed that those surveys represent a good and authoritative
sample of all the general surveys existing in the computer science literature on
computational trust. In figure 3.1 the list of surveys is displayed: boldface is
employed to indicate which were the surveys that underwent the meta-analysis.
It is important to note that many recent surveys and reviews on computational
trust models were omitted, mostly due to the low number of citations. Since
this parameter was the main tool for the selection of the surveys to employ in
4The number of citations was taken on 22/01/2018 from ResearchGate:
https://www.researchgate.net/
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Figure 3.1: Computational Trust Surveys.
the meta-analysis, recent works were penalized. However, it should be pointed
out, in defence of the selection, that the surveys and reviews selected cover
different aspects of trust models in great detail and the overlapping features
identified can be considered, with a high level of confidence, as a comprehensive
set of features shared by most computational trust models5.
Cross-referencing the features highlighted in each survey, some interesting
characteristics of trust models were extracted and four distinctive aspects of
the possible way of building models were highlighted. Those distinctive aspects
are the elements which help in building the classificatory taxonomy which is
presented in this subsection. The aspects are:
• The typology of the trust models.
• The applicability criterion of the trust models.
• The typology of information accepted by the trust models.
• The way such information is acquired in the trust models.
Different combinations of elements characterizing the four aspect generate
different computational trust models.
According to the typology of the models feature, a computational trust
model can be either a socio-cognitive model or a game-theoretical model. A first
clear characterization along this dimension of computational trust models can
be found in [107] and it is then fully developed in [113]. This aspect of models
determine how trust is interpreted inside the models. Game-theoretical mod-
els are typical of conceptions of trust based on economy (see subsection 2.2.2)
and in those, trust is considered a probability measure, which is assessed based
5For completeness, some recent surveys are reported. For recent analyses of computational
trust models or computational trust in general, see [2, 98, 128].
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on interactions and strategic decisions. Those models reduce the whole pro-
cess of trusting to computations based on precise values. One aspect to note
is that, even though in economy there has been a shift towards subjective
probabilities, rather than objective computations, in game-theoretical mod-
els, the probability representing trust is often computed aseptically based on
the available data, with no reference to the subjective evaluation of agents.
Although problematic from a conceptual point-of-view, such a choice allows
for easy implementations of the models in actual computing systems. On the
other side of game-theoretical models, there are socio-cognitive models. In
those models, mental states and evaluations of an agent are highlighted (e.g.,
beliefs, desires and intentions). A thorough analysis of all the possible mental
aspects on which trust might be based can be found in [22]. The major in-
sights for the building of those models come from sociology and philosophy (see
subsection 2.2.1) and trust values to be employed are computed using qual-
itative assessments rather than quantitative ones. Such a practice makes it
hard (though not impossible) to have practical implementations of such mod-
els, since highly complicated mechanisms of representation and manipulation
for the mental states are required from the computational systems. Moreover,
mental notions often have an opaque meaning and lead to vague definitions,
therefore making even harder understanding whether a computational system
is actually implementing the correct notions.
According to the applicability criterion of the models feature, a computa-
tional trust model can be either a general-purpose model or an application-
specific model. This distinction is firstly formalized in [102] and it character-
izes the versatility of the models. In general-purpose models, the trust values
computed can be employed in different contexts, allowing the transfer of com-
putations from one scenario to the other. This allows those models to make
effective use of the same computational resources in cross-domains. General-
purpose models are the most versatile ones, but suffer from lack of precision,
often relying on rough values for trust which might not be accurate for highly
specific tasks. A remark to be made is that the versatility is not tied to the
possibility of adapting the model in order to apply it in different contexts,
but that the model it-self is designed to employ the same resources (i.e, the
information received) to compute general trust values employable in different
(and possibly all) scenarios. Those models are often just theoretical ones,
with no actual implementation. When building such models, emphasis is put
on ideas, rather than specific implementation concerns. However, obtaining
a (possibly) precise general-purpose trust model is an important desideratum
in computer science. Contrary to general-purpose models, application-specific
models, as the name suggests, are models designed to compute trust values in
specific scenarios or for specific purposes. Those are the most common models
and literature abound with examples. The downside of building a model in an
application-specific sense is that the model hardly applies in contexts which
are different from the original one for which the model was built. The reason
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is that the architecture of those models is designed specifically to obtain a
precise result in given situations.
According to the typology of information accepted by the models feature,
a computational trust model can be either a interaction-only based model or
a cognitive-information based model. This distinction is introduced in [113],
expanded in [22] and it characterized the nature of the information employed
to compute trust values. This level of distinction is highly dependent on the
typology of the model distinction. In fact, socio-cognitive models obviously
will employ cognitive information in their computations and game-theoretical
models will only employ interaction results; however, some game-theoretical
models allow the use of partially-cognitive information to affect their compu-
tations (when, e.g., utility functions are constructed starting from the desires
of an agent). Interaction-only based models rely, for their computations, only
on the outcomes of past interactions between the agents in the models. While
typically related to reputation rather than trust models, the fact that some
of the latter models heavily depend on reputation scores, makes is possible to
construct computational trust models solely relying on the outcomes of past
interactions. Those models are the easiest to build and then implement; the
reason is that data is easily gathered, represented and then analysed. On the
other hand, cognitive-information models consider various typologies of infor-
mation (e.g., intentions of agents or aesthetical appearances of websites) to
compute trust values. As with socio-cognitive models, computational models
based on cognitive information are hard to implement and to build, mostly
because cognitive concepts are hard to formalize. This limits their analysis to
theoretical environments and often they are employed as descriptive models
rather than being thought as practical devices.
Finally, according to the way of acquisition of information by the model fea-
ture, a computational trust model can be either a direct-experience based model
or a referral-based model. In direct-experiences models, the information is ac-
quired by direct experience and only first hand information is allowed. Such
models are useful in environments in which different agents evaluate situations
differently and therefore, might assign same values with different meanings.
However, actual implementations of such models are difficult, mainly given the
scarcity of information available. Digital communities are larger than tradi-
tional ones and repeated interactions between the same agents hardly happen.
Without abundant raw data to analyse, trust models have a hard time in com-
puting reliable trust values and therefore aid an agent in taking his decisions
in the given environment. On the other side, there are referral-based mod-
els. Those models allow the use of various information from different sources,
both directly acquired or reported by other agents. Thus, not only the past
history of the evaluating agent is important, but all the histories of all agents
from whom the evaluator can obtain data. Those histories are often collected
in huge databases, from which someone can extract the information he needs
and then compute initial trust values. The obvious advantage of those models
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lies in the fact that they allow trust computations also in contexts in which
the trustor never interacted before with the trustee. However, this opens up
the possible issue of having inconsistencies in the evaluations. Not all agents
judge in similar ways: what might be exceptionally good for an agent, can
be completely normal for another. Nonetheless, those computational trust
models are the most common.
This exhausts the taxonomy. In the next section, classical computational
trust models are going to be analysed in order to extract some core features
necessary for a computational conception of trust.
3.3 Computational Trust Models: an Analysis
In this section, some classical computational trust models are going to be anal-
ysed, in order to obtain some core features of a computational conception of
trust. Those features will then be compared in the final section with the ones
obtained in the previous chapter. It should be remembered that the choice of
the models is partially influenced by the terminological remarks made in sub-
section 3.2.1. Therefore, it could be thought that the comparison between the
features obtained in this section and the one obtained at the end of the previ-
ous chapter is futile, since the latter deeply influenced the former. However,
it is claimed that such a comparison could still prove to be useful, inasmuch
as understanding how socio-economical concepts are manipulated to obtain
implementable version has great theoretical importance and can aid in future
research on similar topics.
The models analysed were selected from a citation analysis made on the
surveys employed for the construction of the taxonomy. On top of this first
layer of selection, further refinements were made to increase the diversity of
the models analysed. To obtain such a result, models were selected by taking
different combinations of the aspects highlighted by the taxonomy. Those
selection criteria individuated five classical computational trust models. The
five models which were selected are [20, 86, 101, 118, 135]. In figure 3.2 it is
possible to see the way such models are sorted according to the taxonomy.
3.3.1 Marsh’s Trust Model
Marsh’s computational trust model [86] is one of the first appeared in the
computer science literature. Developed in his Ph.D. thesis, the model pro-
poses a formal framework for trust, with the idea of applying it to distributed
artificial intelligence and multi-agent systems. In his model, it is possible to
identify three different forms of trust: basic trust, general trust and situa-
tional trust. Basic trust represents the general attitude of an agent, when
all his experiences in life are considered; general trust is the overall trust a
trustor has in a trustee; finally, situational trust is the specific trust a trustor
has in a trustee when a specific collaborative task should take place. Given
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Figure 3.2: Classical examples of computational trust models.
the working definition of trust given in subsection 3.2.1, only situational trust
qualifies as proper trust for this thesis and therefore that form of trust is the
only one that will be analysed.
Situational trust represents the attitude an agent has in another agent.
When a decision has to be made, different agents assess different qualities
of the trustees and then decide whether to collaborate or not. In this sense,
another characteristic of situational trust is its measurability. Situational trust
is always represented with a value between -1 (complete distrust) and +1
(complete trust). The third characteristic is related to the fact that trust
depends on the given situation, therefore it is context-dependant. Finally, the
fourth and last characteristic is that situation trust is agent-dependant, i.e.,
each agent computes his personal value and two agents might return different
results even when they possess the same information and evaluate in the same
situation.
3.3.2 Castelfranchi and Falcone’s Trust Model
In [20], the authors offer one of the first cognitive approaches to the formali-
sation of trust. In their model, trust is taken as a reducible concept, where all
its parts are mental states. First of all, trust is again a relation between two
agents, evaluated towards the achievement of a goal, therefore depending on
the context. On top of that, there are the mental states of the trustor. The
trustor must: have a specific goal in mind; believe that the trustee has the
competence to perform some positive actions towards the goal; believe that
the trustee is willing to perform the given action towards the goal if he is given
the chance to; believe that he indeed needs the trustee to achieve the goal. All
the above mental states contribute to the evaluation the trustor makes and,
as a result, it is possible, in the model, to obtain a binary trust value (trust
or not-trust), which is then employed in decision-making.
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3.3.3 Yu and Singh’s Trust Model
In Yu and Singh’s [135] trust model, trust is completely based on reputation,
which is based both on previous interactions between the trustee and the
trustor and on reported interaction with the trustee by other agents in the
social network of the trustor, which are registered in the formalism as values
called Quality of Service. It is important to note that the two sets of data are
always kept separate and an agent can report only direct interaction he had
with the trustee and no other agents’ ratings; this is to prevent that biased
or unfair ratings are propagated to other agents. This model also includes a
trust managing component, where new trust vales can be computed from old
ones using Dempster-Shaffer’s theory of belief revision. In this case, trust is a
specific value attributed to each trustee by each trustor. The main source of
information to compute trust are interactions, either direct or indirect. This
leads to the fact that two different agents, with the same social network and
the same past experiences, will attribute the same trust value to the trustee.
Finally, in the formalism the past interactions used to compute trust should
be similar to the interaction for which a decision must be made, providing a
context-dependant value for trust.
3.3.4 Sierra and Debenham’s Trust Model
In Sierra and Debenham’s model [118], trust is a “. . .measure of expected
deviations of behaviour. . . ” and is represented as a conditional probability.
While in this model trust is only a component and not the focus of attention,
it is still possible to extract some core characteristics of the concept. First of
all, trust represents a relation between what is expected from a signed contract
and what the contract actually says; in this sense, if the trustee is expected to
act in complete disagreement compared to what the contract says, then there
will be complete distrust. Another characteristic of trust is that it is context-
dependant, insofar as the expectancy might be different for different contracts
(someone might behave properly for low-valued contracts and maliciously for
high-valued contracts). Being a conditional probability, trust has a definite
and continuous numerical value. Finally, the value is subjective, given that
different agents might have different access to pieces of information that can
generate different expectancies (an agent might know that the trustee has
breached the terms of conditions of other contracts in the past).
3.3.5 BDI and Repage
The model BDI and Repage [101] integrates a previous model, Repage, with
a BDI (Belief, Desire, Intention) component. This model is a logical frame-
work with which to reason about the reputation of the trustee, considering
the mental attitudes of the trustor. It should be noted that in this model
there is no direct reference to trust, however, for the way the model works,
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the concept of reputation employed falls under the working definition of trust
given in subsection 3.2.1. In the model there are six components, each one
contributing to a final decision. There are three components representing the
three mental states, two components representing communication and plan-
ning and one representing the Repage model. The Repage model should be
considered the principal component representing trust. In such component,
trust is evaluated using two items: the image and reputation of the trustee.
The image stands for personal opinions about the trustee while reputation is
a general and public score. Both scores are context-dependant and they might
differ, in line with the distinction made between trust and reputation. In
Repage, social evaluations are coded as first-order formulas and are organised
as hierarchies of different levels of abstraction, with images and reputation
predicates holding the top positions. The value of each evaluation is indicated
with a quintuple, where an additivity criterion is required; this value of the
image/reputation predicate indicates the trust the trustor has in the trustee.
On top of the Repage component, the three BDI components complement the
model, by suitably manipulating the first-order sentences. In this model, trust
is a relation between two agents depending on a context. Moreover, the value
is completely subjective in nature, given the reference to the mental states of
the trustor and his image. Finally, trust has a definite value, given in terms
of tuples in the Repage component and as Booleans in the final computations
of the whole model (collaborate or not).
3.4 Computational Trust in a Nutshell
In this section, the core features of computational trust extracted in the pre-
vious section from classical computational trust models are summarized and
then compared with the results obtained at the end of the previous chap-
ter. This will help in building an alternative and novel formal trust language,
employable in computer science as a guide to the implementation of the socio-
economical notion of trust.
From the previous section, four characteristics of computational trust can
be extracted. Those characteristics determine the nature of trust in computer
science; trust is: a) relational; b) subjective; c) measurable; d) context de-
pendent. It is argued, given the methodology followed to obtain them, that
those characteristics form a necessary set of elements that all computational
conceptions of trust ought to possess to qualify as such. All characteristics
will be analysed in turn.
Computational trust has a relational nature. This means that there must
always be someone/something trusting (trustor) and someone/something to
be trusted (trustee). What might differ from model to model is the nature
of the entities, their number and the properties of the relation itself. The
entities can be humans or inanimate objects. They can be two entities, making
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the relation one-to-one; they can be groups, making the relation one-to-many,
many-to-one or many-to-many. The properties of the relation can differ, being,
e.g., reflexive (self-trust), symmetric (reciprocal trust) or transitive (referral
trust). All those differences characterize different models and slightly different
conceptions of trust, but they all share the fact that trust is represented as a
relation.
Computational trust has a subjective nature. This means that trust de-
pends for its value on the entity making the valuation. This characteristic is
extremely important, because it might help in distinguishing between aseptic
and impersonal computations from actual trusting evaluations. Even more
important, the subjectivity component helps in drawing a better and clear
distinction between what might be labelled as reputation and what can be
labelled as proper trust. Trust is always something personal, while, on the
other hand, reputation always expresses a general opinion shared by everyone.
“ . . . [T]rust ultimately is a personal and subjective phenomenon
that is based on various factors or evidence, and that some of
those carry more weight than others. Personal experience typi-
cally carries more weight than second hand trust referrals or rep-
utation. . . ” [64]
What might differ from model to model is the way this subjectivity is cap-
tured: the subjective nature of trust might depend, e.g., on the difference in
past interactions between entities or on the different social networks agents
have; sometimes, this subjectivity can be represented using agent-specific gen-
eral attitudes or by specifying an agent’s peculiar mental states.
Computational trust has a measurable nature. This characteristic is what
marks the difference between computational conceptions of trust and tradi-
tional ones. Computational trust is often designed with the idea of imple-
menting the concept in computational systems; being this the case, it is a
prerequisite that the concept is somewhat measurable. On the other hand,
even though it still might be a measurable concept, in traditional models, this
is not a strict requirement. For example, in Luhmann’s works, no direct ref-
erence to measure is ever made, even if some can argue that the presence or
absence of trust is itself a form of measurement (specifically a Boolean form
of measurement). What might differ from model to model is the nature of the
measurability and the number of values trust has: the measures can either be
qualitative (e.g., using words) or quantitative (e.g., using natural numbers);
moreover, there might be any number of values in play, from two (e.g., 0/1) to
a continuous number of them (e.g., using real numbers). It should be noted
that it is always possible to move from qualitative to quantitative valuations
and vice-versa. Likewise, it is possible to move from valuations with more
values to valuations with less values, but the contrary is not always possible.
Finally, computational trust has a context-dependent nature. This char-
acteristic is controversial, since it depends for its necessity on the definition
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of trust that is employed. To understand this point, it should be noted that
in Marsh’s model there were three different concepts of trust and only the
latter (situational trust) depended for its value on the context of application.
Even though controversial, this characteristic of trust is still valuable, espe-
cially considering that computational trust models should be viewed (and are
viewed in this paper) as soft-security mechanisms that favour cooperation and
facilitate transactions on the web. If trust models are viewed as soft-security
mechanisms, different scenarios call for different computations of trust: re-
warding a vendor for the fact that he/she is good at selling books by granting
him/her trust, doesn’t mean the vendor should also be trusted when he/she
sells insurances. Furthermore, even admitting different definitions for trust, it
might still be possible to provide a relevant and related definition of context
that maintains the characteristic intact. For example, using Marsh’s model
again, it is possible to define a notion of general context, i.e., a context that
encompasses all other contexts, for the respective notion of general trust.
3.5 Computational Trust: Variations on the Theme
In this section, two paradigms important for building models for computa-
tional trust are presented and examined (see [61] for an analysis which taken
into consideration other models and proposes another paradigm for computa-
tional trust model constructions). The focus is on abstract evaluations, rather
than on specific models. No specific examples of models will be given, if not
strictly necessary and, even then, only for exemplative purposes. Specifically,
the two paradigms that are examined are the Beta Paradigm [95] and the
EigenTrust Approach [67]. Peculiar features of those paradigms are identified
and the general methodologies they generate are explicated. Stress in put on
ideas, rather than concrete approaches. The aim is to identify possibilities for
improvements, maintaining their good features and modifying the bad ones.
Under those considerations, the section is developed in a descriptive fashion,
trying to limit the use of formulas and mathematical devices to the minimum
necessary. The section in structured as follows: i) first, the Beta Paradigm
is discussed; ii) second, the EigenTrust Approach is explained and iii) finally,
general conclusions will be drawn from the discussion.
3.5.1 Beta Paradigm
“The Beta model is central to the Beta paradigm. ” [95]
The Beta paradigm is a set of assumptions made on how trust (and related
notions) should be interpreted [63]. This paradigm is principally based on
the so called Beta function. A Beta function is a statistical device employed
to properly interpret binary events, whose outcomes are either successes or
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failures. Specifically, a Beta function is classified as a continuous function
indexed by two parameters α and β.
Definition 1 (Beta Function). The Beta distribution, denoted f(p | α, β) can
be expressed using the gamma function Γ as follows, where 0 ≤ p ≤ 1, α > 0,
β > 0:
f(p | α, β) = Γ(α+ β)Γ(α)Γ(β)p
α−1(1− p)β−1 (3.1)
Starting from the Beta function, it is possible to compute expected values
for the occurrence of future events. The expectancy formula is the following:
E(p) = α
α+ β (3.2)
The expected value represent the most likely value of the success of a future
event (which, in this case, are transactions between agents), while the Beta
function indicates the distribution of likelihood of all values (i.e., it indicates,
for all possible values of x, what is the probability that a future interaction
will succeed with likelihood x).
Give this instrument, the Beta paradigm makes three major assumptions
on the nature of trust and how the results of applying the Beta function should
be interpreted:
1. Trust is a interaction-only oriented phenomenon, thus ignoring any spe-
cific cognitive aspects of the interacting agents (nobody is strictly nec-
essary for an exchange to take place, because the goal of the interaction
is all that matters, not the participants); moreover, interactions are all
equal in nature or, at least, similar enough to be grouped under a single
category.
2. All interactions are fully analysable to the point of clearly determining
their goal; on top this, it is objectively possible to identify whether the
goal was achieved or not, univocally and surely determining success and
failure.
3. There is not enough information in the environment which might allow
an agent to determine the other agents mental/cognitive states, therefore
expectations are purely based on computations based on environmental
evaluations.
Note that those assumptions identify a specific class of models with respect
to the taxonomy given in subsection 3.2.2: computational trust models based
on the beta paradigm are game-theoretic, specific, interaction-only based com-
putational trust models.
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The first assumption has the purpose of letting a modeler specify clearly
a meaning for trust opinions, which are simple estimations that future inter-
actions are successful, based on reflections on similar interactions in the past.
Moreover, agency is thought to have very little impact on the success of the in-
teraction, since cognitive phenomena are neglected under the Beta paradigm.
The second assumption has the purpose of creating a standard of evaluation.
On one hand, no interpretation of results is possible; they are either positive
(success) or negative (failure). Moreover, those evaluations are completely ob-
jective, making it possible to treat second-hand information just as first-hand
one. After all, in combination with assumption one, no cognitive aspects can
influence an opinion and therefore there is no space for personal judgement
and taste. The third assumption has the purpose of eliminating disturbing
factors from computations of possible future success. If nothing about the
other agent can be known, expect for how many successful interactions he
had, to compute expectations an agent will employ only such data and ignore
the rest. In the Beta paradigm, the value representing the likelihood behaviour
of an agent is indicated with the word integrity. A correct computation about
the integrity of agents is a central tenet of the Beta paradigm. As quoted
in the opening of the subsection, another tenet of the Beta paradigm is the
Beta model. A Beta model is a formal model based on the Beta distribution
function. In turn, the Beta distribution function is a well-known statistical
device employed in binary systems to compute conditional expected values
given Booleans observations as inputs and the Gamma function as operator
on those inputs [19]. Being a probability distribution function, its role is that
of indicating what is the probability of different integrities of agent, which, in
turn, determine the likelihood that the agent will succeed in a future interac-
tion. Being a function which is constantly updated, it might be said that the
Beta function falls under a Bayesian interpretation of probability. In addition,
by determining the likelihood that an agent has a give integrity, the function
can be said to provide a measure of how much an agent should trust the other
agent in concluding the interaction. In such a sense, the function is also com-
patible with the idea of attributing high likelihood to a low integrity of the
other agent, thus expressing the idea that it is possible to trust someone not
doing something appropriate for the trustor.
As previously pointed out, this kind of paradigm offers a valuable envi-
ronment for specific classes of computational trust models. Moreover, it is
absolutely ideal for reputation systems, where general trustworthiness values
must be computed, ignoring subtleties of single agents intentions and cognitive
states. However, note also that the class it identifies, i.e., game-theoretic, spe-
cific, interaction-only based computational trust models, is highly restricted
and makes assumptions on trust which are in contrast with many experimental
data on what trust is and how it is fostered (see subsection ??. The reason is
still accepted and extensively employed is that the characteristics of this class
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of models are the best available to produce practical computational imple-
mentations, therefore they are all desirable from the point-of-view of applied
computer science. Nonetheless, researchers shouldn’t content theirselves with
those results, mainly because having a conception of computational trust much
different from the socio-economical one might have also impacts on the posi-
tive effects trust fosters, possibly diminishing them to be point of being futile
to have such computational implementations. That said, the Beta paradigm
accomplishes to goal of providing good assumptions that any modeler wishing
to have practical implementations of his formal systems must keep in mind
and this is what is going to be done in future sections of this thesis6.
3.5.2 EigenTrust
EigenTrust is an algorithm employed to manage reputation in P2P networks [67].
Thus, technically speaking, EigenTrust is neither a paradigm nor it refers to
trust. Instead it is a specific algorithm to represent reputation in digital envi-
ronments. Nonetheless, it is included in this section because the assumptions
made when building the algorithm can be seen as a set of features denoting
a specific paradigm for computational trust. In particular, those assumptions
seem to mimic a typical environment where trust might have developed (see
chapter 2). The assumption are that the system in which EigenTrust should
be applied ought to be:
1. Self-Policing, where there is a shared ethic and the enforcement of such
ethic is promoted by the users themselves.
2. Anonymous, where there is no way of individuating directly a user, but
only his digital profile.
3. Profitless for newcomers, where entering the system for the first time,
doesn’t grant any immediate benefit.
4. Minimal in terms of overhead, where the resources required for the sys-
tem to perform well are minimal.
5. Robust, inasfar as it has to be able to survive attacks from malicious
collectives who collaborate.
As said, those assumptions seem to mimic an ideal situation for trust
to emerge: cognitive phenomena are at the centre and are self-regulated by
the agents and not the environment; true intentions and personalities are
opaque, inaccessible to most agents; trust is earned through interactions and
6It is important to be aware that the most prominent model based on the Beta paradigm
is Subjective Logic. The model is not included in this chapter because it will be analysed
thoroughly later in the thesis, where parallels will be built between this formalism and the
one proper of this thesis.
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not granted freely; the task of evaluating trust require minimal effort, thus,
reducing the complexity an agent has to face in his environment; the system
is intentionally designed to overcome cheating behaviours. In this scenario,
EigenTrust provides efficient ways of producing scores, which represent the
willingness of a given agent to collaborate or not with the agent being evalu-
ated. Specifically, agents stock information about interactions in a simple way,
dividing them between satisfactory and unsatisfactory transactions. This in-
formation form local trust values, from which it is possible to compute an
expected value for possible future transactions. However, those transactions
might be rare on the web, where the amount of users and the size of the
market, make it implausible that the exact two agents interact often, thus
limiting oneself to only local trust values might be senseless. For this rea-
son, the main contribution of EigenTrust is that of providing efficient ways of
aggregating local trust values into general trustworthiness values for a given
agent. Therefore, EigenTrust identifies a class of models quite different from
the one individuated by the Beta paradigm. Specifically, it identifies cognitive,
generic and referral based computational trust models. Note that no specific
reference has been made to the typology of information that is taken into
consideration by EigenTrust. This is because, even though the ethics of the
agents participating in the system is important to determine the way the al-
gorithm will spread some data over other, no measure that captures cognitive
information directly is included in the algorithm. Therefore, it seems that the
cognitive information is valuable only as a meta-variable and not as a specific
feature of the computations.
In the algorithm, starting from primitive values (determined by a restricted
set of agents who are assumed to be trustworthy), each agent is associated
with a generic score, obtained by aggregating all the local trust values of
other agents who have had previous interactions with such said agent. The
way data is aggregated allows to address important practical issues. First of
all, it provides a way to compute pre-interaction trust values. It does so by
combining the evaluations of agents with special-status, indicated initially in
the design of the system and seldom updated; thus, this set of agent is solid
with respect to malicious attempts to make the system unstable from the base.
Second, the system can deal with inactive users, where someone is inactive if he
doesn’t interact with other agent for prolonged periods of time. In such a case,
the algorithm sets the value for such agent to that indicated by the pre-trust
evaluators. Finally, and most importantly, the algorithm is able to deal with
malicious collectives (it was actually this issue which encouraged the authors to
develop EigenTrust). This is achieved by including several mechanism which
lower the possibility for an agent to assign high values to close peers in the
system and low values to all the distant peers. By adjusting values according
to a general average and selecting probabilistically the evaluators from which
to take the data, EigenTrust can isolate malicious pees and greatly reduce
their potential to harm the system. Moreover, freeriders (comparable to subtle
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cheaters) are incentivized to become honest dealers. The principal reason is
that, in EigenTrust, higher levels of reputations (and, thus, trust) allow agents
to have access to same-reputation cycles of users. Thus, by reciprocating less,
the freerider would be inserted in a cycle where it is likely that the other agents
are themselves freeriders. This would likely cause the freerider to benefit less
than he could otherwise, therefore increasing his willingness to reciprocate
more and have access to a higher quality cycle.
As with the Beta paradigm, the main advantage of EigenTrust is that
it is easy to implement in computational systems. Moreover, it highlights
aspects of trust which seem to resemble the features typical of a primitive
notion of trust. However, as it has already been noted, those features are
partially relegated to the meta-analysis level, where it becomes apparent that
they are not implemented computationally in a direct way, but are produced
by human beings through the computational system. The difference between
having the features in the system, rather than being used upon the system, is
an important one, since in the latter case, the algorithm would be useless in
a machine-machine or a human-machine interaction. It is therefore important
to recognize that the assumptions made by EigenTrust are also relevant for
computational system and not only biological and sociological systems, but
that those assumptions shouldn’t just be a by-product of the way humans use
the system, but specific features of the system itself.
3.5.3 Learning from the Variations
A close analysis of the two approaches presented for the implementation of
trust in digital environments, made it possible to recognize that there is no
unique and correct way to formalize trust computationally. Specifically, what
is interesting to note, is that the two approaches differ greatly in how they
set the assumptions. The former (Beta paradigm) sees agents as standardized
users, which always evaluate interactions of the same kind; the latter (Eigen-
Trust) is designed with the idea that different agents might act with different
purposes and therefore evaluate situations differently (up to the point of in-
tentionally misjudging).
What should be highlighted, however, is that both system display a great
success in being able to practically implement their respective notions of trust.
They achieve this goal by employing precise and well-designed assumptions
that permit to identify the scope of the models, without giving up genera
spirit. It is therefore necessary, for any suitable system that aspires at a good
representation of computational trust, to mimic the precision with which those
approaches introduced their assumptions and try to recognize which of those
assumptions make the formalisms adapt for practical implementations. In
particular, for the scope of this thesis, and partially inspired by the assump-
tion shown in the previous models, the assumptions which will be taken into
consideration and will be implemented in the design of the logical language
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for trust are:
1. Information is fully analysable, to the point of clearly determining its
content, i.e., the content of the information is always clear to an agent
and, in case of ambiguities or fuzziness, the agent has the necessary re-
sources (let them be time or computational power) to clarify the ambigu-
ities and sort out the fuzziness. It is, thus, always possible to determine
if an information is relevant to an interacting situation and it is possible,
furthermore, to establish whether the information is possessed or not by
the agent which must entertain the interaction. This assumes that the
language employed is itself free from fuzzy or ambiguous concepts.
2. Information in the environment is scarce, thus, most evaluations are
based on personal opinions about this information and not the actual
information per se. This is equivalent to the fact that the most relevant
aspects employed in making decisions are beliefs, rather than actual
knowledge.
3. Not only will new agents lack a trust value, but they will also not be
aware of the trust values of others. In this sense, each new agent must
form his own knowledge base independently, thus achieving his personal
trust values without having to rely of the opinions of others.
4. Even though interactions can be of the same type, they might depend
on different aspects, depending on the agents who are evaluating the
interaction. Therefore no general, universally recognized value, can be
computed based on past interactions, because the success or failure of
a past interaction might depend on contingent elements that where not
factored in the simple annotation of success or failure.
Assumptions 1. - 4. are going to be the starting point for the proposal of
next chapter.
Chapter 4
A Language for Trust
In this chapter, the goal is that of providing a formal structure in which to
reason about trust and its relation with information and knowledge. To achieve
this goal, modal logic will be employed to formalize knowledge, while a special
structure for trust is designed and implemented into the language. There are
four reasons to choose logic, over other formalisms for trust (see chapter 3).
The first reason is that logic has a great descriptive power: once a log-
ical language is built for a given context of application, it is rather easy to
translate really complicated statements within such context with simple logical
formulas; this allows a modeler to avoid ambiguities and to make intelligible
statements that, otherwise, would be hard to comprehend and manipulate.
The second reason is that logic has a great normative power: once gen-
eral rules for derivations and proofs are established, it is easy to determine
good practices of reasoning from bad ones, thus allowing a modeler to check
straightforwardly which facts follow from which other. In the case of trust,
this aspect is even more important, because it might be highly detrimental for
an agent to accept a specific fact as trustworthy based on incorrect inferences.
The third reason is that logic is closely connected to computer program-
ming: excluding the obvious relation between declarative programming and
logical languages (see, e.g., [70]), the standards of precision and clarity of logic
and the way semantical structures are built resemble that of computational
thinking and programming. This allows a modeler to move from specific ma-
nipulations on the semantical structures to the design of algorithms.
The fourth reason is that logical formalisms are set at a highly abstract
level: it makes few assumptions on the way information is represented and
how to implement the actual manipulations on it. Starting from such a high
level of abstraction, it is possible to move top-down towards more concrete
implementations (see chapter 5 for two possibilities of this sort). Achieving the
highest possible abstract description of trust relationships and their interaction
with knowledge should be a desirable goal of a unifying formalism for trust. In
fact, if the goal is achieved, then all instances of trust would be special cases
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of the abstract notions described in the formalism; having such a dependence
between an abstract concept of trust and the concrete examples in which trust
manifests itself can greatly enhance our comprehension of latter instances and
the way various circumstances can elicit feelings of trust.
The standard rigour of logic, coupled with its descriptive and normative
power, makes it a suitable choice for the formalization of complex concepts,
especially of those concepts which play important roles in our lives. The choice
becomes even more desirable, if the formalization is thought to be a first step
towards a computational implementation of the target concepts. Thus, for this
thesis, there was little doubt that the direction to take was that of building
a logical language for trust, rather than develop other existing theories and
models of trust (see chapter 3 for some examples).
As said, the basic language employed in the thesis to formalize trust is
that of modal logic. The semantical structure that will provide meaning to
the formulas of this language is that of augmented neighbourhood semantics
and the part referring to trust depends on a weight assignment to formulas,
where the weights will determine the relevance of those formulas to trust. The
reasons to choose neighbourhood structures1, over the more common relational
structures (otherwise known as Kripke structures) is mainly practical: since in
neighbourhood structures all the operations are performed over set of states,
rather than on formulas, and since those operations are principally algebraic or
set-theoretic in nature, it is straightforward to move from the logical language
to computational implementations. Moreover, being neighbourhood structures
a proper generalization of relational structures, they permit more freedom
in the choice of axioms and properties of the semantical structures. This
flexibility is, again, a desirable feature for a language that is thought as the
theoretical base for practical implementations of a concept of trust: being
able to implement slightly different notions of trust in computational systems,
allows the modeler to adapt his systems to the specific scenarios he is building
such systems for.
The chapter is structured in the following way. In section one, an intro-
duction to the basic modal language and to neighbourhood semantics is made;
focus will be put on theorems and properties of those particular semantical
structures for modal logic. The section is advisable also for expert reader,
inasfar as they can benefit from acquiring some familiarity with the formal-
ism and the various symbols employed. In section two, a first approach to add
trust evaluations to a formal language is explored; in particular, a context-free,
single agent language for trust is introduced and examined. In section three, a
second approach is explored; contexts are added to the semantical structure in
order to properly reproduce the main features of trust (see sections ?? and ??
1This typology of semantical structure has been fairly neglected in the logical literature in
the past forty-five years. However, they received more attention recently: see for example [27,
41, 96, 97, 100].
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to obtain a list of such features). Finally, in section four decidability theorems
will be proved and complexity results will be given for the language introduces
in section three.
4.1 Modal Logic: an Introduction
In this section, a basic introduction to the formal structures employed to build
a logical language for trust is made. The aim is to introduce all the necessary
notions and theorems which will allow the reader to better understand the
reasons and ideas that guide the proposed language given in section 4.3. The
structure of the section is the following. First, a brief introduction to modal
logic and its scope is made. Second, modal logic based on neighborhood
semantics is introduced: specifically, definitions for the syntax and semantics
are given. Third, invariance and decidability results for modal logic based
on neighbourhood semantics are shown (proofs included). Finally, a short
analysis on what might be needed in a logical language to implement trust
measures is made.
4.1.1 Brief Introduction to Modal Logic
The following introduction is based on [12, 21, 48, 100].
Modal logic is a particular branch of logic in which the modeler can qualify
the truth of propositions of the language. In this sense, modal languages are
extremely useful in dealing with reasonings in intensional contexts, that is,
contexts in which the principle of extension does not hold, i.e. it is not possible
to always determine the truth value of composite sentences solely based on the
truth values of their components.
To better understand the difference between extension and intension take
the following example. Take the sentences:
1. Hesperus (the morning star) is Hesperus.
2. Phosphorus (the evening star) is Phosphorus.
3. Hesperus is Phosphorus.
Since both Hesperus and Phosphorus are, in fact, the planet Venus, all
previous sentences say the same thing (convey the same meaning), that is,
Venus is Venus. However, when reading the sentences, sentences 1. and 2.
seem to be uninformative, while 3. provides useful insight about the morning
and the evening stars, i.e. that they are the same object. Those sensations
depend on the fact that words have both a reference/extension (the object
designated by the word) and a sense/intension (the way such word designates
the object). An extensional context is a context in which the reference of
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words is the only thing that matters, while an intensional context is one in
which the sense of words is also relevant.
The extensionality principle is based on this distinction between extension
and intension of a word (sentence)2. The contexts in which the extensional-
ity principle hold are those contexts in which it is possible to substitute in
propositions expressions with the same extension without modifying the truth
value of the proposition (commonly known as substitution salva veritate). An
example of purely extensional context is mathematics. For example, given the
two sentences:
1. 3 + 2 = 5.
2. 5 =
√
25.
It is possible to substitute in the second part of sentence 1. an expression
that is extensionally equivalent to it, i.e., the second part of sentence 2., and
obtain a new sentence with the same truth value, i.e., 3 + 2 =
√
25. In
an intensional context, on the other hand, this kind of substitutions are not
guaranteed to produce equal truth values. Take, as an example, a modified
version of the previous example:
1. I know that 3 + 2 = 5.
2. 5 =
√
25.
Now, produce the same substitution made in the previous example, gen-
erating the sentence: I know that 3 + 2 =
√
25. Assuming that the first two
sentences are true, there is no guarantee that also the third is. This leads to
the conclusion that knowledge contexts (often labelled epistemic contexts) are
intensional. What matters is how an object is designated, not the designated
object per se.
Given its close relation to intensional contexts, modal logic proved to be
incredibly useful to analyses in various fields. From linguistics [91, 92, 93],
to computer science [103], passing through economy [8], modal logic provided
valuable tools to improve the comprehension of different phenomena in differ-
ent fields. In the following sections, it will be shown that this fragment of logic
can provide further benefits to the comprehension of complex phenomena, such
as trust.
4.1.2 Modal Logic: Syntax and Semantics
A language, formal or not, is always defined through syntax and a semantics.
Therefore, in order to define the basic modal language at the base of the main
proposal of this thesis, syntax and semantics will now be presented. Note that
2See [38] for an exposition of the whole theory of sense and reference.
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modal logic can be developed at different levels of generality, but in this thesis
there will be a focus only on the propositional part of modal logic, leaving
aside predicate considerations.
Definition 2 (Basic Modal Language). Given a (finite or countable) set of
basic unanalysed propositions At, the set of well-formed formulas generated
from At, called L, is the smallest set of formulas defined by the following BNF
grammar:
φ := p | ¬φ | φ ∧ φ | (φ) | ♦(φ)
where p ∈ At.
In the following language connectives are interpreted as in standard propo-
sitional logic, while the modalities are given by the two modal operators 
(called box) and ♦ (called diamond). Those (unary) operators are duals, which
means that it is possible to specify one in terms of the other, employing nega-
tions, i.e. (φ) = ¬♦(¬(φ)). The way those modalities are read can vary
depending on the use of the language. They might have, for example, an
alethic or an epistemic reading, where in the former the box modality is read
as “it is necessary that” and in the latter it is read as “it is known that”; other
readings are obviously possible. To formally interpret this language, a seman-
tical structure is necessary. The semantical structure introduced in this thesis
is the one based on neighbourhood semantics. Neighbourhood semantics is a
generalization of standard Kripke semantics for modal logic and is based on
the notion of a neighbourhood frame:
Definition 3 (Neighbourhood Frame). Let S be a non-empty set of states.
A function N : S → ℘(℘(S)) is called a neighbourhood function. A pair
〈S,N〉 is called a neighbourhood frame if S is a non-empty set and N is a
neighbourhood function.
On a neighbourhood frame it is possible to assume some properties. Those
properties are implemented by imposing some constraints on the behaviour of
the N function. Some interesting properties are the following:
Definition 4 (Possible Properties of N). Let S be a non-empty set of states
and U ⊆ ℘(S). Then basic properties of U are:
• U is closed under intersection, if, for any collection of sets {Xi}i∈I
s.t. ∀i ∈ I, Xi ∈ U , ⋂i∈I Xi ∈ U . With | I |= 2, then it becomes closure
under binary intersections. With I finite, it becomes closure under
finite intersections.
• U is closed under unions, if, for any collection of sets {Xi}i∈I s.t.
∀i ∈ I, Xi ∈ U , ⋃i∈I Xi ∈ U . The same considerations as above can be
applied.
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• U is closed under complements, if, for each X ⊆ S, if X ∈ U , then
X ∈ U , where X = {s | s ∈ S, s /∈ X} is the complement of X.
• U is monotonic, if, for each X ⊆ S, if X ∈ U and X ⊆ Y ⊆ S, then
Y ∈ U . Other ways of defining this property are: being supplemented
or being closed under superset.
• U is a clutter if ∅ /∈ U and, moreover, @X,@Y s.t. X,Y ∈ U and
X ⊂ Y .
• U contains the unit, if S ∈ U ; similarly for the empty set.
• U contains its core, if ⋂(U) ∈ U , where the set ⋂(U) is called the core
of U .
• U is proper, if X ∈ U implies X /∈ U .
• U is consistent, if ∅ /∈ U .
• U is non-trivial, if U 6= ∅.
Composite properties of U are:
• U is a filter, if it contains the unit, is closed under binary intersections,
and is monotonic.
• U is a topology, if it contains the unit, the empty set, is closed under
finite intersections, is closed under arbitrary unions.
• U is augmented, if is contains its core and is monotonic.
It is possible, in the language, to extend properties of the function N to
frames. Therefore, it is possible to say that a neighbourhood frame 〈S,N〉 is
augmented, if ∀s ∈ S, N(s) is augmented.
The definition of neighbourhood model follows directly from that of neigh-
bourhood frame:
Definition 5 (Neighbourhood Model). Given a neighbourhood frame F =
〈S,N〉, a model based on F is a tuple 〈S,N, pi〉, where pi : At → ℘(S) is
a valuating function (assigning set of states to each unanalysed proposition
p ∈ At).
Before giving the truth theoretical definition of the language, a further
function is introduced, which is then employed to define the notion of truth-
set of a formula. Note that a neighborhood function N can induce a map
mN , which is a function that associates to each element X ∈ ℘(S) another
element Y ∈ ℘(S), according to the neighborhood function N , i.e. given
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N : S → ℘(℘(S)), we have a mN : ℘(S)→ ℘(S). The function mN is defined
formally as follows:
mN (X) = {s | X ∈ N(s)} (4.1)
Definition 6 (Truth set). Given a neighbourhood modelM = 〈S,N, pi〉, then
the truth set of a formula piextM (φ) is defined recursively as follows:
piextM (p) = pi(p).
piextM (¬(φ)) = S − piextM (φ).
piextM (φ ∧ ψ) = piextM (φ) ∩ piextM (ψ).
piextM ((φ)) = mN (piextM (φ)).
piextM (♦(φ)) = S −mN (S − piextM (φ)).
The definition of truth in a pointed-model (M, s) follows easily:
Definition 7 (Truth). Given a neighbourhood model M = 〈S,N, pi〉 with
s ∈ S. Truth of a formula φ ∈ L at s is defined recursively as follows:
(M, s) |= p iff s ∈ pi(p);
(M, s) |= ¬φ iff s ∈ piext(¬φ);
(M, s) |= φ ∧ ψ iff s ∈ piext(φ ∧ ψ);
(M, s) |= (φ) iff s ∈ piext(φ));
(M, s) |= ♦(φ) iff s ∈ piext(♦φ))
A formula φ is satisfiable if there is some modelM = 〈S,N, pi〉 and state
s ∈ S such that (M, s) |= φ. Similarly, a set of formulas Γ is satisfiable if
∀φ ∈ Γ, (M, s) |= φ. From the notion of satisfiability, it follows the definition
of validity:
Definition 8 (Validity). Given a neighbourhood frame F = 〈S,N〉 and a
neighbourhood modelM = 〈S′, N ′, pi′〉, then: a formula φ ∈ L is valid onM,
denotedM |= φ, when ∀s′ ∈ S′, (M, s′) |= φ; a formula φ is valid at s in F ,
denoted (F , s) |= φ, provided that ∀M based on F , (M, s) |= φ; a formula φ
is valid on F , denoted F |= φ, provided that ∀s ∈ S, (F , s) |= φ. Suppose G
is a class of frames. A formula φ is valid on G, denoted |=G φ, provided that
∀F ∈ G,F |= φ.
The validity definition exhausts the semantical structure.
4.1.3 Modal Logic: Invariance
Invariance results for the basic modal language will now be presented. Such
results are required to obtain logical equivalences of structures based on affini-
ties of the structures themselves. In particular, for modal logic, the best known
concept of equivalence between structures is bisimulation. In this subsection,
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restrictions will be made on neighbourhood models. The main reason is that
the language presented later will be specified in such restricted structures and
therefore it proves useful to discuss the results obtainable for such restricted
structures, rather than the general ones: thus, results about augmented neigh-
bourhood structures will become the focus now.
The definitions are therefore refined as required by the new class of models
that is analysed. The starting point is the definition of the non-monotonic
core of a collection of sets:
Definition 9 (Non-Monotonic Core). Suppose that U is a monotonic collec-
tion of subsets of S. The non-monotonic core, denoted Unmc is a subset of
U defined as: Unmc = {X | X ∈ U and ∀X ′ ⊆ S, if X ′ ⊂ X, then X ′ /∈ U}.
The non-monotonic core of a collection of sets is the set of minimal elements
of the collection under the subset relation. Interestingly, when the set of states
S from which U is formed is finite (as it will be the case for the logical trust
language introduced later), then the non-monotonic core of U is guaranteed
to be non-empty. Moreover, this non-monotonic core completely determines
the elements of U .
From definition 9, it follows that of core-completeness:
Definition 10 (Core Completeness). A monotonic collection of sets U is core
complete provided that ∀X ∈ U ,∃Y ∈ Unmc s.t. Y ⊆ X.
Starting from those definitions (i.e., definitions 9 and 10), five invariance
results can be proven for augmented neighbourhood models. Recall that a
neighbourhood model is said to be augmented if ∀s ∈ S, N(s) is augmented
(i.e., it is monotonic and contains its core). The invariance results which will
be proven are:
1. Invariance under disjoint unions.
2. Invariance under bounded core morphism.
3. Invariance under core bisimulation.
4. Invariance under generated submodels.
5. Invariance under unravelling.
All the results are taken from [48]. In particular, all results which concern
the core of a model are exclusively due to [48], while most other results can
be found in various introductions to modal logic. In particular, historically,
it seems like those results are due to [21], where they are presented without
proofs (which are left as exercises for the reader). Those invariance results are
important for one main reason: it allows the modeler t check the expressivity of
a language. If two models satisfy the same class of formulas, then it can rightly
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be assumed that they can say the same things. Once this result is extended
to all the structures which resemble the canonical model for the semantics
(intuitively: the model capturing all the validities of the semantical structure
and leaving out all the non-theorems), then an expressivity measure for all the
language is identified. Obviously, the more transformations between models
are possible, the better is the control over the expressivity of the language.
Finally, unravelling will prove to be useful in proving the tree model property,
which, in turn, will be useful in proving that the satisfiability problem for the
language is decidable.
Before proceeding with the definitions and proofs of the invariance results,
it will be given a clear definition of modal equivalence and it will be shown that
indeed augmented neighbourhood models are core-complete, thus justifying
the choice of taking invariance results tied to core-complete models, rather
than the general ones.
The definition of modal equivalence is the following.
Definition 11 (Modal equivalence). Given a pointed neighbourhood model
(M, s), indicate with ThL(M, s) the theory of (M, s), i.e. the set of modal
formulas true at s inM: ThL(M, s) = {φ ∈ L | (M, s) |= φ}.
Two pointed models (M, s) and (M′, s′) are said to bemodally-equivalent,
denoted (M, s) ≡L (M′, s′), when ThL(M, s) = ThL(M′, s′).
For the core-completeness of augmented neighbourhood models.
Lemma 1. Augmented neighbourhood models are core-complete models.
Proof. Assume M = 〈S,N, pi〉 is an augmented neighbourhood model. Then,
by definition ∀s ∈ S,⋂N(s) ∈ N(s). Take an arbitrary s. Now take an
arbitrary X ∈ N(s), show that ∃Y ∈ Nnmc(s) s.t. Y ⊆ X. First note that⋂
N(s) ∈ Nnmc(s). Now take Y = ⋂N(s). Given the definition of ⋂N(s)
and the assumption that X ∈ N(s), it follows directly that ⋂N(s) ⊆ X.
Therefore, Y ∈ Nnmc(s) and Y ⊆ X. Concluding, M = 〈S,N, pi〉 is also
core-complete.
It is now possible to proceed with the invariance results. The first truth-
invariant transformation procedure is that of disjoint union.
Definition 12 (Disjoint Unions). Given a collection of disjoint models {Mi =
(Si, Ni, pii)}i∈I , their disjoint union, labelled ⊎(Mi)i∈I = (S,N, pi), where S =⋃
i∈I(Si), pi(p) =
⋃
i∈I(pii(p)), and for X ⊆ S and s ∈ Si:
X ∈ N(s) iff X ∩ Si ∈ Ni(s)
Theorem 1 (Invariance Under Disjoint Unions). Given a collection of disjoint
models {Mi = (Si, Ni, pii)}i∈I and their disjoint union ⊎(Mi)i∈I = (S,N, pi),
then for each formula φ ∈ L, for each i ∈ I and for each s ∈ Si, it holds that:
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(Mi, s) ≡L (⊎(Mi), s).
Proof (Proof of Theorem 1). Start by rephrasing the thesis as follows: ∀φ ∈
L, piext(φ) = ⋃i∈I(piexti (φ)). The proof is given by induction on the structure
of φ. Given an arbitrary i ∈ I and s ∈ Si.
Base Case.
φ is an unanalysed propositions p ∈ At. This follows directly from the
definition of disjoint union, i.e. s ∈ pi(p) iff s ∈ ⋃i∈I(pii(p)).
Inductive Hypothesis (IH).
piext(φ) = ⋃i∈I(piexti (φ)).
Inductive Steps.
Negation: Show that s ∈ piext(¬φ) iff s ∈ ⋃i∈I(piexti (¬φ)).
• s ∈ piext(¬φ) iff s ∈ (S − piext(φ)). [Definition of piext(¬φ)]
• s ∈ (S − piext(φ)) iff s ∈ (S −⋃i∈I(piexti (φ)). [IH]
• s ∈ (S − ⋃i∈I(piexti (φ)) iff s ∈ S and s /∈ ⋃i∈I(piexti (φ)). [Definition of
set difference]
• s ∈ S iff s ∈ ⋃i∈I(Si). [Defition of disjoint union for S]
• s ∈ ⋃i∈I(Si) and s /∈ ⋃i∈I(piexti (φ)) iff s ∈ ⋃i∈I(Si−piexti (φ)). [Definition
of set difference]
• s ∈ ⋃i∈I(Si − piexti (φ)) iff s ∈ ⋃i∈I(piexti (¬φ)). [Definition of piext(¬φ)]
Conjunction: Show that s ∈ piext(φ ∧ ψ) iff s ∈ ⋃i∈I(piexti (φ ∧ ψ).
• s ∈ piext(φ ∧ ψ) iff s ∈ piext(φ) ∩ piext(ψ). [Definition of piext(φ ∧ ψ)]
• s ∈ piext(φ) ∩ piext(ψ) iff s ∈ piext(φ) and s ∈ piext(ψ). [Definition of
intersection]
• s ∈ piext(φ) iff s ∈ ⋃i∈I(piexti (φ)). [IH]
• s ∈ piext(ψ) iff s ∈ ⋃i∈I(piexti (ψ)). [IH]
• s ∈ ⋃i∈I(piexti (φ)) and s ∈ ⋃i∈I(piexti (ψ)) iff s ∈ ⋃i∈I(piexti (φ) ∩ piexti (ψ).
[Definition of intersection]
• s ∈ ⋃i∈I(piexti (φ)∩piexti (ψ) iff s ∈ ⋃i∈I(piexti (φ∧ψ). [Definitio of piext(φ∧
ψ)]
Box modality: Show that piexti (φ) ∈ Ni(s) iff piext(φ) ∈ N(s).
Left-to-right. Assume that piexti (φ) ∈ Ni(s). From IH, it is possible to
derive that piexti (φ) ⊆ piext(φ). Therefore, piext(φ) ∩ Si ∈ Ni(s) (note that
piext(φ)∩Si = piexti (φ)). By definition of disjoint unions for N , piext(φ) ∈ N(s).
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Right-to-left. Assume piext(φ) ∈ N(s). By definition of disjoint unions for
N , piext(φ)∩Si ∈ Ni(s). By IH, piext(φ)∩Si = piexti (φ). Thus, piexti (φ) ∈ Ni(s).
Diamond modality: The proof is obtained by combining the proofs for nega-
tion and the box modality.
The second truth-invariant transformation procedure is that of bounded
core morphism.
Definition 13 (Bounded Core Morphism). Given two core-complete, mono-
tonic models M1 = (S1, N1, pi1) and M2 = (S2, N2, pi2). A function f : S1 →
S2 is a bounded core morphism fromM1 toM2 if
1. s and f(s) satisfy the same unanalysed propositions p ∈ At.
2. If X ∈ Nnmc1 (s), then f [X] ∈ Nnmc2 (f(s)).
3. If Y ∈ Nnmc2 (f(s)), then ∃X ⊆ S1 s.t. f [X] = Y and X ∈ Nnmc1 (s).
Before introducing the concept of invariance under bounded core mor-
phisms, it is useful to introduce the notion of bounded morphism and then
prove the invariance result for such notion. The invariance under bounded
core morphism will then follow easily.
Definition 14 (Bounded Morphism). Given two monotonic models M1 =
(S1, N1, pi1) and M2 = (S2, N2, pi2). A function f : S1 → S2 is a bounded
morphism fromM1 toM2 if
1. s and f(s) satisfy the same unanalysed propositions p ∈ At.
2. If X ∈ N1(s), then f [X] ∈ N2(f(s)).
3. If Y ∈ N2(f(s)), then ∃X ⊆ S1 s.t. f [X] ⊆ Y and X ∈ N1(s).
Lemma 2. Conditions 2. and 3. of definition 14 taken together are equivalent
to the following condition:
f−1[Y ] ∈ N1(s) iff Y ∈ N2(f(s))
Proof (Proof of Lemma 2). Assume conditions 2. and 3. of definition 14
hold. Show that f−1[Y ] ∈ N1(s) iff Y ∈ N2(f(s)).
Assume that f−1[Y ] ∈ N1(s). Given condition 2. of definition 14, f [f−1[Y ]] ∈
N2(f(s)). By the fact that Y ⊇ f [f−1[Y ]] and by monotonicity of N2, Y ∈
N2(f(s)).
Assume that Y ∈ N2(f(s)). Given condition 3. of definition 14, ∃X ⊆
S1 s.t. f [X] ⊆ Y and X ∈ N1(s). From f [X] ⊆ Y it follows that X ⊆
f−1[f [X]] ⊆ f−1[Y ]. By monotonicity of N1, f−1[Y ] ∈ N1(s).
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Now, assume f−1[Y ] ∈ N1(s) iff Y ∈ N2(f(s)) (call it α). Show that
conditions 2. and 3. of definition 14 hold.
For condition 2., assume X ∈ N1(s). By monotonicity of N1, f−1[f [X]] ∈
N1(s) and, by α, f [X] ∈ N2(f(s)).
For condition 3., assume Y ∈ N2(f(s)). By α, f−1[Y ] ∈ N1(s). Given
f [f−1[Y ]] ⊆ Y , the required X can be taken to be f−1[Y ].
The theorem of invariance under bounded morphism follows:
Theorem 2 (Invariance Under Bounded Morphism). Given two monotonic
modelsM1 = (S1, N1, pi1) andM2 = (S2, N2, pi2). If f : S1 → S2 is a bounded
morphism fromM1 toM2, then ∀φ ∈ L and each s ∈ S1:
(M1, s) ≡L (M2, f(s))
Proof (Proof of Theorem 2). Start by rephrasing the thesis as follows: f−1[piext2 (φ)] =
piext1 (φ), where f−1(X) = {s ∈ S1 | f(s) ∈ X}. The proof is given by induction
on the structure of φ.
Base Case.
φ is an unanalysed propositions p ∈ At. This follows directly from condi-
tion 1. of definition 14, i.e. s ∈ f−1[piext2 (p)] iff s ∈ piext1 (p)
Inductive Hypothesis (IH).
f−1[piext2 (φ)] = piext1 (φ)
Inductive Steps.
Negation: Show that s ∈ f−1[piext2 (¬φ)] iff s ∈ piext1 (¬φ).
• s ∈ f−1[piext2 (¬φ)] iff f(s) ∈ piext2 (¬φ). [Definition of f−1]
• f(s) ∈ piext2 (¬φ) iff f(s) ∈ (S2 − piext2 (φ)). [Definition of piext]
• f(s) ∈ (S2−piext2 (φ)) iff f(s) ∈ S2 and f(s) /∈ piext2 (φ). [Definition of set
difference]
• f(s) ∈ S2. [Hypothesis]
• f(s) /∈ piext2 (φ) iff s /∈ piext1 (φ). [IH]
• s ∈ S1 and s /∈ piext1 (φ) iff s ∈ (S1−piext1 (φ)). [Definition of set difference]
• s ∈ (S1 − piext1 (φ)) iff s ∈ piext1 (¬φ). [Definition of piext]
Conjunction: Show that s ∈ f−1[piext2 (φ ∧ ψ)] iff s ∈ piext1 (φ ∧ ψ).
• s ∈ f−1[piext2 (φ ∧ ψ)] iff f(s) ∈ piext2 (φ ∧ ψ). [Definition of f−1]
• f(s) ∈ piext2 (φ ∧ ψ) iff f(s) ∈ piext2 (φ) and f(s) ∈ piext2 (ψ). [Definition of
piext]
4.1 Modal Logic: an Introduction 69
• f(s) ∈ piext2 (φ) iff s ∈ piext1 (φ). [IH]
• f(s) ∈ piext2 (ψ) iff s ∈ piext1 (ψ). [IH]
• s ∈ piext1 (φ) and s ∈ piext1 (ψ) iff s ∈ piext1 (φ ∧ ψ). [Definition of piext]
Box modality: Show that s ∈ f−1[piext2 ((φ))] iff s ∈ piext1 ((φ))
• s ∈ f−1[piext2 ((φ))] iff f(s) ∈ piext2 ((φ)). [Definition of f−1]
• f(s) ∈ piext2 ((φ)) iff f(s) ∈ mN (piext2 (φ)). [Definition of piext]
• f(s) ∈ mN (piext2 (φ)) iff piext2 (φ) ∈ N2(f(s)). [Definition of mN ]
• piext2 (φ) ∈ N2(f(s)) iff f−1[piext2 (φ)] ∈ N1(s). [Lemma 2]
• f−1[piext2 (φ)] ∈ N1(s) iff piext1 (φ) ∈ N1(s). [IH]
• piext1 (φ) ∈ N1(s) iff s ∈ mN (piext1 (φ)]). [Definition of mN ]
• s ∈ mN (piext1 (φ)]) iff s ∈ piext1 ((φ)). [Definition of piext]
Diamond modality: The proof is obtained by combining the proofs for nega-
tion and the box modality.
It is possible now to prove that augmented neighbourhood models are truth
invariant under bounded core morphisms.
Theorem 3. Every bounded core morphism is a bounded morphism.
Proof (Proof of Theorem 3). First note, that to have a bounded core mor-
phism, the models have to be core-complete.
Show that if f is a bounded core morphism, then it is also a bounded
morphism. Assume that f is a bounded core morphism. Show that conditions
1-3 of definition 14 hold.
For condition 1., show that: s and f(s) satisfy the same unanalysed propo-
sitions p ∈ At. This follows directly from condition 1. of definition 13.
For condition 2., show that: If X ∈ N1(s), then f [X] ∈ N2(f(s)). As-
sume X ∈ N1(s). By core-completeness (see definition 10), ∃Y ∈ Nnmc1 (s)
s.t. Y ⊆ X. By condition 2. of definition 13, if Y ∈ Nnmc1 (s), then
f [Y ] ∈ Nnmc2 (f(s)). By the definition of non-monotonic core (see defini-
tion 9), if f [Y ] ∈ Nnmc2 (f(s)), then f [Y ] ∈ N2(f(s)). Given f [Y ] ⊆ f [X] and
monotonicity of N2, f [X] ∈ N2(f(s)).
For condition 3., show that: If Y ∈ N2(f(s)), then ∃X ⊆ S1 s.t. f [X] ⊆
Y and X ∈ N1(s). Assume Y ∈ N2(f(s)). By core-completeness, ∃Z ∈
Nnmc2 (f(s)) s.t. Z ⊆ Y . By condition 3. of definition 13, if Z ∈ Nnmc2 (f(s)),
then ∃W ⊆ S1 s.t. f [W ] = Z and W ∈ Nnmc1 (s). By the definition of
non-monotonic core, if W ∈ Nnmc1 (s), then W ∈ N1(s). Given the fact that
f [W ] = Z ⊆ Y , W is the set we are looking for.
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By theorem 3, it follows that for core-complete neighbourhood models,
bounded-core morphisms preserve truth of formulas.
The third truth-invariant transformation procedure is that of core bisimu-
lation.
Definition 15 (Core Bisimulation). Given two augmented neighbourhood mod-
els M1 = 〈S1, N1, pi1〉 and M2 = 〈S2, N2, pi2〉, a non-empty binary relation
E ⊆ S1 × S2 is a core bisimulation between M1 and M2 (denoted by
E :M1↔cM2), if
• (Local Harmony) If s1Es2, then s1 and s2 satisfy the same unanalysed
propositions, i.e. ∀p ∈ At, s1 ∈ pi1(p) iff s2 ∈ pi2(p).
• (zig)c If s1Es2 and X ∈ Nnmc1 (s1), then ∃X2 ⊆ S2 s.t. X2 ∈ Nnmc2 (s2),
and ∀t2 ∈ X2, ∃t1 ∈ X1 s.t. t1Et2.
• (zag)c If s1Es2 and X2 ∈ Nnmc2 (s2), then ∃X1 ⊆ S1 s.t. X1 ∈ Nnmc1 (s1),
and ∀t1 ∈ X1, ∃t2 ∈ X2 s.t. t1Et2.
As with bounded-core morphisms, it is useful to first introduce the notion
of standard bisimulation for monotonic neighbourhood models, prove the in-
variance result for such transformation and then show that core bisimulations
over core-complete neighbourhood models are also bisimulations over those
models.
Definition 16 (Bisimulation). Given two monotonic neighbourhood models
M1 = 〈S1, N1, pi1〉 and M2 = 〈S2, N2, pi2〉, a non-empty binary relation E ⊆
S1×S2 is a bisimulation betweenM1 andM2 (denoted by E :M1↔M2),
if
• (Local Harmony) If s1Es2, then s1 and s2 satisfy the same unanalysed
propositions, i.e. ∀p ∈ At, s1 ∈ pi1(p) iff s2 ∈ pi2(p).
• (zig) If s1Es2 and X1 ∈ N1(s1), then ∃X2 ⊆ S2 s.t. X2 ∈ N2(s2), and
∀t2 ∈ X2, ∃t1 ∈ X1 s.t. t1Et2.
• (zag) If s1Es2 and X2 ∈ N2(s2), then ∃X1 ⊆ S1 s.t. X1 ∈ N1(s1), and
∀t1 ∈ X1, ∃t2 ∈ X2 s.t. t1Et2.
The theorem of invariance under bisimulation follows:
Theorem 4 (Invariance Under Bisimulation). Given two monotonic models
M1 = (S1, N1, pi1) and M2 = (S2, N2, pi2). If E ⊆ S1 × S2 is a bisimulation
between M1 and M2, then ∀φ ∈ L, s1 ∈ S1 and s2 ∈ S2 s.t. s1Es2, it holds
that:
(M1, s1) ≡L (M2, s2)
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Proof (Proof of Theorem 4). Rephrase the thesis as follows: s1 ∈ piext1 (φ) iff
s2 ∈ piext2 (φ). The proof is given by induction on the structure of φ. Assume
that s1Es2.
Base Case.
φ is an unanalysed propositions p ∈ At. This follows directly from local
harmony.
Inductive Hypothesis (IH).
s1 ∈ piext1 (φ) iff s2 ∈ piext2 (φ).
Inductive Steps.
Negation: Show that s1 ∈ piext1 (¬φ) iff s2 ∈ piext2 (¬φ).
• s1 ∈ piext1 (¬φ) iff s1 ∈ (S1 − piext1 (φ). [Definition of piext]
• s1 ∈ (S1 − piext1 (φ) iff s1 ∈ S1 and s1 /∈ piext1 (φ). [Definition of set
difference]
• s2 ∈ S2. [Hypothesis]
• s1 /∈ piext1 (φ) iff s2 /∈ piext2 (φ). [IH]
• s2 ∈ S2 and s2 /∈ piext2 (φ) iff s2 ∈ (S2 − piext2 (φ). [Definition of set
difference]
• s2 ∈ (S2 − piext2 (φ) iff s2 ∈ piext2 (¬φ). [Definition of piext]
Conjunction: Show that s1 ∈ piext1 (φ ∧ ψ) iff s2 ∈ piext2 (φ ∧ ψ).
• s1 ∈ piext1 (φ ∧ ψ) iff s1 ∈ piext1 (φ) and s1 ∈ piext1 (ψ). [Definition of piext]
• s1 ∈ piext1 (φ) iff s2 ∈ piext2 (φ). [IH]
• s1 ∈ piext1 (ψ) iff s2 ∈ piext2 (ψ). [IH]
• s2 ∈ piext2 (φ) and s2 ∈ piext2 (ψ) iff s2 ∈ piext2 (φ ∧ ψ). [Definition of piext]
Box modality: To prove the theorem for the box modality, go back to the
original statement. Therefore, show that:
(M1, s1) |= (φ) iff (M2, s2) |= (φ)
Left-to-right:
Assume (M1, s1) |= (φ). By the definition of piext and that of mN , it
follows that piext1 (φ) ∈ N1(s1). By the (zig) condition, there is a Y ⊆ S2 s.t.
Y ∈ N2(s2) and ∀t2 ∈ Y , ∃t ∈ piext1 (φ) s.t. t1Et2. By (IH), it follows that
Y ⊆ piext2 (φ). By monotonicity, piext2 (φ) ∈ N2(s2). By the definition of piext
and that of mN , it follows that (M2, s2) |= (φ).
Right-to-left:
4.1 Modal Logic: an Introduction 72
Symmetrical to the left-to-right direction, employing the (zag) condition
instead of the (zig).
Diamond modality: The proof is obtained by combining the proofs for nega-
tion and the box modality.
By proving that a core bisimulation is also a bisimulation, the truth-
invariance theorem will apply also to core bisimulations3
Theorem 5. Given two core-complete, monotonic models M1 = (S1, N1, pi1)
and M2 = (S2, N2, pi2). If E ⊆ S1 × S2 is a core bisimulation between M1
andM2, then it is also a bisimulation between them.
Proof (Proof of Theorem 5). Assume that E is a core bisimulation between
M1 andM2. Show that E satisfies all conditions of bisimulations.
The local harmony condition is straightforward, since the two conditions
state the same fact.
For the (zig) condition. Assume s1Es2 and X ∈ N1(s1). By core-completeness,
∃Y1 ∈ Nnmc1 (s1) s.t. Y1 ⊆ X. By the (zig)c condition of core bisimulation,
∃Y2 ⊆ S2 s.t. Y2 ∈ Nnmc2 (s2) and ∀t2 ∈ Y2, ∃t1 ∈ Y1 s.t. t1Et2. Since Y1 ⊆ X,
∀t2 ∈ Y2, ∃t1 ∈ X s.t. t1Et2. By the definition of non-monotonic core, it also
follows that Y2 ∈ N2(s2). Therefore, the (zig) condition is satisfied.
For the (zag) condition. Analogous to the (zig) condition, employing the
(zag)c condition instead of the (zig)c.
The fourth truth-invariant transformation procedure is that of generated
submodels.
The starting point of the procedure of generated submodels, is the defini-
tion of submodel:
Definition 17 (Submodel). Given a monotonic neighbourhood model M =
(S,N, pi). ThenM′ = (S′, N ′, pi′) is a submodel ofM if
• S′ ⊆ S.
• ∀p ∈ At, pi′(p) = pi ∩ S′.
• N ′ = N ∩ (S′ × ℘(S′)), i.e. ∀s ∈ S′ : N ′(s) = {X ⊆ S′ | X ∈ N(s)}.
Given a monotonic model M = (S,N, pi) and any subset S′ of S, it is
possible to construct the related submodel, denoted by M S′= (S′, N S′
, pi S′).
Starting from the notion of submodel, it is possible to define a notion
of generated submodel (i.e., a notion of submodel that guarantees truth-
invariance).
3It is indeed possible to prove that the two concepts are equivalent, where every bisimu-
lation over core-complete, monotonic models, is also a core-bisimulation.
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Definition 18 (Generated Submodel). Given a monotonic neighbourhood
model M = (S,N, pi) and a submodel of M, M′ = (S′, N ′, pi′). M′ is a
generated submodel of M, if the identity map i : S′ → S is a bounded
morphism, i.e., ∀s′ ∈ S′ and ∀X ⊆ S,
(i−1[X] = X ∩ S′) ∈ N ′(s′) iff X ∈ N(s′).
With the definition of generated submodel for monotonic neighbourhood
models, the truth invariance result for generated submodels follows directly
from the proof of truth-invariance for bounded morphism.
Given a monotonic model M = (S,N, pi) and a subset X of S, the sub-
model generated by X in M is defined as the submodel M S′ , where
S′ = ⋂Y X ⊆ Y withM Y being a generated submodel ofM.
Moreover, for a core-complete, monotonic modelM = (S,N, pi) and X ⊆
S, the submodel generated by X inM can also be obtained by restrictingM
to the subset Wω(X), whose definition is:
Definition 19 (Rooted Model). Given a core-complete, monotonic model
M = (S,N, pi). For X ⊆ S, Nnmcω (X) and Wω(X) are defined recursively
as follows:
For Nnmcω (X):
• Nnmc0 (X) =
⋃
x ∈ XNnmc(x)
• Nnmcn+1 (X) =
⋃
x ∈Wn+1(X)Nnmc(x)
• Nnmcω (X) =
⋃
x ∈Wω(X)Nnmc(x)
For Wω(X):
• W0(X) = X
• Wn+1(X) = ⋃Y ∈Nnmcn (X) Y
• Wω(X) = ⋃n∈ωWn(X)
If Wω({s}) = S, thenM is called a rooted model with root s.
Those definitions will prove to be useful in the definition of the next truth-
invariant transformation procedure, which is unravelling.
Definition 20 (Tree-like Models). Given a core-complete, monotonic model
M = (S,N, pi) and a root element of S, i.e., root ∈ S, a modelMroot is said
to be a tree-like monotonic model if the following hold:
• S = Wω({root}).
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• ∀s ∈ S, s /∈ ⋃n>0Wn({s}).
• ∀s1, s2, t ∈ S and ∀X1, X2 ⊆ S, if v ∈ X1 ∈ Nnmc(s1) and v ∈ X2 ∈
Nnmc(s2), then X1 = X2 and s1 = s2.
Intuitively, this definition says that a core-complete, monotonic neighbour-
hood model is tree-like, if all states of the model are reachable from the state,
indicated as the root of the model, through a sequence of core neighbourhoods.
Moreover, all such neighbourhoods must be disjoint and unique. Finally, the
path traced must not contain cycles, i.e., no neighbourhoods might contain
the root of the model. Such models are interesting because it can be shown
that if a formula is satisfiable in a core-complete neighbourhood model, then
it is satisfiable in a tree-like model, where the formula is true at the root of
the model. The important step, therefore, is that of obtaining a truth invari-
ant transformation of core-complete, neighbourhood models which turns them
into tree-like models. Unravelling is such transformation.
Before introducing the unravelling transformation, some formal elements
must be defined.
Definition 21. Given a monotonic modelM = (S,N, pi) and a state s1 ∈ S,
the set ~Ss1 is defined as follows: ~Ss1 = {(s1X2s2X3s3 . . . Xnsn) | n ≥ 0 and
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, Xi ∈ N(si−1) and si ∈ Xi}
From each (s1X2s2X3s3 . . . Xnsn) ∈ ~Ss1 , it is possible to define two maps:
1. Pre: (s1X2s2X3s3 . . . Xnsn) 7→ (s1X2s2X3s3 . . . Xn−1sn−1Xn)
2. Last: (s1X2s2X3s3 . . . Xnsn) 7→ sn
Definition 22. Given a monotonic model M = (S,N, pi), x¯ ∈ ~Ss1 and Y ⊆
~Ss1, define a neighbourhood function ξ : ~Ss1 → ℘(℘( ~Ss1)) as follows: Y ∈ ξ(x¯)
iff ∀y¯ ∈ Y (Pre(y¯) = x¯X) and Last[Y ] = X ∈ N(Last(x¯), for some X ∈ ℘(S).
Definition 23. Given a monotonic model M = (S,N, pi), the neighbourhood
function ~Ns1 is defined taking ξ and closing it under superset, i.e., Y ∈ ~Ns1(x¯)
iff ∃Y ′ ∈ ξ(x¯) s.t. Y ′ ⊆ Y .
Finally, a definition for the valuation functions:
Definition 24. Given a monotonic modelM = (S,N, pi), the valuation func-
tion ~pis1 is defined as follow: x¯ ∈ ~pis1(p) iff Last(x¯) ∈ pi(p).
From those definitions it is possible to define the unravelling of a model.
Definition 25 (Unravelling of Models). Given a monotonic model M =
(S,N, pi) and a state s1 ∈ S, the unravelling of M from s1 is defined
as the model ~Ms1 = ( ~Ss1 , ~Ns1 , ~pis1)
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Given the fact that the map Last : ~Ms1 → M is a bounded morphism,
it holds that an unravelled model is truth-invariant compared to the starting
model.
One interesting aspect of unravelling is that it is possible to prove, for
monotonic modal logic based on neighbourhood semantics, that the tree model
property holds. Specifically, the property states that if a formula is satisfied
in a model, then it is satisfied also at the root of some tree-like model.
Theorem 6 (Tree Model Property). Given a modal formula φ ∈ L, if φ is
satisfiable in some monotonic model, then φ is satisfiable at the root of some
tree-like monotonic model.
Proof (Proof of Theorem 6). Given the monotonic model M = (S,N, pi)
which satisfies φ at state s ∈ S, M can be unravelled from s to produce an
unravelled version of the model ~Ms = ( ~Ss, ~Ns, ~pis) as defined in definition 25.
Given the invariance result for such transformation, it is true that (M, s) |= φ
iff ( ~Ms, (s)) |= φ. Given the assumption, the formula φ is satisfied at the root
of the tree-like model.
For what concerns this thesis, this last invariance result concludes the
discussion over truth-invariant transformations of models. However, before
moving to the reflections about trust in logical languages, an interesting result
should be mentioned.
Specifically, it is interesting to see that augmented neighbourhood mod-
els are in a one-to-one correspondence with standard Kripke models. This is
interesting because those standard models are often employed to model knowl-
edge in computational systems. The proof of the one-to-one correspondence
follows.
The definition of a standard Kripke model is the following:
Definition 26 (Kripke/Relational Models). A Kripke frame is a tuple
〈S,R〉, where S is a non-empty set of states and R ⊆ S × S is a relation
on S. A Kripke model is a triple M = 〈S,R, V 〉, where 〈S,R〉 is a Kripke
frame and V : At → ℘(S) is a valuation function assigning sets of states
to atomic propositions.
In a relational model, truth of a formula at a pointed model is defined in
the following way:
Definition 27 (Truth in a Relational Structure). Given a modelM = 〈S,R, V 〉
and a formula φ, the formula is true at a pointed model (M, s) in the following
sense:
(M, s) |= p iff s ∈ pi(p);
(M, s) |= ¬φ iff (M, s) 6|= φ;
(M, s) |= φ ∧ ψ iff (M, s) |= φ and (M, s) |= ψ;
(M, s) |= (φ) iff ∀t s.t. sRt, (M, t) |= φ.
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Note now that, given a relation R on a set S, it is possible to define two
corresponding functions:
• R→ : S → ℘(S). For each s ∈ S, let R→(s) = {t | sRt}.
• R← : ℘(S)→ ℘(S). For each X ⊆ S, let R←(X) = {s | ∃t ∈ X s.t. sRt}.
From those definition it is possible to define the notion of R− necessity.
Definition 28 (R-Necessity). Given a relation R on a set S and a state s ∈ S,
a set X ⊆ S is R-necessary at s if R→(s) ⊆ X. Define NRs to be the set
of sets that are R-necessary at s, i.e., NRs = {X | R→(s) ⊆ X}. The R
superscript will be omitted when R is clear from context.
One nice property of R− necessary sets is the following:
Lemma 3. Given a relation R on a set S, then ∀s ∈ S,NRs is augmented.
Proof (Proof of Lemma 3). Take an arbitrary R on S and an arbitrary s ∈ S.
Show that NRs is augmented, i.e., that NRs is monotonic and that it contains
its core. For monotonicity: Assume that X ∈ Ns, show that if X ⊆ Y ⊆ S,
then Y ∈ NRs . Assume that X ⊆ Y ⊆ S. Since X ∈ NRs , then R→(s) ⊆ X.
Given the assumption that X ⊆ Y , then, by transitivity of the subset relation,
R→(s) ⊆ Y . By definition of NRs , Y ∈ NRs . For core containment: Show that⋂(NRs ) ∈ NRs . By the definition of NRs , ∀X ∈ NRs , R→(s) ⊆ X, therefore
R→(s) is the smallest set common to all subsets of NRs . Therefore
⋂(NRs ) =
R→(s). By the equality condition of the subset relation, R→(s) ⊆ R→(s). By
the definition of NRs , R→(s) ∈ NRs . By substitution,
⋂(NRs ) ∈ NRs .
Given the two definitions of augmented neighbourhood models and of
Kripke models, it is now possible to prove the modal equivalence between
the class of relational models and that of augmented neighbourhood models.
First define a notion of equivalence between relational and neighbourhood
frames.
Definition 29 (Point-wise equivalence). Given a non-empty set S, a neigh-
bourhood frame F = 〈S,N〉 and a relational frame F = 〈S,R〉, F and F are
said to be point-wise-equivalent if ∀X ⊆ S, X ∈ N(s) iff X ∈ NRs .
Before providing the proof of the equivalence between the two classes of
models, two lemmas are necessary.
Lemma 4. Given a relational frame F = 〈S,R〉, there is a modally equivalent
augmented neighbourhood frame.
Proof (Proof of Lemma 4). Take an arbitrary relational frame F = 〈S,R〉.
Build a neighbourhood frame F = 〈S′, N〉 in the following way: for S′, just
take the set S of the relational frame. For N , set each N(s) = NRs , where the
relation R is that of the relational frame. By lemma 3, it is guaranteed that
those NRs are augmented, therefore the frame F is also augmented.
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Lemma 5. Given an augmented neighbourhood frame F = 〈S,N〉, there is a
modally equivalent relational frame.
Proof (Proof of Lemma 5). Take an arbitrary augmented neighbourhood frame
F = 〈S,N〉. Build a relational frame F = 〈S′, R〉 in the following way: for S′,
just take the set S of the augumented neighbourhood frame. For R, set that
s1Rs2 only if s2 ∈ ∩N(s1). It is now necessary to show that for each s ∈ S,
NRs = N(s). Assume s ∈ S and X ⊆ S.
Assume that X ∈ NRs , then R→(s) ⊆ X. Since R→(s) = ∩N(s) and N
contains its core, R→(s) ∈ N(s). Moreover, given the fact that N is mono-
tonic, X ∈ N(s).
Now, assume that X ∈ N(s), then ∩N(s) ⊆ X. Therefore, X ∈ NRs .
Theorem 7 (Equivalence between Relational and Augmented Neighbourhood
Models). Given an augmented neighbourhood frame F = 〈S,N〉 and a rela-
tional frame F = 〈S,R〉, if F and F are point-wise equivalent, then, for any pi
and ∀s ∈ S, ifM = 〈F , pi〉 and M = 〈F, pi〉, then (M, s) ≡L (M, s).
Proof (Proof of Theorem 7). Assume that F = 〈S,N〉 and F = 〈S,R〉 are
point-wise equivalent. Take an arbitrary pi and an arbitrary s ∈ S. Show
that (M, s) ≡L (M, s), with M = 〈F , pi〉 and M = 〈F, pi〉. The proof is by
induction on the structure of the formula φ.
Base Case.
φ is an unanalysed propositions p ∈ At. This follows directly from the fact
that the valuation pi and the set S is the same on both structures.
Inductive Hypothesis (IH).
The piext(φ) is the same in both structures.
Inductive Steps.
All Boolean cases follow directly from arguments similar to the one given
for the base case.
Box modality: Show that (M, s) |= (φ) iff (M, s) |= (φ).
Left-to-right.
Assume (M, s) |= (φ). Then s ∈ piext((φ)), which means that s ∈
mN (piext(φ). By definition, this means that piext(φ) ∈ N(s). By the definition
of point-wise equivalence, it follows that piext(φ) ∈ NRs . By definition of NRs ,
it follows that R→(s) ⊆ piext(φ), therefore, φ holds in all states accessible from
s. Thus, (M, s) |= (φ).
Right-to-left.
Assume (M, s) |= (φ). This means that φ holds in every state accessible
from s. Thus R→(s) ⊆ piext(φ). By definition of NRs , it follows that piext(φ) ∈
NRs . By the definition of point-wise equivalence, it holds that piext(φ) ∈ N(s).
By the definition of mN and of truth in a neighbourhood model, it follows that
(M, s) |= (φ).
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Diamond modality: The proof is obtained by combining the proofs for nega-
tion and the box modality.
Putting together theorem 7 with lemmas 4 and 5, it holds that the two
classes of models are modally equivalent. Therefore, general results concering
one of the semantical structures, also hold in the other.
4.1.4 Reasoning About Trust
Adding trust to the semantical structure of a logical language is no easy task.
What is required is an element, inside the structure, that can evaluate trust
formulas according to a proper definition of computational trust. As argued
in previous chapters of this thesis (see chapters 2 and 3), such a notion must
account for the fact that trust is a relation, that trust is measurable, that this
measure is subjective and that it can vary depending on different contexts
of evaluation. Thus, what the structure should contain is, first of all, a set
of evaluation contexts in which to assess trust. Moreover, in each of those
contexts, all else equal, different agents must be allowed to attribute different
values to trust. Those measures must depend on various elements known by
the agent. As it has been shown, which elements are relevant can vary greatly
depending on how computational trust models are built, starting from just
reputation scores, up to complex data such as the mental states of other agents.
Regardless of how many and which ones should be taken into account, a general
model for computational trust, must allow agent to attribute relevance values
to those elements, in order to transform those relevance for trust values into
actual trust values. Finally, the trickiest part is that of representing trust
as a relation. This might be straightforward in a setting where predicate
logic is employed; however, in this thesis, the focus is on the modal fragment
of propositional logic, therefore, there is no direct space for relations in the
language. To overcome this difficulty, the best way is to translate relations
into propositions and then assess trust over those propositions. This simple
solution can then generalize the concept of trust, allowing it to be assessed for
all formulas of the language. In this sense, trusting a formula becomes equal
to trusting that the formula under analysis is true. The fact that trust, so
intended, becomes a modality over truth is interesting, because its treatment
can become quite similar to that of other modal operators for which properties
and general rules are studied. Despite this nice parallel, formalising trust in
this way in a logical language expresses a quite strong view on trust. This
view, although reasonable, is far from being innocent., therefore, the approach
should be seen as one among many others, which might turn out to be more
intuitive. On the other hand, the approach presented in this thesis seem to be
a good one under many aspects. For instance, the semantical structure which
will be proposed possesses many desirable properties a semantical structure
ought to possess (e.g., being decidable with respect to most decision problems);
in addition, the tools which characterize the structure can be employed to draw
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parallels with other formalisms, allowing a strengthening of those formalisms;
finally the formalism is simple and straightforward and its internal procedures
permit easy implementations in computational systems.
In the next sections, two versions of the language will be proposed: the
first one will be contextless, where it should be assumed that the context of
evaluation is set beforehand by the modeller and thus making the language
application-specific; the second language will include the contexts, making it
a more versatile version of the previous one. At this stage, contexts are still
seen as primitives. This is an issue which should be explored more deeply and
which is, unfortunately, relegated to future works. Another important aspect
is that both languages are single-agent and thus, do not allow for interactions
between trust and knowledge of different agents inside the same language.
However, differently from the analysis required by contexts, building multi-
agent languages should not be troublesome. Unfortunately, this thesis does
not contain any detailed analysis of such possibilities. One final extension
which might prove to be interesting is that of a dynamic language, in which
trust values and knowledge could be transferred from agent to agent. Again,
this is a proposal for the future and thus, not included in the thesis.
4.2 A Context-Free Language for Trust
It will now be introduced the syntax and semantics of a formal language that
will allow to reason about knowledge and trust and, furthermore, to provide
a trust computing mechanism that can produce values to be fed into other
models’ manipulation component. The language will be called Modal Logic
for Trust (MLT) and, specifically, Context-free Modal Logic for Trust (CF-
MLT) and Contextual Modal Logic for Trust (C-MLT).
The leading idea of the framework comes from the assumption made at
the end of chapter 3, i.e., that a system in which a computational concept of
trust must be implemented should have the following features:
1. Information is fully analysable to the point of clearly determining its
content. It is, thus, always possible to determine if an information is
relevant to an interacting situation and it is possible, furthermore, to
establish whether the information is possessed or not by the agent which
must entertain the interaction.
2. Information in the environment is scarce, thus, most evaluations are
based on personal opinions about this information and not the actual
information per se. This is equivalent to the fact that the most relevant
aspects employed in making decisions are beliefs, rather than actual
knowledge.
3. Not only will new agents lack a trust value, but they will also not be
aware of the trust values of others. In this sense, each new agent must
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form his own knowledge base independently, thus achieving his personal
trust values without having to rely of the opinions of others.
4. Even though interactions can be of the same type, they might depend
on different aspects, depending on the agents who are evaluating the
interaction. Therefore no general, universally recognized value, can be
computed based on past interactions, because the success or failure of
a past interaction might depend on contingent elements that where not
factored in the simple annotation of success or failure.
Another important aspect which determined specific decisions concerning
the language come from an insight found in [64]:
“ . . . [T]rust ultimately is a personal and subjective phenomenon
that is based on various factors or evidence, and that some of
those carry more weight than others. Personal experience typically
carries more weight than second hand trust referrals or reputation
. . . ”
The idea is therefore that of using the expressive power of a formal language
to describe the information possessed by an agent and then transform this
knowledge into a trust value about a given proposition.
This idea of linking possessed knowledge and trust is not a novel one.
In the sociological literature, one of the authors expressing the idea of the
importance of this link is Russell Hardin:
“ . . . rational subjects must choose in the light of what knowledge
they have, and that knowledge determines their capacities for trust.
. . . It is commonly argued that trust is inherently embedded in
iterated, thick relationships. But such relationships are merely
one source of relevant knowledge in a street-level epistemological
account. Early experience may heavily influence later capacity for
trust. For example, bad experiences may lead to lower levels of
trust and therefore fewer opportunities for mutual gain. ” [54]
It is therefore advisable to construct a language that uses knowledge as an
enabling factor for trust. This insight, coupled with the fact that modal logic
is one of the best available formal languages for modelling knowledge [58],
inspired the idea of designing a language for trust embedded in modal logic.
The language which derives from those choices is similar to an evidence-
based logic (where evidence is represented as possessed knowledge4), such
that different pieces of evidence are assigned weights that determine whether
an agent trusts a given proposition or not. Basically, the language is a modal
4See [13] for another example on how evidence can be represented.
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language augmented with a trust operator, interpreted in an augmented neigh-
borhood semantical structure5.
4.2.1 Syntax
In the language (CF-MLT) L(At) (for short L) of logic formulas (which are
ranged over by φ, ψ, . . . ), the starting point is the finite set At of atomic propo-
sitions representing basic pieces of information. Given p ∈ At the language is
defined by the following BNF grammar:
φ := p | ¬φ | φ ∧ φ | K(φ) | T (φ)
All other connectives are defined in the standard way and are included (as
abbreviations) a dual operator for knowledge and one for trust (expressing
possible knowledge and possible trust):
1. φ ∨ ψ := ¬(¬φ ∧ ψ);
2. φ→ ψ := ¬φ ∨ ψ;
3. φ↔ ψ := (φ→ ψ) ∧ (ψ → φ);
4. K̂(φ) := ¬K(¬φ);
5. T̂ (φ) := ¬T (¬φ)
Formula K(φ) should be intuitively read as “formula φ is known”; such
formulas are called knowledge formulas. Formula T (φ) should be intuitively
read as “formula φ is trusted”; such formulas are called trust formulas. The
degree to which a formula can be trusted goes from 0, complete distrust, to
1, complete trust; the point of transition from distrust to trust will strictly
depend on the semantical structure interpreting the language.
4.2.2 Semantics
The semantics provided in this section is in truth theoretical form and de-
pends on a structure that is a combination of an augmented neighborhood
structure for modal logics [100] and an added component to assign weights to
formulas. This added component is fundamental to interpret trust formulas.
Even though it has been stressed their importance for trust evaluations, in
this first version of the language, contexts are not included. This little caveat
implies that the notion of trust captured by this logical language is one that
is multiplex in nature, as defined in chapter two. On the other hand, both
5See [21, 48, 72, 12] for a general introduction to modal logics and monotonic neighbor-
hood structures. Moreover, see [124] for an approach that interprets the same language in a
standard relational structure.
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the how and the whom dimensions are fully captured by the laguage, since
the information chosen by the evaluating agent might be both fully strategic
or moralistic, while the object of trust can be both single agents (when the
formulas evaluated concern only single entities) or whole groups (when the
formulas evaluated express information about a whole group). Note, there-
fore, that the language allows a high level of freedom to the modeler, who can
freely choose to describe or reason about many different situations.
The language is interpreted in the following structure:
Definition 30 (Context-free Trust Model). A context-free trust model is
a tuple M = (S, pi,N, T , θ), where
• S is a finite set of possible states of the system which is modeled s, s′, . . . 6.
• pi is a valuation function, assigning set of states to atomic propositions.
• N is an augmented neighborhood function.
• T = {〈ω, µφ〉 | φ ∈ L} is a trust relevance structure.
• θ is a trustworthiness threshold function.
A context-free trust model in which there is no valuation function pi is
called a context-free trust frame.
Intuitively, a possible state s ∈ S represents a way in which the system
(either the real world or the states of a computing device) can be specified7;
hence, two states differ from one another by what propositions hold in such
states. It is assumed that states are maximally consistent descriptions of the
system. They are maximal inasfar as the truth value of each proposition is
specified. They are consistent inasfar as a proposition and its negation can’t
both be trusted in the same state.
Function pi is a valuation function that assigns to each proposition p ∈ At
a set of states, i.e., pi : At → ℘(S); a state is included in the set if, and only
if, the proposition holds in the given state8. Starting from pi it is possible
6Often, in logic, those states are also called possible worlds, without any reference to the
systems being modeled. On the other hand, it is customary in computer science to refer
to systems which are being modelled and possible states as possible configurations (e.g.,
distribution of values to the variables in the description of the system) of the system.
7Here the reference is made to systems whose states can be determined clearly. The
language chosen is typical of computer science, where the objects that are modeled are often
computational systems and where the specifics are the values of the variables defining the
system.
8This is an important point in the language, because most functions employed work on
states (sets of states) rather than on propositions and/or formulas. However, note that it is
always possible to move from propositions to sets of states in which such propositions hold,
and viceversa. Therefore, it is reasonable and intuitive to assume that all functions working
on sets of states, actually work on propositions instead. The same holds when generalizing
to formulas in place of atomic propositions.
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to define a further labeling function L : S → ℘(At): L is a function that
associates each state with the subset of atomic propositions that are true in
that state. The labeling function L is introduced to simplify the discussion
in the sections that will follow, however, this function is not strictly needed,
thus it is not part of the semantical structure for the language.
Function N is an augmented neighborhood function that assigns to each
state s ∈ S a set of subsets of S, i.e., N : S → ℘(℘(S)); the set of subsets
obtained by applying N is closed under superset, i.e., for each X ⊆ S and
each s ∈ S, if X ∈ N(s) and X ⊆ Y ⊆ S, then Y ∈ N(s). Moreover, N
contains its core, i.e., ∩N(s) ∈ N(s). Intuitively, function N assigns to each
state the sets of states corresponding to the known propositions in such state 9.
The neighborhood function is employed to interpret the knowledge operators
of the language. Note that using neighborhood functions knowledge is defined
directly10: thus, once the informative content of a proposition is determined (in
the specific case by applying function pi), the function N assigns to each state
of the system a set containing all those contents corresponding to the known
propositions. The closure under superset condition expresses the intuitive idea
that when something is known, weakened pieces of information derived from
the knowledge possessed are also known 11. The closure under core, on the
other hand, indicates that an agent is always aware of the conjunction of the
information he possesses.
T is a trust relevance structure, where for each φ ∈ L, there is an ordered
couple 〈ω, µφ〉. ω is a function that assigns to each formula φ ∈ L a consistent12
set of subsets of S, i.e., ω : L → ℘(℘(S) − ∅) (this condition expresses the
informal idea that contradictions might not be considered relevant for trust
formulas). This consistent set, which we call Ωφ, contains the sets of states
corresponding to the formulas relevant for trust in φ. µφ is a trust weight
function, assigning to elements in Ωφ rational numbers in the range [0, 1]
according to their relevance for trust in the formula, i.e. µφ : Ωφ → [0, 1] ∈ Q.
0 represents no trust relevance and 1 represents full trust relevance. It is
assumed that the weights assigned are subadditive to 1, i.e., ∑X∈Ωφ µφ(X) ≤
1, guaranteeing that it is never possible to exceed full trust (i.e. the value 1).
Intuitively, the functions µφ assign to the trust relevant formulas a specific
weight for trust, with respect to a given formula φ, which is evaluated for
9To make the exposition simpler during the course of the paper, elements of ℘(S) will be
indicated with letters from the end of the alphabet capitalized and with eventual superscripts
and subscripts, i.e., X,X2, Y,X ′, X ′2, Y ′ . . . .
10This is a completely different approach from standard relational structures, where the
modally relevant operators are defined in terms of truth in the structure. However, note that
there is a one-to-one correspondence between relational structures and augmented neighbour-
hood structures
11For instance, if a proposition p is known at a state s, i.e., pi(p) ∈ N(s), then also p ∨ q
is known at s, i.e., pi(p ∨ q) ∈ N(s).
12Recall that the definition of consistency for a collection of sets is the following: U is
consistent, if ∅ /∈ U .
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trust. The notion of relevance employed is an intuitive one: an information
related to a formula is relevant for trust, if knowing such information would
modify the trust assessment made towards that formula. Obviously, having
no trust relevance means that whether or not the information is known, the
trust assessment would be the same; on the other hand, full trust relevance
means that knowing the information is the only way it is possible to modify
the trust assessment.
Finally, θ is a trustworthiness threshold function that assigns to each for-
mula φ ∈ L a rational number between 0 and 113, i.e. θ : L(At)→ [0, 1] ∈ Q.
This rational number indicates the minimum threshold needed to trust the
formula.
It is important to notice that the values attributed in T are arbitrary and
will depend mostly on the specific application of the model. Theoretically, it
can be thought that T contains all the infinite possible attribution of values
that are consistent with the assumptions made on the model. Although this
holds in theory, on the practical side of the thing, different applications will
require different attribution of values. The general idea is that each agent
participating in a digital community will have a specific set of functions rep-
resenting his attitudes.
Before providing the truth definition for a formula in a model, some fur-
ther functions must be added; those functions will help in defining the truth
of knowledge and trust formulas. Some of the functions have already been
introduced in subsection 4.1.2; they are reintroduced just for clarity.
First note that a neighborhood functionN can induce a mapmN , which is a
function that associates to each element X ∈ ℘(S) another element Y ∈ ℘(S),
according to the neighborhood function N , i.e. given N : S → ℘(℘(S)), there
is a map mN : ℘(S)→ ℘(S). The function mN is defined formally as follows:
mN (X) = {s | X ∈ N(s)} (4.2)
Intuitively, mN returns, for each set of states corresponding to a formula
(i.e. the formulas informative content), a set of states such that a state is
in the set if, and only if, the formula is known in the state. Therefore, if a
formula φ corresponds to a set of states X, then s ∈ mN (X) iff K(φ) holds in
s.
The relation between N and mN is similar in spirit to the one between the
valuation function pi and the labelling function L. The function mN will help
in defining the truth of knowledge formulas.
A second and important derived element of the semantical structure is
the family of functions Λ = {τφ | φ ∈ L(At)}, which contains functions that
assign ideal trust values to states of the system. Intuitively, a function τφ
13Real numbers could have been employed. However, it is believed that density is sufficient
to capture the different grades of trust and continuity is not required. For this reason, it
follows the choice to use rational numbers.
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(τφ : S → [0, 1] ∈ Q) indicates how much trust an agent has in the formula φ
(representing the parameter of µφ) in the given state denoting the argument of
τφ, provided that the agent is aware, in such a state, of all the relevant basic
information related to φ, i.e., the agent knows all the relevant propositions
which are true in that state. Another way to put it is the following: if an
agent knows exactly which one is the current state of the system, then τφ
will specify the amount of trust the agent has towards φ. Thus, τφ represents
an ideal measurement of trust. Note that, even though ideal, this is a trust
measure indicating how much an agent trusts the proposition φ in the given
state and is therefore a subjective measurement.
Functions τφ14 are defined as follows:
τφ(s) =
∑
X∈Ωφ:s∈X
µφ(X) (4.3)
It is assumed that if in (4.3) there is no X such that s ∈ X then τφ(s) = 0.
Moreover, the subadditivity criterion on µφ guarantees that τφ itself never
exceeds 1 (this is to be expected, since trust, even in an ideal setting might
never exceed the maximum value of 1, i.e., full trust). Note that it is possible
that τφ(s) = 0 and τ¬φ(s) < 1, thus the functions do not complement each
other. This is perfectly reasonable, given the fact that trust, especially in ideal
settings, might not be closed under complementation. In fact, it is perfectly
acceptable that an agent doesn’t trust a given proposition at all and, at the
same time, he does not fully trust the negation of such proposition.
Given the family of functions τφ, it is possible to define a trust value for
each X ∈ ℘(S). The functions performing such task will be defined as τ extφ .
Such functions are defined as follows:
τ extφ (X) = mins∈X{τφ(s)} (4.4)
Intuitively, the function τ extφ looks at all states in the set X under analysis
and selects the worst-case scenario, i.e., that in which the trust value is the
lowest. This choice models the behaviour of a cautious agent, which will
only consider the information he possesses to make an evaluation on trust
and won’t therefore make any other assumption on the trustworthiness of the
formula under analysis. However, other possibilities for the definition of τ extφ
are possible, such as taking the maximum (which would model the behaviour
of an optimistic agent) or the average value between all the τφ(s) (which would
model the behaviour of an agent which is neither cautious nor optimistic).
Specifically, such definition would be formalized as follows.
For the maximum (optimistic agent):
τ extφ (X) = maxs∈X{τφ(s)} (4.5)
14Again, one for each φ ∈ L.
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For the average (neutral agent):
τ extφ (X) =
∑
s∈X{τφ(s)}
| X | (4.6)
Where | X | stands for the cardinality of X, i.e., it represents the number
of states in X.
A further remark needs to be done about the value of τ extφ , which can never
exceed 1, meaning that for no set of states can trust exceed its maximum
value. It is interesting to observe that if the formula is applied to a singleton
set containing only a single state s (i.e., X = {s}), then the value of the
function τ extφ (X) is equal to the value of τφ(s). This proves that τ extφ is a
proper extension of τφ.
Put concisely, the way trust formulas will be evaluated is the following:
1. Determine the minimal set of states compatible with all the information
known by an agent in a state.
2. Compute the trust relevance weight of such minimal set.
3. The value obtained indicates how much an agent trusts the formula
indicated by the set.
To improve the readability of the truth theoretical definition for the for-
mulas, a definition of truth set is given for each formula of the language.
Definition 31 (Extension of the Valuation Function). Given a context-free
trust model M = (S, pi,N, T , θ), then the truth set of a formula, denoted piextM ,
is defined recursively as follows:
• piextM (p) = pi(p) for all p ∈ At;
• piextM (¬φ) = S − piextM (φ);
• piextM (φ ∧ ψ) = piextM (φ) ∩ piextM (ψ);
• piextM (K(φ)) = mN (piextM (φ));
• piextM (T (φ)) = {s | τ extφ (
⋂
X∈N(s)X) ≥ θ(φ)}.
Two things that characterize the truth sets of trust formulas are: first,⋂
X∈N(s)X, which can also be indicated with
⋂
N(s), is the core of N(s) and
indicates the minimal set of states which are compatible with all the knowledge
of the agent; second, to compute the piext of T (φ), it must be checked whether
in a given state the trust value of the core of N in such state is greater than
or equal to the trustworthiness threshold for the formula.
Now that all the elements of the semantical structure have been introduced,
it is possible to provide the truth definition of a formula φ:
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Definition 32 (Truth). Given a context-free trust model M = (S, pi,N, T , θ),
and a state s ∈ S, a formula φ is true in a context-free pointed model, indicated
with (M, s) |= φ, according to the following conditions:
• (M, s) |= p iff s ∈ pi(p);
• (M, s) |= ¬φ iff s ∈ piext(¬φ);
• (M, s) |= φ ∧ ψ iff s ∈ piext(φ ∧ ψ);
• (M, s) |= K(φ) iff s ∈ piext(K(φ));
• (M, s) |= T (φ) iff s ∈ piext(T (φ)).
The above structure is sufficient to reason about knowledge and trust and
their inter-relationship in a single-agent, context-free environment. Further-
more, the language provides effective tools to compute pre-trust values and
therefore can be also employed as a trust computing model.
In the next section, an extension of this language will be proposed.
4.3 A Language for Trust
In this section, an extension of the language presented in the previous section
is proposed. In this language, a specific component for contexts is added at
the semantical level. Such contexts will allow to produce semantical reflections
in line with all previous reasonings about trust. Specifically, trust values will
depend both on the formula being evaluated and the context in which it is
evaluated. Those contexts of evaluations will allow for a more fine-grained
description of trust: where in the previous language a formula was either
trusted or not, in this contextual version of the language, a formula might
be trusted in some contexts, but not in others. Moreover, having contexts
will also allow to define different notions of validity, which, it will be shown,
correspond to versions of trust commonly found in the literature.
4.3.1 A Language for Trust: Syntax
The syntax for the language is the same as the one presented in the previous
section. Therefore, the language (C-MLT) L(At) (for short L) of logic formulas
(which are ranged over by φ, ψ, . . . ), the starting point is the finite set At of
atomic propositions representing basic pieces of information. Given p ∈ At
the language is defined by the following BNF grammar:
φ := p | ¬φ | φ ∧ φ | K(φ) | T (φ)
All other connectives are defined in the standard way and are included (as
abbreviations) a dual operator for knowledge and one for trust (expressing
possible knowledge and possible trust)
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4.3.2 A Language for Trust: Semantics
In the contextual version of the language for trust, logical formulas are inter-
preted in the following structure.
Definition 33 (Contextual Trust Model). A contextual trust model is a
tuple MC = (S,C, pi,N, T , θ), where
• S is a finite set of possible states of the system s, s′, . . . .
• C is a finite set of primitive evaluation scenarios c, c′, . . . . Such sce-
narios can be considered as points of evaluation, where an agent must
determine whether he trusts or not a given formula. In this sense, in
each possible state of the system, the same set of primitive contexts is
attributed and then, for each point in such set, a different evaluation of
trust formulas is given in the state. Note that it is theoretically possi-
ble to evaluate formulas according to subsets of the set of contexts, thus
assessing trust in scenarios which include different evaluation criteria.
However, for the scope of this thesis, only evaluations considering single
contexts will be taken into consideration15.
• pi is a valuation function, assigning set of states to atomic propositions.
• N is an augmented neighborhood function.
• T = {〈ωc, µc,φ〉 | c ∈ C and φ ∈ L} is a trust relevance structure.
• θc is a trustworthiness threshold function.
As it is easy to notice, the only difference between a context-free trust
model and a contextual trust model is given by the presence of the set of
contexts C and by the influence this set of contexts has on the trust related
part of the model. Intuitively, the set C is a finite set of primitive scenarios,
where a scenario is a situation in which trust must be assessed. For instance,
someone might trust his mechanic when it comes to fixing cars, but might
not trust him for financial advices. In the example, “fixing cars" and “giving
financial advices" are to be considered two separate contexts of evaluation,
thus two elements of the set of contexts. Note that those two contexts might
15It is possible to imagine that the semantics provided in the following section is two-
dimensional, in the sense that formulas are evaluated according to two distinct dimensions.
The main dimension is the state of evaluation. Such dimension determines the facts that
are true for the system and what is known by the evaluator. The second dimension is the
context of evaluation. Such dimension determines the reason why some formula is being
evaluated and thus what is actually relevant for trust in such formula. The first dimension
shall be considered the one characterizing the main interpretation tool for formulas, while
the second dimension is the one characterized by the contexts in which such evaluation shall
take place.
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be considered in every possible state of the system and thus, it might also be
assumed that there are equivalent sets of contexts for each state of the system.
All other elements of the structure behave exactly as in context-free struc-
tures. The only slight difference is that the trust components of the model are
always indexed with respect to a context. Similarly, all functions derived from
those components are indexed according to the same context of evaluation.
While a small addition from a formal perspective, having contexts in the lan-
guage greatly enhance the expressivity of the language. In particular, simplex
notions of trust can now be modeled without problems, hence covering the
whole space of trust definitions.
We thus get:
τc,φ(s) =
∑
X∈Ωc,φ:s∈X
µc,φ(X) (4.7)
And:
τ extc,φ (X) = mins∈X{τc,φ(s)} (4.8)
This influences the truth set of trust formulas in the following way:
piext(T (φ)) = {s | τ extc,φ (
⋂
X∈N(s)X) ≥ θ(c, φ)}
Those changes produce a change also in the truth definition for the seman-
tics, which is given with respect to contextual pointed models, rather than
simple pointed models:
Definition 34 (Contextual Pointed Model). A contextual pointed model
is a triple (MC , s, c), where MC is the contextual trust model, s ∈ S is a state
of the system and, finally, c ∈ C is a context of evaluation.
The definition of truth follows:
Definition 35 (Truth). Given a contextual trust modelMC = (S,C, pi,N, T , θ),
a state s ∈ S, and a context c ∈ C, a formula φ is true in a contextual pointed
model, indicated with (M, s, c) |= φ, according to the following conditions:
• (M, s, c) |= p iff s ∈ pi(p);
• (M, s, c) |= ¬φ iff s ∈ piext(¬φ);
• (M, s, c) |= φ ∧ ψ iff s ∈ piext(φ ∧ ψ);
• (M, s, c) |= K(φ) iff s ∈ piext(K(φ));
• (M, s, c) |= T (φ) iff s ∈ piext(T (φ)).
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In general, it seems like context do not add much to the structure, if
not subtle nuances. It might be argued that it is sufficient to construct a
different context-free trust model for each context and the same results that
can be achieved in the contextual models are achieved in the multiple context-
free models. While this critique is partially true, the strength of contextual
models come from their definition of validity. In fact, for contextual models,
four different notions of validity might be defined, each one corresponding to
different notions of trust, showing that the semantical structure proposed has
the impressive capacity of capturing slightly different conceptions of trust,
employing the same tools. In particular, the notions of validity that can be
defined in contextual models are:
Definition 36 (Validity). Given a contextual trust modelMC = (S,C, pi,N, T , θ):
A formula φ is context-valid with respect to MC if:
∃c ∈ C s.t. ∀s ∈ S : (M, s, c) |= φ (4.9)
A formula φ is state-valid with respect to MC if:
∃s ∈ S s.t. ∀c ∈ C : (M, s, c) |= φ (4.10)
A formula φ is model-valid with respect to MC if:
∀s ∈ S ∀c ∈ C : (M, s, c) |= φ (4.11)
Finally, a formula φ is valid (|= φ) if it is model-valid for every model M .
When assessing trust formulas according to those validity principles, nice
considerations about trust might be derived.
If a trust formula is context-valid, then the notion of trust analysed is
one for which it exists a context in which what is known is irrelevant for the
attribution of trust. Thus, whatever the state of the system is, in that context
trust will be granted. This kind of trust is typical of situations in which
there is little choice other than trusting and no matter what is the level of
knowledge, trust is always the best decision. An example could be a situation
where the cost of not trusting and therefore not collaborating can be so high
that even if the other agent then defects the collaboration, the loss is still less
or equal to the cost of not trusting. Take, again, the example of the worn rope
which an agent must choose whether to use or not to escape his house while
it is burning. Assuming that the cost of not using the rope is death for the
agent, no matter what he knows about the rope, he will trust it and use it to
try and escape. This is because, even if the rope breaks (defects the trusting
relationship), the worse that can happen to the agent is that he fractures his
leg falling. Trust formulas that are context-valid seem to capture profoundly
the idea behind moralistic versions of trust. In moralistic trust, education and
upbringing determine instinctive attributions of trust. It the ethical and moral
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status of the trustor to determine whether he trusts or not and information
specific to the trustee is often irrelevant. On the other hand, strategic versions
of trust can hardly be context-valid, since high amount of specific information
is required to determine whether to trust or not the trustee.
If a trust formula is state-valid, then the notion of trust analysed is similar
to what Marsh [86] calls, general trust. Such a notion of trust describes an
omnicomprehensive and general attitude of an agent towards a proposition in
a given state of the system, independently from the context of evaluation. This
means that the knowledge he possesses, in the given state, is sufficient to have
trust in the proposition independently on what is actually relevant for it. This
might be the case when an agent evaluates some general factors as relevant
for trust independently from the contexts. For example, he might believe
that, independently from the situation, a buddhist monk wouldn’t never fail
to collaborate or maintain his word, therefore, knowing that someone is a
buddhist monk is sufficient to trust him, no matter the context. Trust formulas
that are state-valid seem to capture the idea behind multiplex versions of
trust. In its multiplex version, trust doesn’t depend on the specific context
of evaluation and it therefore represents a general feeling towards the trustee.
Those conception of trust is clearly captured by state-valid trust formulas.
If a trust formula is model-valid, then the notion of trust analysed is that
of blind trust. Independently from the knowledge of the agent and the con-
text of evaluation, the agent simply trusts someone else. This happens often
with parental relationships. Children trust their parents instinctively, inde-
pendently from what they know (they often know very little) and what is the
context of evaluation (they do not trust them to, but just trust them). Trust
formulas that are model-valid seem to capture an idea of trust that is close to
prejudice. When agents assess trust through prejudices, they often rely very
little on actual information and they do not consider what is the task to be
performed. Comparably, model-valid trust formulas are those that are true
independently from knowledge and context and thus capture this idea of trust
based on prejudice quite well.
Finally, if a trust formula is valid, then the notion of trust described in
one where independently from what is modelled, there is blind trust in the
proposition. A trust of this kind might be so rare, than in fact it might
also be that is doesn’t exist. As it will be shown, the language proposed can
predict this, since it can be proved that there are no valid trust formulas in
the language.
This concludes reflections on the semantical structure. In the next section,
decidability results for the language are given.
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4.4 A Language for Trust: Decidability Results
In this subsection, the proofs of the decision procedures for some interesting
problems in the setting of the language presented will be given. In particular,
given any logical language, there are three natural computational problems
that arise:
• Model checking problem: This is the problem of deciding, given a model
and a formula, whether the model satisfies the formula.
• Model equivalence problem: This is the problem of deciding, given two
models, whether the models satisfy the same formulas. The model equiv-
alence issue helps in determining the expressive power of a language,
since, once it can be determined which models are equivalent and which
are different, it is also possible to determine which classes of models are
equal and which are different, thus determining if some class of model
can express more or less things (in the form of logical formulas) compared
to other classes.
• Satisfiability problem: This is the problem of deciding, given a formula,
whether that formula is satisfiable by some model. The importance of
the satisfiability problem is related to the validity problem. Once it is
determined whether a formula is satisfiable or not, it is also possible to
determine through an effective procedure which are the valid formulas
of the language. Given the fact that sets of valid formulas semantical
identify classes of models, through model equivalence, the solution to
the satisfiability problem helps in determining those classes of models.
It will be proved that the last language introduced in this thesis is decidable
w.r.t. the three decision problems indicated above.
Theorem 8 (Model Checking for C-MLT.). The model checking problem for
Contextual Modal Logic for Trust is decidable, i.e., given a contextual model
MC = (S,C, pi,N, T , θ), a state s ∈ S and a formula φ ∈ L, it is possible to
decide whether (M, s, c) |= φ or (M, s, c) 6|= φ.
Proof (Proof of Theorem 8). Take an arbitrary formula φ ∈ L(At), an arbi-
trary contextual model MC = (S,C, pi,N, T , θ), an arbitrary state s ∈ S and
an arbitrary context c ∈ C. Compute piextT (φ) by following the procedure given
in the previous subsection. At this point, check if the state s is a member of
the set piextT (φ), i.e., check whether s ∈ piextT (φ).
If yes, then the formula is satisfied by the model in the state, otherwise it
is not. In both cases, you obtain an answer to the model checking problem.
In order to provide the proof of the model equivalence problem, a modified
version of bisimulation will be introduced (see definitions 15 and 16 for the
standard definition of bisimulation for neighbourhood semantics):
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Definition 37 (Trust bisimulation). Let MC = (S,C, pi,N, T , θ) and M ′C′ =
(S′, C ′, pi′, N ′, T ′, θ′) be contextual trust models. A non-empty binary relation
Z ⊆ S × S′ is a trust bisimulation between MC and M ′C′ (in symbols Z :
MC↔M ′C′) if, with s ∈ S, s′ ∈ S′, C = C ′, and θ = θ′16:
• (prop) If sZs′, then for all p ∈ At, s ∈ pi(p) iff s′ ∈ pi′(p).
• (zig) If sZs′ and X ∈ N(s), then there is an X ′ ⊆ S′ s.t. X ′ ∈ N ′(s′)
and, for all t′ ∈ X ′, there exists a t ∈ X s.t. tZt′.
• (zag) If sZs′ and X ′ ∈ N ′(s′), then there is an X ⊆ S s.t. X ∈ N(s)
and, for all t ∈ X, there exists a t′ ∈ X ′ s.t. tZt′.
• (trust zig) If sZs′, then for all the sets Ωc,φ generated by the ωc functions,
if X ∈ Ωc,φ and s ∈ X, then there exists a unique X ′ ⊆ S′ s.t. X ′ ∈
Ω′c,φ, s′ ∈ X ′, and for all other t′ ∈ X ′, there exists a t ∈ X s.t. tZt′.
Moreover, µc,φ(X) = µ′c,φ(X ′).
• (trust zag) If sZs′, then for all the sets Ω′c,φ generated by the ω′c func-
tions, if X ′ ∈ Ω′c,φ and s′ ∈ X ′, then there exists a unique X ⊆ S s.t.
X ∈ Ωc,φ, s ∈ X, and for all other t ∈ X, there exists a t′ ∈ X ′ s.t.
tZt′. Moreover, µc,φ(X) = µ′c,φ(X ′).
Intuitively, the (prop) condition is needed to preserve local harmony at
the atomic level. The two (zig) and (zag) conditions are needed to preserve
equivalence of knowledge formulas between models. Finally, the two (trust
zig) and (trust zag) conditions are needed to preserve equivalence of trust
formulas between models. The uniqueness condition inside the (trust zig) and
(trust zag) conditions simply state numerical conditions on how many sets
might be in the trust bisimilarity relation. If more than one element exists
inside the sets being compared, then the two sets must be label as not being
trust bisimilar. Those conditions are mandatory in order to obtain the model
equivalence results that will follow.
The following lemma will help us to prove model equivalence between trust
bisimilar models.
Lemma 6. Let Z ⊆ S×S′ be a trust bisimulation between two contextual trust
models MC and M ′C′, then the following holds, with s ∈ S, s′ ∈ S′, C = C ′,
and θ = θ′:
If sZs′, then τc,φ(s) = τ ′c,φ(s′), for all couples (c, φ).
16Each time it is claimed that the set of contexts are equal, what is argued is actually that
the two sets contain exactly the same elements. Note that this would mean that both sets
could be indicated with the same symbol. The equivalence of the teeta functions is similar
in spirit. When it is claimed that they are equivalent, what is said is that they return the
same values when given the same arguments.
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Proof. Assume sZs′ and take an arbitrary couple (c, φ). Rephrase the thesis,
using the definition of τ , in the following way:∑
X∈Ωc,φ:s∈X µc,φ(X) =
∑
X′∈Ω′
c,φ
:s′∈X′ µ′c,φ(X ′)
Expand both sums in the following way (with all the X ∈ Ωc,φ s.t. s ∈ X
and all the X ′ ∈ Ω′c,φ s.t. s′ ∈ X ′):
µc,φ(X1) + · · ·+ µc,φ(Xn) = µ′c,φ(X ′1) + · · ·+ µ′c,φ(X ′m)
First, note that by the (trust zig) and (trust zag) conditions, it must be the
case that n = m. If this were not the case, i.e., n 6= m, then either the (trust
zig) or the (trust zag) unique existence condition would not be fulfilled and
there would be a contradiction with the assumption that sZs′. For instance,
suppose n > m, then it would be impossible to fulfil the (trust zag) condition,
because it would be impossible to find a unique A ∈ Ωc,φ for each one of the
A′ ∈ Ω′c,φ.
Now the proof is straightforward. Taking the (trust zig) and (trust zag)
conditions together it is possible to create a one-to-one correspondence be-
tween the elements of the two summations. Moreover, the two conditions also
assure that the µc,φ and the µ′c,φ values of corresponding sets are themselves
equal. Therefore the whole summations will return the same results. which
means that τc,φ(s) = τ ′c,φ(s′).
Another important result which is needed is that of the bisimilarity of
the two cores of two bisimilar models. Note that this is not the same thing
as core bisimulation. In a core bisimulation, it is just require that the non-
monotonic cores of each model are bisimilar, where the non-monotonic cores
might contain more than one set inside them. On the other hand, the core of
a set is a single set. Specifically, it is the set whose elements are common to
all sets in the collection under analysis. What is important, therefore, is not
that the non-monotonic cores are bisimilar (this would follow from the inverse
of theorem 5), but that the actual cores are. The result will be proven for
core-complete, monotonic models. Given that the part concerning knowledge
of contextual trust models is based on augmented neighbourhood models and
given the fact that those models are in fact core-complete and monotonic, then
the result proven applies also to contextual trust models. In order to introduce
the theorem, it is also necessary to extend the definition of bisimulation from
models (and states) to sets.
Definition 38 (Set Bisimulation). Given two monotonic modelsM1 = (S1, N1, pi1)
and M2 = (S2, N2, pi2). If there is a bisimulation E between them, i.e.,
M1↔M2, then, given two subsets X ⊆ S1 and Y ⊆ S2, X and Y are said to
be set bisimilar, indicated with X↔Y if:
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• (Set zig) ∀x ∈ X,∃y ∈ Y s.t. xEy.
• (Set zag) ∀y ∈ Y,∃x ∈ X s.t. xEy.
Intuitively, two sets are bisimilar, if a bisimulation relation can be built
among all of the elements of the sets.
Theorem 9. Given two core-complete, monotonic models M1 = (S1, N1, pi1)
and M2 = (S2, N2, pi2). If there is a bisimulation E between s1 ∈ S1 and
s2 ∈ S2, then, the two cores ⋂N1(s1) and ⋂N2(s2) are set bisimilar.
Proof (Proof of Theorem 9). Assume s1Es2. Show that
⋂
N1(s1)↔⋂N2(s2).
The proof is by contradiction. Assume that ⋂N1(s1) and ⋂N2(s2) are not
set bisimilar. Then, either (a) ∃v ∈ ⋂N1(s1) s.t. for no v′ ∈ ⋂N2(s2), vEv′,
or (b) ∃r′ ∈ ⋂N2(s2) s.t. for no r ∈ ⋂N1(s1), rEr′. Both cases produce a
contradiction.
Case (a): ∃v ∈ ⋂N1(s1) s.t. for no v′ ∈ ⋂N2(s2), vEv′. This is in
contradiction with the (zag) condition of bisimulation, i.e., if s1Zs2 and X2 ∈
N2(s2), then there is an X1 ⊆ S1 s.t. X1 ∈ N1(s1) and, for all t ∈ X1, there
exists a t′ ∈ X2 s.t. tZt′. To make the contradiction explicit, assume that
v1 is the actual element of
⋂
N1(s1) for which there is not v′ ∈ ⋂N2(s2) s.t.
v1Ev′. By the fact that v1 ∈ ⋂N1(s1), then ∀X ∈ N1(s1), v1 ∈ X. Now, take⋂
N2(s2), by the (zag) condition of bisimulation, ∃X ⊆ S1, X ∈ N1(s1) and,
for all v ∈ X1, there exists a v′ ∈ ⋂N2(s2) s.t. vZv′. Since v1 ∈ X, then
∃v′ ∈ ⋂N2(s2) s.t. v1Ev′. This contradicts the assumption that there is no
such v′.
Case (b): analogous, but with a contradiction with the (zig) condition.
Both cases generate a contradiction, therefore ⋂N1(s1) and ⋂N2(s2) must
be set bisimilar.
We can now prove that trust bisimilar models satisfy the same formulas.
Theorem 10 (Invariance Under Trust Bisimulation). LetMC = (S,C, pi,N, T , θ)
and M ′C′ = (S′, C ′, pi′, N ′, T ′, θ′) be contextual trust models. If Z ⊆ S×S′ is a
trust bisimulation between MC and M ′C′, then, for each formula φ and s ∈ S,
s′ ∈ S′ s.t. sZs′, with C = C ′, and θ = θ′, we have:
(M, s, c) |= φ iff (M ′, s′, c) |= φ.
Proof. Both directions by induction on the structure of the formula.
Base case. φ = p, for p ∈ At. Assume (M, s, c) |= p, then, by the (prop)
condition of trust bisimulation, (M ′, s′, c) |= p. The proof is symmetrical in
the other direction.
Inductive hypothesis (IH)
(M, s, c) |= φ iff (M ′, s′, c) |= φ.
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Inductive steps:
Negation: Assume (M, s, c) |= ¬φ. By the truth definition of negation,
s ∈ piext(¬φ). By the definition of truth set, s ∈ (S − piext(φ)). By the
definition of set difference, s ∈ S and s /∈ piext(φ). By IH, s′ /∈ pi′ext(φ). By
assumption, s′ ∈ S′. By the definition of set difference, s′ ∈ (S′ − pi′ext(φ)).
By the definition of truth set, s′ ∈ (S′ − pi′ext(φ)). By the truth definition of
negation, s′ ∈ pi′ext(¬φ). Therefore (M ′, s′, c) |= ¬φ. The proof is symmetrical
in the other direction.
Conjunction: Assume (M, s, c) |= φ ∧ ψ. By the truth definition of con-
junction s ∈ piext(φ ∧ ψ). By the definition of truth set, s ∈ piext(φ) ∩ piext(ψ).
By intersection definition, s ∈ piext(φ) and s ∈ piext(ψ). By IH, s′ ∈ pi′ext(φ)
and s′ ∈ pi′ext(ψ). By intersection definition s′ ∈ pi′ext(φ) ∩ s′ ∈ pi′ext(ψ). By
definition of truth set, s′ ∈ pi′ext(φ ∧ ψ). Therefore (M ′, s′, c) |= φ ∧ ψ. The
proof is symmetrical in the other direction.
Knowledge Formulas: (Left to right) Assume (M, s, c) |= K(φ). By the
truth definition of knowledge formulas s ∈ piext(K(φ)). By the definition of
piext , s ∈ mN (piext(φ)). By the definition of mN , piext(φ) ∈ N(s). Call piext(φ),
A. By the (zig) condition of trust bisimulation, there exists a A′ ∈ N ′(s′) and,
for all t′ ∈ A′, there exists a t ∈ A s.t. tZt′. Note now that IH could be
rephrased has:
s ∈ piext(φ) iff s′ ∈ pi′ext(φ).
It therefore follows that, by IH, A′ ⊆ pi′ext(φ). Since A′ ∈ N ′(s′) and N ′ is
monotonic, pi′ext(φ) ∈ N ′(s′). By the definition of m′N , s′ ∈ m′N (pi′ext(φ)). By
the definition of pi′ext , s′ ∈ pi′ext(K(φ)). By the truth definition of knowledge
formulas, (M ′, s′, c) |= K(φ).
(Right to left) The proof is symmetrical, but employing the (zag) condition
instead of the (zig) condition.
Trust Formulas: (Left to right) Assume (M, s, c) |= T (φ). By the truth
definition of trust formulas τ extc,φ (
⋂
X∈N(s)X) ≥ θ(c, φ). Recall that we assumed
that, when evaluating trust formulas in two models, the context of evaluation
and the trustworthiness threshold is the same for both evaluations, therefore
θ(c, φ) = θ′(c′, φ). This said, we must prove that, with sZs′:
τ extc,φ (
⋂
X∈N(s)X) = τ ′extc,φ (
⋂
X′∈N ′(s′)X ′)17
Recall that the definition of τ extc,φ (X) is the following: mint∈X{τc,φ(t)}.
Thus what must be proven is that the minimum value of τc,φ(t) among
all the t ∈ ⋂N(s) is equal to the minimum value of τ ′c,φ(t′) among all the
t′ ∈ ⋂N ′(s′). By theorem 9, ⋂N(s) and ⋂N ′(s′) are set bisimilar. Now take
the t ∈ ⋂N(s) s.t. τc,φ(t) is the minimum. By set bisimilarity, there is a
17The latest statement “being equal to” could be substituted with “being less than or equal
to”. Nonetheless, by proving the equivalence, there is an implicit proof of the right-to-left
direction inclueded in the left-to-right direction.
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t′ ∈ ⋂N ′(s′) s.t. tEt′. By lemma 6, τc,φ(t) = τ ′c,φ(t′). Moreover, τ ′c,φ(t′) is
the minimum value of the set ⋂N ′(s′). Suppose it is not. Then there is an
element in ⋂N ′(s′) with a lower value and which is, by a reverse reasoning, in
a bisimilarity relation with a element in ⋂N(s) whose τc,φ are equal. Thus,
this would contradict the fact that τc,φ(t) is the minimum value.
We can finally give the proof of the model equivalence decidability problem.
Theorem 11 (Model Equivalence for C-MLT). The model equivalence prob-
lem for Contextual Modal Logic for Trust is decidable.
Proof. Given two modelsMC = (S,C, pi,N, T , θ) andM ′C′ = (S′, C ′, pi′, N ′, T ′, θ′)
check the following:
• (Context equivalence) C = C ′.
• (Trustworthiness threshold equivalence) θ = θ′.
• (Trust bisimulation existence) Whether it exists a trust bisimulation
between MC and M ′C′
If all points provide positive answers, then, by theorem 10, the two models
satisfy the same formulas and are therefore equivalent. If any of the previous
points fails to hold, then the two models are distinct. In both cases, you obtain
an answer to the model equivalence problem.
Finally, the satisfiability decision problem. One important thing to notice
is that trust formulas are always satisfiable, therefore, they can’t be valid in
any class of models. This should be expected, given the highly subjective
nature of trust. In fact, whatever the proposition to be trusted might be, it is
always possible to construct a suitable model that satisfies the trust formula
containing, under its scope, the proposition to be trusted.
Lemma 7. Every trust formula is satisfied by at least one model.
Proof. Take an arbitrary trust formula T (φ). Now construct a model in the
following way:
• Take an arbitrary set S of states.
• Take an arbitrary set C of contexts.
• Take an arbitrary function pi.
• Take a function N s.t. ∃s ∈ S s.t. ⋂X∈N(s)X 6= ∅.
• Take T s.t. ωc(φ) = {S} and µc,φ(S) = 1.
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• Take an arbitrary θ.
In such a model, the trust formula T (φ) is satisfied in all states s.t.⋂
X∈N(s)X 6= ∅. This is because the τ of each state is 1 and once we have a
non-empty set of states X on which to take the minimum, we will always end
up with the value 1. Therefore, we always end up with full trust in the for-
mula φ, satisfying the formula no matter what the value of the trustworthiness
threshold is.
Given lemma 7, the satisfiability decision problem for the language depends
only on whether it is possible to decide, given a formula of the other typologies,
if they are satisfiable by some model. In this sense, note that in (contextual)
trust logic all models are finite, therefore, if a formula is satisfiable in the
language, it must be satisfied by a finite model. This property is the so called
finite model property, which, in the language here presented, is forced on the
formulas. This property, even if imposed, is of extreme importance when
dealing with the satisfiability decision problem. However, this property alone
is not sufficient, because a check on an infinite number of finite models might
still be needed. It is necessary, thus, to provide an effective upper bound to
the size of the models that might satisfy a given formula. A proof that such
a bound exists for monotonic neighborhood models can be found in [100] and
its bound can also be applied to augmented neighbourhood models, given the
fact that those models are indeed monotonic. However, the path followed in
this thesis is slightly different and will rely on the fact that there is strict
correspondence between relational structures and augmented neighbourhood
models. Therefore, the proof of the effective bound on the size of a model
satisfying a formula of the language is given in terms of relational models. Note
that determining satisfiability will become the task of finding the adequate
relational model satisfying the formula and then translate such model into an
augmented neighbourhood model through the procedure described in lemma 4.
The theorem that can help with satisfiability is that of the effective finite
model property, where this property states that a satisfiable formula is satisfied
in a finite model of a certain size (dependent on the size of the formula under
analysis).
Theorem 12 (Effective Finite Model Property). Modal Logic has the effective
finite model property.
Before producing the proof of the theorem, some important variations
on definitions that were provided for neighbourhood structures will now be
provided for relational structures.
Definition 39 (Relational Bisimulation). Given two relational models M =
〈S,R, V 〉 and M′ = 〈S′, R′, V ′〉 a binary relation E ⊆ S ×S′ is a bisimulation
between two states s ∈ S and s′ ∈ S′, indicated with sEs′, if:
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1. s and s′ satisfy the same unanalysed propositions p ∈ At.
2. If sRv in M, then ∃v′ ∈M′ s.t. s′Rv′ and vEv′.
3. If s′Rv′ in M′, then ∃v ∈M s.t. sRv and vEv′.
Definition 40 (Relational Tree Unravelling). Every relational model M =
〈S,R, V 〉 has a bisimulation with a rooted tree-like model. The tree-like model
is constructed as follows. The set of states of the model are all finite path of
states s ∈ S, starting with a specific root root and passing only to R-successors
at each step. The relation R holds between two paths if the second is one step
longer than the first. Valuations are equal in both models.
Proof (Proof of Theorem 12). Take and arbitrary non-trust formula φ which
can be satisfied in a relational model M = 〈S,R, V 〉. Unravel M through
relational tree unravelling, s.t. φ holds at root. To prove the effective finite
model property, it will be shown that the evaluation of the formula only requires
finite path depth and finite branching width.
To prove it, transform, through equivalences, the formula into a Boolean
combination of unanalysed propositions and modal formulas defined through K̂.
Unanalysed propositions only depend on the valuation function and therefore
can be established right away. For the modal part, for every true K̂, choose
a verifying successor state in the model for such K̂. The total number of
successors to be chosen is bounded by the number of elements in the Boolean
transformation of the formula φ, therefore there is a finite branching width.
For false K̂, no successor needs to be chosen. Note that, at each step, a
level of modal operators is lost, therefore, the depth of the path to follow is
restricted to the maximum among all the numbers of operators elements of
the Boolean combination equal to φ have. This sets a finite path depth to the
model. Combining the finite width with the finite depth, it is possible to obtain
a bound on the size of the model satisfying the formula.
From theorem 12 and lemma 7, the satisfiability result follows.
Theorem 13 (Satisfiability Problem for MLfT). The satisfiability problem for
Modal Logic for Trust is decidable.
Proof (Proof ot Theorem 13). By lemma 7 it is known that every trust for-
mula is satisfiable in at least one model. By theorem 12 it is known that, if
a non-trust formula is satisfied in a relational model, then it is satisfied in a
effectively bounded finite relational model. Check all models (up to bisimula-
tion) of such size, if it is found, then transform such model into an augmented
neighbourhood model through the procedure described in lemma 4. The re-
sulting augmented neighbourhood model also satisfies the formula and thus is
answer to the satisfiability problem is positive. If there is no such relational
model, then there is no augmented neighbourhood model that satisfies the for-
mula. Assume there was, then, by the procedure described in lemma 5, it would
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be possible to construct a relational model in which the formula would be sat-
isfied, contradicting the assumption. Therefore, in such a case the answer to
the satisfiability problem is negative. In either case an answer is obtained.
This chapter is concluded with a brief reference to possible proof theories
for trust logics. A specific proof theory for the language here presented is
lacking and is part of a work in progress. It should be noted, however, that, as
already mentioned earlier in the text, there are no trust formulas valid in the
semantics just proposed. This is due to the highly subjective nature of trust
and by the fact that it is hardly possible to find truisms about such concept.
Therefore, any proof theory that captures the validities concerning the modal
part of the language will suffice as a proof theory for the current language,
where trust formulas will appear only as substitutions inside tautologies. In
this sense, the most appropriate axiomatic system for the language here pre-
sented is the one containing the distributivity axiom over the modal opera-
tor. Nonetheless, it is important to mention that there are many axiomatic
systems employed to formalize formal languages that contain operators for
trust [11, 26, 77]. While sound and complete and useful in reasoning about
trust in general, such system are, nevertheless, faulty isasfar as they model
trust directly, without making use of the insight that trust often depends on
other information.
Chapter 5
Frameworks for Trust
Reasoning
In this chapter, other theoretical model employed to represent trust and un-
certainty are proposed. Differently from chapter 3, where the focus was on
practical models for trust, here the focus will be on omnicomprehensive the-
oretical frameworks for trust. The idea is to check how the logical language
for trust presented in chapter 4 behaves in comparison to those other theo-
retical frameworks. Specifically, the frameworks analysed will be Subjective
Logic [59] and Dempster-Shafer Theory of Evidence [29, 116]. Those frame-
works and characterizing elements of those will be introduced. Weaknesses
and strengths of each of them are going to be highlighted and theorems about
correspondences between their formal structures and the semantical structure
of C-MLT will be proven. Once the correspondences are built, it is argued that
those formalisms might benefit by considering procedures operated inside C-
MLT. The chapter is structured as follows: in section one, Subjective Logic
is discussed and a correspondence between it and C-MLT is built; in section
two, Dempster-Shafer Theory of Evidence is discussed and a correspondence
between it and C-MLT is built.
5.1 Subjective Logic
In this section, Jøsang’s Subjective Logic [59] (SL) will be introduced and then
it will be shown how the semantical structure of C-MLT can be employed to
compute trust values (in the form of opinions) to be fed into the models of
SL. It will also be explained why this specific model was chosen and why it
is believed that building a correspondence between contextual trust models
and the models of SL is beneficial to both. As a side result in the analysis
of the comparison between the two formalisms, the difference between trust
computing and trust manipulation models for trust will be further clarified
(recall that the distinction was introduced in chapter 3.
5.1 Subjective Logic 102
Figure 5.1: Genesis of Subjective Logic.
SL is a formal framework for artificial reasoning based on the Beta paradigm.
In general, Subjective Logic can be thought of as an extension of probabilistic
logic (see figure 5.2). The extension is obtained by introducing, in a standard
probabilistic logic, two new elements: one of uncertainty and one of subjectiv-
ity. The former, which should be seen as a second-order probability measure-
ment, helps in evaluating what is the likelihood on obtaining a certain level
of probability for specific events. The latter, is employed to attribute beliefs
(or estimates) to specific agents, rather than having anonymous evaluations
valid for all. The fact that SL represents an extension of probabilistic logic is
also proven formally, through the construction of an homorphism between a
suitable version of the former (i.e., one in which only dogmatic multi-nomial
opinions are considered) and the latter. To understand why uncertainty might
play a role in real life examples, take the following example: two urns are
placed in front of an agent, who has to decide from which urn he wants to
extract a ball. Each urn contain 100 balls, which are either red or black. The
agent will receive a prize if he extracts a red ball and nothing if he extracts
a black one. He is told that in urn one, there are exactly 50 red ball and 50
black ones, therefore he knows that the probability of extracting a red ball is
1/2. He receives no information about the second urn. By the principle of
indifference [69], the agent should also assign a 1/2 probability of extracting
a red ball to urn number two. However, as it is evident, the two probabilities,
while equal, represent two distinct forms of information. In the first case, the
probability is assigned with certainty, while in the second one, the probability
is assigned with maximum uncertainty. In a standard probabilistic language,
this distinction can’t be expressed, but in SL, the expressivity is sufficient to
capture the subtleties behind this example.
Formally, SL consists of a belief model, whose elements are called opinions,
and a set of algebraic operations defined on this model for combining opinions
in different ways. Possible operations are addition, subtraction and fusion of
beliefs1.
Concerning computational trust, in SL trust is represented as the opinion
1In fact, there are at least nineteen different operators which have been well studied in
SL. See figure 5.2 for the complete list, with reference to the pages where they are discussed
in [59].
5.1 Subjective Logic 103
Figure 5.2: Subjective Logic Operators.
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of an agent x about the truth of a given proposition p [65]. The proposi-
tions on which opinions range, express sentences which describe collaborative
frameworks. For example, a proposition p might express the following sen-
tence: “Agent y won’t defect the partnership in the next month”. Specifically,
an opinion has three components, plus a fourth optional component, which,
however, is fundamental to compute expected trust in the truth of the propo-
sition. The three major components are, respectively, a belief component b,
a disbelief component d and an uncertainty component u, while the fourth
component (a) is defined as the base rate and indicates the prior probability
associated with the truth of a proposition when no initial relevant information
is available, i.e., the base rate represents a first estimate of the plausibility of
the truth of the proposition. The belief, disbelief and uncertainty components
are additive to one, leading to the fact that SL is effectively an extension of
traditional probabilistic logics (if the uncertainty component is assumed to
be equal to zero, SL becomes a traditional probability model). This also de-
termines the fact that an opinion has two levels of freedom, where the third
component is always determined by the values of the first two components
defined. The additivity principle of the three major components allows also
for a nice visualization of opinions through a triangle, which is called opinion
triangle2, see Fig. 5.3. It is possible to observe in the figure that an opinion ω
is identified through the three major components of belief, disbelief and un-
certainty and, after a generic opinion is obtained, it is possible to compute the
expected trust value E(ω) using the base rate: the base rate determines the
slope of the projection of the opinion on the base of the triangle and allows to
compute an expected value when uncertainty is assumed to be zero.
Being based on the Beta paradigm, the core of the theory of SL is given
in terms of the Beta function. Recall that the Beta function is employed to
compute expected values for the likelihood of a given event of having a certain
probability.
f(p | α, β) = Γ(α+β)Γ(α)Γ(β)pα−1(1− p)β−1
In SL only a subset of the Beta functions are considered, i.e., probability
certainty density functions, whose parameters are taken to be the success-
ful interactions (r) and the failures (s), where the relation between the two
parameters of the beta functions (α, β) and the two parameters (r, s) is the
following:
α = r + 1 s.t. r ≥ 0 β = s+ 1 s.t. s ≥ 0
2This visualization works fine until we deal with trinomial opinions (which correspond,
visually, to a tetrahedron). In this thesis, only binomial opinions are important, since it
is assumed that propositions can only be either true or false and nothing inbetween those
values. Therefore, the standard opinion triangle is sufficient as a visual aid of the opinion
components. See [59] (Section 3.5) for a discussion on what a multinomial opinion represents.
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Figure 5.3: Opinion triangle
Through those equivalences and the Beta function results, the different
components of an opinion are defined as follows:
bp = rprp+sp+2 ; dp =
sp
rp+sp+2 ; up =
1
rp+sp+2 .
Where the denominators are employed to normalize the values obtained
by counting the successful and failed interactions.
SL is a widely employed model to manipulate trust and the reason for
this is that the many algebraic operators that are included in the model can
describe numerous interacting situations and precisely indicate the dynamics
of trust in all those situations. However, SL is rather ill-suited when it comes
to compute initial trust values to be used as inputs to the model. The reason
is that the only source of information that SL allows to compute trust values is
a set of reputation scores based on past interactions, i.e., the success or failure
of those interactions. Once it is noticed that different agents might evaluate
interactions differently (therefore, that which is a success for someone, might
be a failure for someone else and viceversa) and that reputation scores in one
context are not easily transferable to another context (being successful in an
interaction involving selling cars, might have no impact in the possibility of
success when it comes to prepare meals for dinner), the fact that SL has no
other means to compute initial trust values becomes a big drawback. This is
also noted by Jøsang himself [65]:
“The major difficulty with applying SL is to find a way to consis-
tently determine opinions to be used as input parameters. People
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may find the opinion model unfamiliar, and different individuals
may produce conflicting opinions when faced with the same evi-
dence.”
The aim of this section is specifically to show that contextual trust models
can be employed as a trust computing component that can produce initial
trust values which can then be plugged into SL, effectively improving the
model. The leading idea is that, in order to have an effective formalization
of the notion of trust, a trust model must accomplish two basic goals. The
first goal is that of providing a reduction of the notion of trust to more basic
notions that can be known by an agent. This is necessary to explain how trust
is generated in different contexts. The second goal is that of explaining the
dynamics of trust, i.e. how trust evolves under different circumstances. To
each goal corresponds a different component of trust models. Specifically, it
is possible to identify a trust computing and a trust manipulation component.
The former serves the purpose of gathering relevant information and then use
it to compute initial trust values; the latter takes the initial trust values as
granted and manipulates them for specific purposes using different operators.
As said, SL possesses an effective trust manipulation component, but lacks
an effective trust computing component3. In the next following subsection, a
mapping between contextual trust models and opinions in SL is built. What
will become evident is that contextual trust models allow a modeller to specify
initial trust values for SL which can be based on any kind of information (as
long as it is expressible as a proposition in a logical language) both quantitative
and qualitative.
5.1.1 Pre-Trust Computations for SL
The aim of a pre-trust computation is to obtain the three distinct components
of SL opinions. Such components are, respectively, belief, disbelief, and un-
certainty (base rate values are assumed to be known, as it happens in SL). It
will now be shown that obtaining those three components is straightforward
starting from contextual trust models, once all the semantical components of
the models are explicitly given. The three opinion components are explicitly
specified as: “agent i believes in proposition p” (symbolically bi(p)) means that
agent i, the trustor, believes, to a given degree, in the truth of proposition p;
“agent i disbelieves in proposition p” (symbolically di(p)) means that agent i
disbelieves, to a given degree, in the truth of proposition p; finally, “agent i is
uncertain about proposition p” (symbolically ui(p)) means that agent i does
not possess any relevant information on whether to trust or not the proposition
3See [86] for an example of a computational trust model that has an effective trust com-
puting component, but a poor trust manipulation component. Other examples of computa-
tional trust models where the two components are easily identifiable are [101] and [135]. See
also [7, 22, 43, 101, 113, 94, 123] for surveys on computational trust models.
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p. Note that the three components are agent-specific, while in the trust logical
languages introduced in the previous chapter, there is no specific reference to
different agents. This issue is easily avoidable by constructing an appropriate
model for each agent (or by building a more powerful multi-agent language).
Note also that in the language, the quantity of information is given by the
cardinality of the set attributed by piextT to formulas. Specifically, the smaller
the cardinality (the fewer states are present in the set), the higher the amount
of information possessed (i.e., more propositions are taken into consideration).
Given those intuitions, it is possible to proceed with the computation of the
components.
The first step is that of the selection of a state s used as vantage point.
The N function is then checked for the state selected: this will specify what
the agent knows, i.e., the information the agent possesses. The set of states
compatible with the knowledge of the agent, i.e., the core ofN , is then selected.
At this point the only thing that is needed is to compute the τc,φ(s), such that
s ∈ (⋂N(s)). The three opinion components are then obtained by taking:
• for bi(p), the minimum among all the τc,φ(s) (recall that this is the
meaning of trust in C-MLT);
• for di(p), 1 minus the maximum among all the τc,φ(s);
• for ui(p), the difference between the maximum and the minimum.
Intuitively, the value bi(p) is obtained by looking at how much trust is
present in the worse possible state compatible with the knowledge of the agent.
The value di(p) is obtained by looking how much trust is lost in the best
possible state compatible with the knowledge of the agent. Finally, ui(p) is
obtained by looking at how much information can still be achieved.
Formally, the mapping works in the following way:
Definition 41. Given a contextual trust model MC = (S,C, pi,N, T , θ), a
state s ∈ S and a context c ∈ C. An opinion (bi(p), di(p), ui(p)) of Subjective
Logic, where the proposition p is evaluated at c and is expressible in C-MLT
as formula φ is obtained in the following way:
• bi(p) = min{τc,φ(t) | t ∈
⋂
N(s)}.
• di(p) = 1−max{τc,φ(t) | t ∈
⋂
N(s)}.
• ui(p) = max{τc,φ(t) | t ∈
⋂
N(s)} −min{τc,φ(t) | t ∈
⋂
N(s)}.
It is important to note that there is no actual way in C-MLT to represent
agency. Unfortunately, the language developed in this thesis is still single
agent and therefore the mapping from trust values in C-MLT and opinions in
SL is only partially defined. In fact, at this level of generality (i.e., before the
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language is expanded to cover multi-agent scenarios), one must build a specific
contextual trust model for each agent that has to be described. However, since
it is fairly reasonable to imagine a multi-agent extension of the language, this
issue can be solved without much troubles. Once a multi-agent version of the
language is provided, the mapping from trust values in C-MLT and opinions
in SL can be fully established.
The advantage of moving from C-MLT to SL is that, given its nature, in
C-MLT basic trust values can be computed starting from a wide variety of
information. The only limit is the expressivity of such information in proposi-
tional terms. Provided that, for human beings, most knowledge is represented
propositionally, it is clear that many typologies of information can be used in
the language to obtain trust values. This allows for a great amount of free-
dom in the modelling of trust computing algorithms. On the other side, once
the initial trust values are obtained, it is advisable to plot them in a trust
manipulation model which is efficient in transforming and combining those
trust values. Manipulating trust at the syntactical and/or semantical level in
the language might turn out to be troublesome, while manipulations in SL
are straightforward and easy to perform. This should explain why SL might
need C-MLT and, on the reverse, why C-MLT can benefit from being able to
translate its trust values into opinions in SL.
5.2 Dempster-Shafer Theory of Evidence
In this section, Dempster-Shafer Theory of Evidence [29, 116] (DSTE) will
be briefly introduced and then it will be shown how to move from contextual
trust models in C-MLT to Belief and Plausibility functions in DSTE. The
treatment of DSTE is based on the presentation of the theory given in [45],
where, however, most theorems are left as exercises. Those theorems will be
proved explicitly and new definitions useful for C-MLT will be introduced.
In particular, emphasis will be put on operations on the trust structures of
contextual trust models. Those operations, which help in drawing the parallel
with DSTE, can also allow reflections on possible properties to impose on trust
structures to obtain determinate trust concepts in C-MLT.
DSTE is a logical framework designed to interpret and model the likelihood
of events. The core idea of DSTE is to use two functions, namely a belief and
a plausibility function, to express how evidence influences the likelihood of
specific possible outcomes. The base on which DSTE works is a set of possible
worlds (those should be thought of as the state of the system introduced for C-
MLT, therefore, maximally consistent descriptions of possible ways the world
might be) W . Events are then indicated with subsets of W ; a set U ⊆ W
represents an event in the sense that in all worlds (states) included in U a give
event takes place. For example, the event of Mirko Tagliaferri being blonde,
identifies a subset U of W , specifically, the subset U s.t. ∀w ∈ U , Mirko
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Tagliaferri is blonde in w. Informally, given an event U , the two functions
Bel(U) and Plaus(U), represent, respectively, the amount of support someone
has in favor of the hypothesis that event U is true (i.e., the real world is in U)
and the amount of support someone has against the hypothesis that event U
is true (i.e., the real world is not in U).
Formally, Bel(U) is a function assigning numerical values to subsets of W ,
where the numbers that are assigned range over the set [0, 1] of real numbers,
i.e. Bel : ℘(W ) → [0, 1] ∈ R. The properties that the function Bel must
satisfy are the following:
1. Bel(∅) = 0;
2. Bel(W ) = 1;
3. Bel(⋃ni=1 Ui) ≥∑ni=1∑{I⊆{1,...,n}:|I|=i}(−1)i+1Bel(⋂j∈I Uj).
It can be said that belief functions provide a lower bound to the likelihood
of events.
On the other hand, Plaus(U) is just like Bel(U), in that it assigns numer-
ical values to subsets of W , i.e. Plaus : ℘(W ) → [0, 1] ∈ R. However, Plau
is defined often defined in terms of Bel. Therefore, to compute Plaus, the
following formula is employed:
Plaus(U) = 1−Bel(U¯)
Given this relation, the properties defining Plaus are:
1. Plaus(∅) = 0;
2. Plaus(W ) = 1;
3. Bel(⋂ni=1 Ui) ≥∑ni=1∑{I⊆{1,...,n}:|I|=i}(−1)i+1Plaus(⋃j∈I Uj).
It can be said that plausibility functions provide a upper bound to the
likelihood of events.
Other ways of seeing Bel and Plaus functions is to interpret them inside
a theory of evidence, where evidence provides different degrees of support
to different subsets of W . In this sense, a belief function is nothing more
than the sum of all those evidences supporting a specific subset of W . This
is expressed formally employing mass functions, where a mass function m is,
again, a function assigning numerical values to subsets ofW , i.e., m : ℘(W )→
[0, 1] ∈ R. The properties a mass function must satisfy are the following:
1. m(∅) = 0;
2. ∑U⊆W m(U) = 1.
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Mass functions play an important role in DSTE and they are even more
important for the purpose of this section, since they will be at the base of the
correspondence between DSTE and C-MLT. In particular, it will be shown that
specific classes of contextual trust models, based on precise trust structures,
can be interpreted as being mass functions in DSTE.
In DSTE, it is possible to prove (see [116]) that beliefs and plausibility
functions can be characterized in terms of mass functions and, moreover, that,
for any belief (plausibility) function, there is a unique mass function charac-
terizing it. To produce a belief function starting from a mass function, the
following formula is employed:
Belm(U) =
∑
[U ′:U ′⊆U ]
m(U ′) (5.1)
As it is possible to notice, a belief function over U is obtained by summing
up the probabilities of the evidence of sets which confirm U or more specific
instances which are contained in U . To produce a plausibility function starting
from a mass function, the following formula is employed:
Plausm(U) =
∑
U ′:U ′∩U 6=∅
m(U ′) (5.2)
Plausibility functions over U are obtained by summing up the probabilities
of the evidence of sets which are compatible with U .
With those definitions in hand, in DSTE there are different rules to manip-
ulate belief, plausibility and mass functions. Among them, the most important
is that of combination, which permits to combine different sets of evidence in
order to obtain a unified set which indicates how likely is the event consistent
with all the evidences obtained. No details will be given about the combi-
nation rule, but the reader should understand that part of the strength of
DSTE is contained in the way evidence is represented and the possibility of
combining it properly. This is what promoted DSTE at the top of the possible
theories for the representation of uncertainty and beliefs.
5.2.1 From Trust Values to Beliefs
The aim is that of generating a belief function (and, accordingly, a plausibility
function) starting from the resources of contextual trust models. By looking
at the structure of mass functions, it is easy to notice that they are extremely
similar in spirit to µ functions in contextual trust models and thus it is ad-
visable to work on those functions to obtain the correspondence. One issue
which prohibits to establish the correspondence directly is that µ functions
are subadditive to 1, where mass functions are additive to one. To solve this
problem, the definition of extensions of trust structures is required.
Definition 42. A trust structure T ′ = {〈ω′c′ , µ′c′,φ〉 | c′ ∈ C ′ and φ ∈ L} is
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said to be an extension of a trust structure T = {〈ωc, µc,φ〉 | c ∈ C and
φ ∈ L} if:
• c = c′;
• ωc(φ) ⊆ ω′c′(φ), ∀φ ∈ L;
• If X ∈ ωc(φ), then µc,φ(X) = µ′c′,φ(X).
An important aspects of extended trust structures is that they are mono-
tonic with respect to which trust formulas they allow to be satisfied. Therefore,
if a trust structure allows a trust formula T (φ) to be satisfied in a specific con-
textual trust model, then, all extensions of such trust structure, will allow
T (φ) to be satisfied in the same contextual trust model4.
Even though useful for other reasons (e.g., studying possible limitations,
based on extensions, to place on trust structures in order to obtain specific
conceptions of trust), the concept of extension alone is not sufficient to derive
mass functions. In order to obtain such derivation, a special class of trust
structures extensions are required. This class is now defined:
Definition 43. A trust structure T ′ = {〈ω′c′ , µ′c′,φ〉 | c′ ∈ C ′ and φ ∈ L} is
said to be an additive extension of a trust structure T = {〈ωc, µc,φ〉 | c ∈ C
and φ ∈ L} if:
• T ′ is an extension of T ;
• ∑X∈ωc(φ) µc,φ(X) = 1, ∀φ ∈ L.
Thus, an additive extension of a trust structure is simply an extension
for which the µ functions are additive to one. Note that, using the term
improperly, additive extensions of trust structures are fixed points under the
extension operation. This is because all extensions of an additive structure
can only differ in the elements contained in ωc(φ), which, however, will receive
a relevance weight of 0. This means that such extensions would not improve
the amount of trust formulas satisfiable in the contextual trust model. The
additive extensions of a trust structure are yet not sufficient to properly define
mass functions; one last step to make is to set the values of all other X ∈ ℘(S)
s.t. X /∈ ωc(φ) equal to 0. This is required because mass functions are defined
over the whole powerset of the initial set of possible states and therefore, the
same must hold for µc,φ if the goal is to construct a bridge between the two.
In particular, the µc,φ for which this further condition has been imposed will
be indicated with µmassc,φ
4It is said “allow to satisfy”, rather than simply “satisfy”, because a formula is satisfied
by a contextual pointed trust model and not by a trust structure per se. However, it is
evident that trust structures play an important role in the possibility of satisfying a formula.
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Theorem 14. Given a trust structure T = {〈ωc, µc,φ〉 | c ∈ C and φ ∈ L},
a proposition φ, and a context of evaluation c, the function µ′massc,φ is a mass
function in DSTE terms.
Proof (Proof of Theorem 14). By the consistency definition of ωc, the empty
set is never contained in any extension (additive or not) of a trust structure.
Therefore, by the definition of µ′massc,φ , such set will receive the value 0. This
proves the first condition on mass functions.
By the fact that µ′massc,φ derives from an additive extension of a trust struc-
ture, ∑X∈ωc(φ) µ′massc,φ (X) = 1, thus the second condition on mass functions is
proved.
By the fact that for µ′massc,φ both conditions of mass functions hold, it is
itself a mass function in DSTE terms.
Theorem 14 allows to build a bridge between C-MLT and DSTE, by pro-
ducing a mass function starting from trust structures. This can benefit DSTE
because it allows the theory to build very peculiar mass functions. Normally,
mass functions in DSTE take evidence as a general notion, one for which only
the relevance for certain fact is assessed. The mass functions that originate
from the procedure described above, on the other hand, describe a very spe-
cific typology of evidence, i.e., that of knowing that an agent trusts a given
proposition. µ′massc,φ specifies how different sets of states might be influenced
by the fact that T (φ) is satisfied in the model. Thus, those mass functions
should be seen as a reverse inference on relevance, once it is established what
is trusted. At that point, belief functions become ways of determining the
belief of an agent that the real state of the system is one of a set of possible
states. Given this reverse inference feature, this correspondence can also help
C-MLT to design special algorithms that can support, once implemented in a
digital environment, different kind of reasonings. Thus, the benefit is mutual.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
The aim of this thesis was that of building a formal language for trust, which
could help reasoning about computational versions of trust. The plan was to
construct such language taking into consideration both socio-economical and
computational analyses of trust. This was due to the fact that it is believed,
by the author, that a good conceptual comprehension of what trust might be is
essential to a correct formalisation of the concept. Above this, understanding
which phenomena might have contributed to the origins of trust might also
provide benefits to new communities which hope to generate trusting attitudes
in their specific environment. This is the case for computer science. The
massive transition from face-to-face interactions to web-based interactions,
created the need for new computational social attitudes which could mimic
their biologically-dependent counterparts.
For all those reasons, after a brief introduction, in chapter 2, a proposal
on the possible origins of trust was made, assessing it with respect to some
experimental results and determining its plausibility from both a practical and
a theoretical point-of-view. Trust was then analysed from a socio-economical
perspective, in order to select the features that are considered fundamental by
the respective communities. This helped in defining an initial set of charac-
teristics of trust and to generate an initial working definition for it.
Given the scope of thesis, the next logical step was that of analysing the
literature on computational trust, highlighting differences and similarities be-
tween the treatment trust receives in sociology/economy and the one it receives
in computer science. In chapter 3 computational trust models where studied.
A taxonomy useful in categorizing them was built and conceptions of trust of
classical computational trust models were extracted and fused together to ob-
tain a fundamental core for computational trust. The analysis embraced also
some important theoretical frameworks, which helped in determining proce-
dures of selection for assumptions to be made in digital environment in order
to allow computational trust to be present. All this work made it possible
to understand how computer scientists attempted to replicate trust in digital
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communities and gave interesting insights on some core features every formal
definition of trust ought to possess to qualify as computational. Those insights
constituted the base on which the logical language was built.
In chapter 4, the actual logical language for trust was built. After an
introduction to modal logic, with emphasis on neighbourhood semantics, two
versions of the language were proposed. One in which contexts were missing
and the other where they were included. Decision procedure results were
presented, thus showing characteristics which make the language appealing to
computer scientists interested in practical implementations. The semantical
structure used to interpret the language was thoroughly explored, highlighting
all the philosophical reasons which produced the choices made.
Finally, in chapter 5, other theoretical frameworks employed to model trust
in computer science and to reason about uncertainty were introduced. This
allowed for the possibility of exploring formal frameworks which are already
well-established and therefore, represent excellent examples of success of for-
malisation. After being introduced, pros and cons of those frameworks were
explicitly shown. Correspondence theorems between the semantical structure
for the language of chapter 4 and the formal frameworks were proven and it
was discussed how such semantical structure can help to improve those frame-
works. This showed that, even if still underdeveloped and novel in spirit,
the logical language introduced in this thesis already possesses some interest-
ing features, which can be employed, from the get-go, to implement a formal
concept of trust and to understand the phenomenon of trusting better.
Along all the chapters, all the aims set forth in the introduction have been
achieved.
6.1 Future Works
All the results presented in this thesis could be greatly improved. Among
those, some interesting topics to explore are:
With respect to chapter 2.
1. Constructing some psychological experiment explicitly designed to test
the proposal brought forwards about the origins of trust. Such exper-
iments would revolve around reciprocal altruism and cheating, testing
whether the total absence of cheating might induce trust to disappear.
2. Improve on the cross-disciplinary examination of trust. Currently, many
research on trust is discipline-specific and most communities tend to
ignore results obtained by the others. Few exception made [40, 110, 111],
no multidisciplinary approach has been attempted with good success.
This fact is unfortunate, because it is widely recognized that trust is
a multi-faceted concept and therefore, it seem a prerequisite that any
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good attempt at understanding trust, must involve an interdisciplinary
analysis rather than an intradisciplinary one.
With respect to chapter 3.
1. Refine the proposed taxonomy, in order to include more aspects of trust
models and thus, allowing a better categorization for them.
2. Create a repository of computational trust models, sorted according to
their features. This would greatly improve the ability of computer sci-
entists to navigate among all the possible implementations of computa-
tional trust. Moreover, having all the models sorted according to the
features highlighted by the taxonomy, searching for a model suitable for
highly specific purposes would be easy and fast.
3. Further refine the description of computational trust paradigms and pro-
vide an omnicomprehensive analysis of all the existing ones. This would
enhance all future research on computational trust, allowing new re-
searchers to identify the paradigm (and therefore the core assumptions)
perfectly suited for the concept of trust they are trying to model.
With respect to chapter 4
1. Provide a proper axiomatic system for the language, identifying rules of
inference for various notions of trust and see what has to be done at the
semantical level to capture those slightly different notions of it. In the
thesis, a possible mechanism to impose limitations on the trust struc-
tures has been introduced, however, no real results have been achieved
employing it.
2. Provide the algebraic counterpart of the semantical structure. It is al-
ready known that the part relating to neighbourhood semantics is cor-
respondent to coalgebraic structures, however, given the novelty of the
trust structure part, no algebraic considerations have ever been made on
those.
3. A better analysis of the complexity results for the decidability prob-
lems for the language. All decision procedures have been proven, but
no real algorithms have been proposed for effectively carrying out such
decision procedures. Therefore, lacking those algorithms, no clear com-
plexity classes for those problems have been identified. Understanding
how complex those procedures are can help understand how good is the
design for the language.
4. Multi-agent and dynamic versions of the language should be designed
and then thoroughly studied. In particular, multi-agent versions of
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the language would allow to discuss notions such as distributed knowl-
edge [46, 55, 57] and common knowledge [46, 76, 79, 88] and thus improv-
ing the expressivity of the language. Moreover, it would allow also to
discuss group related notions of trust, such as social trust. On the other
side, dynamic versions of the language, would allow to discuss the ef-
fects of public and private announcements and the impact those have on
trust. For example, a public announcement might influence the knowl-
edge of an agent at the point of making less states compatible with what
he knows and, thus, this would influence how much he trusts a given
proposition.
With respect to chapter 5
1. Explore other theoretical formalisms to reason about trust and/or un-
certainty and then compare their formal structure with the semantical
structure of the language here proposed. In particular, it would be nice
to analyse the relationship between contextual trust models and proba-
bility theory. Another interesting issue to analyse is the relation between
trust structures and algebras in measure theory.
Chapter 7
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